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A BSTR A C T

This thesis explored Concurrent Engineering, one recent approach to product innovation
(Parsaei and Sullivan, 1993; Syan and Menon, 1994), which seeks to achieve a balance
between organisational, technological and human factors in new product development
(Prasad, 1996) in order to gain efficiencies of time and cost, and improve product quality.
As a contribution to the literature on implementation processes, the thesis presents the
findings from a longitudinal case study o f a project, which sought to introduce CE into an
Australian manufacturer of military electronics systems. It also examines the implications of
introducing CE for the overall organisation. Particular attention is given to HRM aspects
and the role of human resource management (HRM) in the implementation of CE. It is
argued that HRM is a key consideration for the successful introduction of CE. Almost all
aspects of managing the product development process under a CE approach are linked to
people management. Yet, surprisingly, HRM often receives little attention in implementing
CE. A possible explanation was found in the play o f organisational power and politics
around the project. Drawing on the case study findings, the thesis demonstrates that CE,
despite the technical connotations of the term, is a complex organisational issue in the sense
that its successful implementation requires appropriate organisational culture, skills,
structures, and interpersonal relations. So, when companies consider the introduction of CE
the human side of the organisation should be included in the focus from the beginning.
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PART ONE

1

IN TR O D U C TIO N

1.1

RESEARCH PROBLEM

As markets become increasingly globalised manufacturing companies have to compete not
only in terms of quality and cost, but increasingly in terms of time-to-market and
innovativeness of their products (Clark and Wheelwright, 1995). Effective product
innovation processes have therefore become the focus of considerable interest. Many
different approaches, practices and tools have been adopted to address this problem
(Rosenau, Griffin, Castellion and Anschuetz, 1996; Syan and Menon, 1994). Some focus on
individual project performance improvements and others on performance improvements
across a portfolio of projects.
Concurrent Engineering is one recent approach to effective product innovation. In contrast
to other approaches, which often focus on a particular aspect of product innovation (Brown
and Eisenhardt, 1995; McDonough and Griffin, 1997), CE seeks to achieve a balance
between organisational, technological and human factors in the new product development
process. The CE concept emerged in the USA in 1980s, but it is based on perspectives
within the disciplines of engineering and management that can be traced back to the early20th century (Gerwin and Susman, 1996; Smith, 1997). Its philosophy represents a
systematic approach to the organisation and management of the integrated and concurrent
design of products and their related manufacturing processes (Winner, Pennell, Bertrand,
and Slusarczuk, 1988). CE aims to overcome disintegration in the product development
process by realising cross-functional integration (i.e. high level co-ordination, co-operation,
communication), integration of design (i.e. product life cycle issues considered up-front),
and a high level concurrence between project tasks (overlaps, parallel activities) (Haddad,
1996b; Clausing, 1994).
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Numerous CE surveys, which provide a snapshot in time, convey the picture that CE is
widely adopted by companies in many industrialised countries. But to date the CE literature
is predominantly anecdotal. Empirical research on CE did not appear until the late 1980s.
Even then it rarely dealt with processual aspects of CE, and only few detailed studies of CE
implementation processes exist (see e.g. Lettice, 1995; Thamhain, 1994; Poolton, 1994;
Smart, Lettice, and Evans, 1995). The requirements of successful CE implementation are
largely glossed over in the CE literature. Up to now the problematic processual and complex
nature of CE implementation remains poorly understood and CE an ambiguous and vague
concept with interpretative flexibility (Abrahamson, 1996). Furthermore, only few studies
are available of the appropriateness of CE for different industries, organisations and product
types. Attention has been mainly paid to industries like automotive, aircraft or electronics
characterised by complex products and customers in markets.
While there has been an emphasis in the CE literature on technology, it has increasingly
been recognised that the organisational dimension is decisive for the successful
implementation of CE. However, despite the growing emphasis on organisational factors
(DeLorge, 1992) and the realisation of the importance of Human Resource Management in
the CE literature (particularly for achieving cross-functional integration), no longitudinal
studies have addressed the implementation of CE from a non-technical viewpoint or
analysed the role of Human Resource Management in this process. Despite scattered notions
of HRM aspects, the CE literature - and indeed the product innovation literature generally remains shallow with regard to the role of HRM. Where there have been explanations of the
role of HRM in CE and product innovation, these have been essentially universalistic and
prescriptive (Atuahene-Gima, 1996).
The implementation of CE varies across companies. It is process and product dependent, as
well as contingent on an organisation's strategy and structure. In turn, these factors lead to
variations in the organisational arrangements for CE. A company can use a variety of cross
functional arrangements, including inter-departmental committees, integrating departments.
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or liaison roles for achieving effective integration. The cross-functional team, however, is
widely considered central to CE (Trygg, 1993). It is the most common structural feature in
reports of successful CE practice (Moffat and Gerwin. 1994).

While the CE literature

mostly refers to the cross-functional team in very generic terms, such teams can vaiy widely
along a number of dimensions, including size, temporality, location, scope, leadership,
degree of involvement, and level of governance. In addition to structural differences, cross
functional teams van' according to a process dimension. This dimension refers both to the
size and nature of the task upon which they are engaged and to the capacity they have for
solving problems, making decisions and resolving conflicts. Variations in cross-functional
arrangements including variations in cross-functional teams are likely to require different
HRM alignments and differing HRM practices ranging from the selection of appropriate
cross-functional arrangements to the selection of appropriate tools and techniques. Aspects
of leadership, team sponsorship, team member selection, performance measurement and
rewards, as well as career management and team member development, also have to be
considered. Yet, surprisingly the CE literature has largely neglected the HRM issue
(Schubert and Couchman, 1998).
A broad range of literature, managerial as well as organisational, has emphasised the
increasing significance of Human Resource Management in today's organisations (Storey,
1995: Clark, 1993). These views are broadly based on the recognition of "people as the most
valuable resource" in an organisation. In man}- cases, however, this recognition is not
consonant with the organisational reality, despite the rhetoric of company vision and
mission statements. There are also two major knowledge gaps in this area. The HRM
literature has focused on man} aspects of cross-functional integration such as team-building,
leadership, and performance appraisal for teams (Campion and Higgs, 1995; MacDuffie,
1995; Clark, 1993; Howes, 1997, Belcher, 1991). However, these HR issues are "treated
broadly in isolation from other HRM activities: no account is made o f the need fo r
functional integration - where HRM program areas need to be treated and linked as a
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systematically related whole" (Zanko, Couchman, Badham, Schubert and Zainuddin, 1998,
p. 132). Despite the need for internally consistent, mutually supportive HRM, a holistic
strategic approach to organisational integration has not yet been developed (Clark and
Mallory, 1996). Secondly, although the interdependence of various HR elements (such as
training, job design, selection, recruitment, rewards, performance) has been recognised
(Youndt, Snell, Dean and Lepak, 1996; Klein and Maurer, 1995), this recognition has rarely
been applied to CE (Haddad, 1996b).
Derived from the above gaps it appears that HRM is a hidden agenda in CE. CE, despite the
technical connotations of the term, is an organisational issue in the sense that its successful
implementation requires

appropriate

organisational

culture,

skills,

structures,

and

interpersonal relations. Based on the discovered shortcomings and theoretical and empirical
knowledge gaps in previous research, the initial research question was defined as: "What
role does Human Resource Management play in implementation o f C E ? At a later stage,
after the preliminary case study1 brought about the need to differentiate HRM (HRM was
commonly equated with the HR Department and its work), the research question was refined
into: "What role does Human Resource Management as a generic organisation-wide activity
and a specialist function play in implementing CE?".
As a contribution to the research literature on CE implementation processes, this thesis
presents the findings from a longitudinal case study (18 months, from February 1996 to July
1997) of a project that sought to introduce CE into an Australian plant developing and
producing military electronics systems. In a rapidly changing industry (with less funding
available, higher levels of competition for projects, and a more demanding approach to
procurement projects by the customer), not only the case study company but all companies
in this industry sector are increasingly required to compete in terms of quality and cost, as
well as time to the market and innovativeness of their products. Their traditional approach to

1 Details o f the preliminary case study are provided in chapter two and the appendix.
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product development is often no longer tenable (Defence Industry and Logistics Program of
the ADFA, 1997).
An opportunity to restructure project procedures in the case study company arose under an
efficiency-improvement program initiated by the company's multi-national parent. As part of
the analysis conducted by consultants under this program, it was suggested that CE offered
considerable promise for the company. The company's senior management accepted this,
and a CE implementation project was initiated.
The case study examined the implications of introducing CE for the overall organisation and
explored the role of HRM as a specialist function and organisation-wide activity in this
process. It did not look at a product development project, which applied a CE approach, but
specifically investigated the introduction process of CE.
One of the first steps in this process was the appointment of a CE Project Team. This team
commenced work by analysing the problems in the company's design and development
procedures. After a year of activity and extensive consultation within the company, the CE
Project Team proposed a "solution set". This was based on CE principles, but was
customised to address the specific problems identified within the company.

It clearly

reflected a more technical bias. Although effective communication and co-operation among
project personnel were recognised as important factors in achieving integration and
concurrence, there was a major emphasis on procedures, systems and tools. Some attention
was given to the design of project teams, addressing issues such as team formation, training
for team building, the definition of clear team goals, and a team charter. A formalised team
structure was also proposed. But the roles, responsibilities and authority of the individual
teams and of team members were insufficiently defined. Other than the project team
structure, organisational and HRM issues remained basically untouched. The necessary
changes to implement the Implementation Team's version of CE were not specified in detail
and concentrated mostly on technical modifications. Organisational implications of the shift
from a functional to a more project-oriented matrix structure were not addressed.
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Furthermore, the company's CEO claimed that HRM was o f the highest importance.
However, a specialist HRM function did not exist within the company. Rather, there was a
more traditional Personnel Manager, basically concerned with administrative tasks and not
with more strategic issues. Neither did the company have a consistent HRM strategy. A
stated company orientation towards teamwork was not reflected in its HRM policies and
practices. Given the nature of HRM policy and practices in the company, it was perhaps not
surprising that only limited support was given to the CE Implementation Team from the
personnel department. Neither was the personnel department involved in the initiation and
management of organisational change. This role resided mainly with the company's
executive and line managers. Furthermore, the case study revealed that only certain HR
issues were discussed, both within the overall organisational change process as well as
within the CE implementation project. Thus, it became necessary during the case study to
analyse (a) why HRM issues in general received only minor attention, and (b) what
prevented HRM issues from being sufficiently considered in the development of a CE-based
solution set. Other questions were also raised: why did a HRM specialist function not exist
in the company, although HRM was claimed to be of major importance; and why were HRM
specialists not involved with the management of change?
It is now widely acknowledged that organisational change is an essentially political process,
involving conflict struggles, negotiation, bargaining, compromise, and the "play o f power"
(Buchanan and Boddy, 1992). The introduction of CE, which necessitates substantial
organisational change, is no exception. Successfully implementing CE involves developing
high levels of collaboration across departmental and disciplinary boundaries, usually via the
medium of the cross-functional project team. Accompanying this formation of more
autonomous project-focused units within the organisation, is a devolution of authority and
accountability (e.g. over budgets, schedules, the management of risk, and resources) from
functional managers to the project teams. But such change will inevitably involve power
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struggles, between different groups and individuals (some of whom will be seen as "losers"
and others as "winners” from change).
In the case study company many power struggles were detectable. The exercise of power
and political lobbying had a significant influence on the course and outcome of the change
process in general and of the CE implementation project in particular. Indeed, the playing
out of organisational politics provided a possible explanation for the way the company dealt
with HRM and CE. From its inception, the CE Project was seen by senior management to be
of secondary importance. This perception was reflected in the selection of the project team
leader and of the team members. Though resources in the form of people's time were
provided to develop a CE concept suitable for the company and to conduct intensive training
throughout the organisation, senior management gave little active support to the more farreaching changes that were proposed. In addition, functional managers most often acted to
protect their territories, and some were rather resistant to any change in the product
development process. In this environment, and in the absence of any dedicated HRM
specialists within the company, there was no recognition among managers that a strategic
HRM approach could significantly contribute to the success of CE and organisational
change. This was especially the case for the CE Project Team leader, who saw HRM issues
as outside the purview of his project and so did not attempt to develop a strategic HRM
approach as part of the CE concept.
The case study did not bring about the expected finding in as much as it revealed very little
consideration of HRM issues during the attempt to introduce CE. That initiative had so far
proved to be of only limited success. Little had substantively changed within the company,
and although there had been some improvements, most development projects were still set
up and managed following a more traditional approach by the end of the investigation. There
was an interesting irony here. It is the author's view that competitive success in the defence
electronics industry will increasingly depend on the adoption of effective product
development practices based on CE principles, and that to successfully implement these

8

practices requires a major shift in the approach to HRM policy. But until senior management
in the case study company takes this view on board, and is prepared to act on it, the
company is unlikely to achieve high levels o f cross-functional integration and thus, the
competitive advantage it needs to survive and prosper.

1.2

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Arising out of the above discussed knowledge gaps in CE research and practice, this thesis
has taken up a number of challenges.
The first objective was to identify and understand the issues manufacturing companies face
by attempting to improve their product development performance. Increasing globalisation
and global competition lead not only to the need to systematically and rapidly use new
technologies, but also to reorganise the conventional approach to product development, in
order to remain competitive. Competitiveness is required in terms of quality and cost, but
increasingly in terms of time-to-the market and innovativeness of products. The traditional
product development process (with features such as a linear sequential process with few
overlapping activities, organisational compartmentalisation, an inadequate integrative
mechanism to co-ordinate the overall effort, and a lack o f consideration of downstream
issues upfront) becomes a barrier for product development success.
The second objective was to develop a conceptual framework that illustrates both the
primary importance of the organisational enablers (Haddad, 1996a, b) and the key elements
of complexity manufacturing companies face in implementing CE. A main argument put
forward in this thesis was that there is no "one best way" in implementing CE (Poolton and
Barclay, 1996; Schubert and Couchman, 1998). Internal factors (such as a company's
product and process, its strategy and structure) and external environmental factors (e.g. the
market a company operates in) shape CE implementations. These differences will lead to
different cross-functional arrangements (including different types of cross-functional teams)
for different types of projects.
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A third objective was to analyse the CE implementation process in the context of an
Australian manufacturer with a market approach different to that commonly found in the CE
research literature. So far attention has been paid mainly to industries such as automobile,
aircraft or electronics which develop complex products and sell them to customers in
markets. The case presented here, by contrast, focused on the development of complex
products, but which are developed under contract for a single customer. With this, the author
aimed to show the applicability of CE in this particular industrial setting.
The fourth research objective was to explore the role of HRM as a specialist function and as
an organisation-wide activity in the implementation of CE. The author wanted to explore
firstly, what efforts, services and intentions towards the management of its employees,
expressed through its HRM strategies, policies and practices were undertaken by the
company in the context of implementing CE. And secondly, how HRM as a specialist
function was involved in the initiation and management of CE and in the initiation,
elaboration and establishment of appropriate HRM policies and practices that support CE.

1.3

RESEARCH STRATEGY

Before the author engaged in the actual case study presented in this thesis, she carried out a
preliminary case study about CE in order to identify and understand the issues
manufacturing companies may encounter or be confronted with in dealing with CE. The
preliminary case study was conducted at a different plant and company than the one chosen
for the main case study, as outlined in chapter two. The insights gained from the preliminary
case study contributed to the operationalisation of CE and the refinement of the initial
conceptual framework as introduced in chapter three. The model guided and informed the
remainder of the study and was in turn tested and further elaborated by the research. The
research strategy and process are described in chapter two.
Equipped with such a framework the author approached the fourth research objective,
exploring the role of HRM in implementing CE, by participating in a sustained company
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attempt to define and implement CE. Organisational change, like the implementation of CE,
is a processual and contextual process (Pettigrew, 1973, 1988; Dawson, 1996). It requires
the consideration of past, present and future conditions as well as the internal and external
context in which an organisation functions. Therefore, a decision was made to undertake a
longitudinal and processual case study. Ordinary case studies, which only provide a
snapshot in time, are often superficial and exhibit little contextual investigation. In contrast,
the longitudinal and processual approach made it possible to gain in-depth information
about: the substance of the change itself; the significance attributed to HRM in the transition
process; the involvement of HRM with CE; as well as the interaction between various
factors within this process (Dawson, 1996). It made it possible to investigate the change
process as it unfolded over time within its contextual framework and to use multiple sources
of data. Data was collected within a single firm over an 18-month period through participant
observation and interviews. The primary data was complemented with a range of secondary
sources, including company memoranda, procedure manuals, and minutes of meetings.
In parallel, and based on the selection of the case study company, the study provided the
opportunity to investigate CE in the Australian context. MILSYS, as the case study company
is called in the thesis, was an Australian producer of defence electronics2. This enabled the
author to analyse the applicability of CE for a company with a particular market approach,
the development of complex products developed under contract for a single customer.
The investigation started with the analysis of MILSYS' traditional product development
process. In parallel the author analysed the company's approach to HRM generally and in
relation to product development. She also examined other internal and external contextual
conditions, particularly developments within the industry sector the company operated in
and Australia's Defence policy. In comparison to the investigation of the actual CE Project,

2 In order to rigorously ensure the confidentiality requirements set by the company and to ensure that
the name o f the company can not be inferred from the analysis, the author anonymised the name o f
the company and all relevant data sources.
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the analysis of the context occupied almost as much time, and is given a similar amount of
space as the process itself. This highlights the high dependency of the CE implementation
process on its contextual conditions and the enormous complexity of such an organisational
change process, as proposed in chapter three and four.
Some of the key results of the investigation, as mentioned earlier, showed there was little
appreciation among MILSYS' managers of HRM's potential contribution to the success of
organisational change and CE. These findings raised a number of questions about the nature
of CE as a concept and its potential application, the disparity of management rhetoric and
management practice and the problematic nature of socio-technical changes (Badham,
Couchman and McLoughlin, 1997). In the next step it became thus necessary to analyse why
HRM issues received only minor attention within the CE Project. Attention was then given
to play o f organisational power and politics as a possible explanation for these findings.
Drawing on the conceptual framework the study shows that a significant organisation-wide
change like CE is neither a unidirectional nor a rational undertaking. On the contrary, it is a
messy, complex, and multi-layered process. It is strongly shaped by its organisational
context and actors, in other words by its inherent play of organisational power and politics.
How the thesis is structured in detail is described in the following section.

1.4

THESIS STRUCTURE

An important aspect in implementing CE is the creation and establishment of organisational
and cultural conditions most appropriate for cross-functional integration, and their reflection
in HRM policies and practices. With this in mind the present work seeks to illustrate the
complexity of the CE implementation effort and the role HRM plays in such an undertaking
using the example of an Australian company with a particular market approach.
The first part of this thesis comprises the methodological and theoretical considerations on
which the longitudinal processual case study - discussed in Part Two - is based.
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Chapter one introduces the reader to the research problem o f this thesis, the four main
research objectives and research strategy, and lays out the structure of this thesis.
Chapter two describes the selected research strategy, the "double-loop research process ". It
introduces the preliminary case study as the key element of the first loop and the main case
study as the key component of the second loop. It explains why a longitudinal processual
approach was chosen for the main case study and justifies the decision on theoretical,
practical and methodological grounds. The chapter also explains the applied research
methods. It outlines the selection process of the case study company, the methods used for
data collection and analysis and shows how the quality of the study was ensured.
In chapter three, Concurrent Engineering is introduced as one particular approach to
improve the product development process. The chapter introduces the first part of the
theoretical framework (the CE implementation framework) of this thesis that was derived
from the findings from the literature analysis, and guided the further investigation. An
overview is then provided of different research perspectives on CE. The chapter also
discusses the suitability of CE for different industries, product types and manufacturing
systems as well as its dependence on a company's size and market approach. The conditions
for cross-functional integration are then discussed, and the cross-functional team introduced
as widely seen success factor for CE. It is shown that cross-functional teams can vary widely
along a structural and a process dimension. In the last part of this chapter the requirements
for successful CE implementation are summarised, whereas emphasis is given to the
organisational enablers rather than the technical enablers.
The fourth chapter turns attention to HRM in CE. It introduces two main views on HRM: 1)
HRM as synonym for personnel management, and 2) HRM as a broadened approach to
personnel management. The latter was adopted for the analysis of HRM in this thesis, as
reflected in the second part of the theoretical framework introduced at the beginning of
chapter four. After a brief examination of critical developments in the HRM field, HRM's
influence on organisational performance is discussed. The chapter then links HRM with CE
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and discusses various levers of HRM that are considered of critical importance to CE. Based
on a review of a broad range of research literature, the author identified (and discusses) a
number of key areas where HRM policies and practices could support and facilitate CE and
for which CE may have significant implications respectively. These key areas are
performance measurement and reward, training and development, selection and staffing, job
design, career management, and employee relations. The final part of this chapter links the
earlier introduced two parts of the theoretical framework. It shows that the combined
framework not only reflects the complexity of CE implementation but also the assumed role
of HRM in CE.
Chapters five to nine present the results of the main case study and form the second part of
this thesis. Chapter five and six introduce the context within which the CE Project was
embedded, with chapter six concentrating on HRM.
In chapter five, the reader is introduced to the environmental and organisational conditions
faced by the CE Project. The chapter begins with a summary of MILSYS' history outlining
the main events in MILSYS' development up to the time of the initiation of an organisation
wide change program in 1994. Then, with the examination of the recent changes in
Australia's Defence strategy and policy, a link is drawn to the initiation of the change
program in MILSYS. The change program is interpreted as a response to the new conditions
faced by organisations in the Defence industry, more precisely the defence electronics
industry. The competitive success of organisations in this industry sector will increasingly
depend on the adoption of effective product development practices based on CE principles.
To undermine this assumption, the chapter also provides an analysis of the limitations of the
company’s organisational structure and its traditional linear-sequential development process.
Chapter six provides more details about MILSYS' approach to HRM. HRM is analysed as
specialist function and also as an organisation-wide activity. The chapter shows that the
restriction of the Human Resource Department to administrative and welfare services
hindered its involvement with the organisational and cultural change process in MILSYS
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and thus its involvement with CE. In addition, the chapter examines functional, project and
business administration management and its responsibility for HRM and discusses the
changes that evolved in this regard over the course of the organisational change program.
Chapter seven analyses the actual CE Project. It introduces the CE Project Team and the aim
and course of the CE Project, commencing with the nomination of the CE Project Team, and
the team's study of available literature on CE. It examines the work of the CE Project Team
and the achieved outcomes such as the proposal of a "solution set" after more than a year's
work. With the presentation of the concept, chapter seven discusses how the team was able
to apply general CE principles, and at the same time customise the CE concept to address
specific problems identified within MTLSYS. It is shown that the proposed solution reflected
a more technical bias. Despite the recognition of effective communication and co-operation
as important factors in achieving integration and concurrence, it placed major emphasis on
procedures, systems and tools. Apart from the project team structure, organisational and
HRM issues were basically untouched. The chapter concludes that despite the numerous
training sessions and seminars, the CE initiative so far proved to be of limited success, as
little substantive changes were introduced. By the end of the case study period most
development projects were still set up and managed following a more traditional approach.
One reason the implementation of CE within MILSYS was of limited success is discussed in
chapter eight. It is shown that CE is an essentially political process, involving conflict,
struggles, negotiation, bargaining, compromise, and the "play o f power" (Buchanan and
Boddy, 1992). The chapter shows that the CE implementation process was shaped by the
actions and interactions of a whole "cast o f characters" (Hutton, 1994), i.e. different groups
and individuals within the company. Three of the groups (the CE Project Team and the
groups of functional and project manages) and three individual key players (the Technical
Managing Director, the OCC Project Leader, and the CE Project Leader) are investigated in
detail with regard to their influence on CE. The chapter concludes that the exercise of
organisational power and political lobbying indeed influenced the course and outcome of the
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CE Project. It also influenced the role HRM played in this process and - in the case of
MILSYS - prevented more far-reaching change.
Chapter nine, finally, summarises the case study results. It concludes that the presented case
may be interpreted as negative in as much as it revealed little consideration o f HRM issues
during the attempt to introduce CE and because the prospects for the full implementation of
CE and the adoption of a strategic HRM approach seemed limited in the foreseeable future.
Within this context the chapter points to an interesting irony of the case, namely that in
order to remain competitive, defence electronics companies are becoming increasingly
dependent on the adoption of effective product development practices based on CE
principles. However, these practices will not be successful unless a major shift to the
companies' approach to HRM is realised. The chapter then summarises the thesis
contribution to theory and practice. At last, the chapter points out several critical questions
that remain unanswered, but for which the presented thesis provides a reference point for
further research in this area.
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2

M ETH O D O LO G Y

The aim of this chapter is to describe and justify the chosen research design and
methodology. First, the research strategy, the double-loop research process, is outlined,
followed by a discussion of the processual case study approach as the most appropriate way
to answer the research question. The chapter continues with a description of the research
methods starting with the selection process for the appropriate case, followed by an outline
of the data collection techniques and the data analysis process.

2.1

THE DOUBLE-LOOP RESEARCH PROCESS

The research approach can be best described as a double-loop research process, as shown in
Figure 1. It encompassed the development, test and refinement of a conceptual framework. It
also involved the development of interpretations through a "continuous interplay between
academic pre-conceptualisation (based on a comprehensive knowledge o f the area under
study) and detailed empirical descriptions o f emerging themes and topic" (Dawson, 1997, p.
390).
The starting point was the author's interest in product development and HRM, as well as her
knowledge and experience in the latter field3. An initial literature review complemented her
knowledge and experience and led to the identification of the research problem: the
insufficient exploration of HRM in Concurrent Engineering implementations. The
discovered shortcomings and theoretical and empirical knowledge gaps in previous research
led to the definition of the research question: What role does HRM play in the implemen

3 Prior to this study, the researcher was involved in elaborating and managing a comprehensive team
work implementation project (2 years). This implementation o f teamwork at the shopfloor level in a
large German multinational in the metalworking industry involved, for example, the design o f a
comprehensive qualification program and a close co-operation with the workers council of the
company. She was also responsible for elaborating a new personnel information system comprising
o f personnel statistics, personnel planning and personnel development data, and was involved in the
design and application o f a flexible annual working time concept and a new company-wide wage
arrangement
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tation of CE? Based on a detailed literature review the author developed a conceptual
framework, introduced in chapter three and four. It reflects the primary importance of the
organisational dimension in the implementation of CE (Haddad, 1996b). The literature
analysis was used to identity key aspects of CE and organisational issues relating to the
successful implementation of CE.
Parallel to theory building the author decided on the methodological approach. The nature of
the research question determined the design of the research process and the decision for a
processual case study approach. As discussed later, this approach made it possible to
investigate the change process as it unfolded over time within its contextual framework. It
enabled the researcher to deal with the dynamic and complexity of change and generate
"sound knowledge not only o f processes and outcome but also o f why and how outcomes are
differentially shaped by processes" (Pettigrew7, 1997, p. 342).
The next step was a preliminary case study, as described later, in order to further develop
the theoretical framework. With the help of the preliminary case study the author aimed to
identify and understand the issues manufacturing companies may encounter or be confronted
with in dealing with CE. A further literature review and continuous discussions of evolving
ideas with other researchers and supervisors accompanied the study. All those activities, but
especially the insights gained from the preliminary case study, contributed to a better
understanding of CE. They confirmed that despite the increasing recognition of the
organisational dimension for the successful implementation of CE, HRM in this context had
received little attention. The terms HR function and HR Management were often used
synonymously by company members. Based on their narrow definition, they did not think
about HRM as playing a role in the investigated product development projects. In order to
better explore the role of HRM in CE it thus became necessary to distinguish between HRM
as a specialist function and HRM as generic organisation-wide activity. The initial research
question was changed to: "What role does Human Resource Management as a generic
organisation-wide activity and a specialist function play in implementing CE?". With an
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accordingly refined research question and conceptual framework the second stage of the
research process was entered.
The second loop represents the main investigation, which was based on a single longitudinal
processual case study of a sustained company attempt to define and implement CE. The
researcher decided to conduct such a case study for theoretical, methodological as well
practical reasons (Barley, 1990; Pettigrew, 1990; Van de Ven and Huber, 1990). The first
(and theoretical) reason was that the relationship between CE and HRM was poorly
explored in the research literature and that the question why CE is difficult to put into
practice was largely left open in CE research. Both aspects will be dealt with in the
conceptual framework. Practical reasons were the limited time, resources and funding
available for the study, as well as the problematic issue of gaining access to organisation(s).
The aim was to gather not only a time series of snapshots (Pettigrew, 1990), but rich
contextual data over time in order to grasp the dynamics of the CE change process. In order
to achieve this, a longitudinal processual case study seemed to be most appropriate. A
continuous investigation over a period of at least 12 months was seen as a minimum
requirement for such an analysis by the researcher. With this requirement and a fieldwork
phase of about 6 months in the preliminary case study, it was considered unrealistic to focus
on more than one in-depth processual case study in the framework of a Ph.D.
The main investigation consisted of comprehensive data collection and analysis. The results
of the case study are discussed in Part Two of this thesis. As illustrated in the double-loop
research design, an ongoing literature review and discussions with colleagues again
complemented the empirical investigation. The case study revealed that HRM did not play a
major role in the implementation of CE. Only certain HR issues were discussed, both within
the overall organisational change process as well as within the CE implementation project.
The HR Department was not a HRM specialist function, apart from minor administrative
support, it was not involved in initiating or implementing CE.
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Figure 1:

The Double-Loop Research Design

Therefore, a number of further research questions arose that needed to be addressed in the
analysis: Why was HRM not dealt with systematically in designing and implementing CE?
Why were substantial HRM issues neglected or received only minor attention? What
prevented HRM issues from being sufficiently considered in this process? These questions
are dealt with in chapter nine. The findings derived from the data analysis yielded a better
understanding of the empirical phenomenon and enabled the author to refine the CE
concept.
After laying out the double-loop research design, the followring section briefly introduces the
preliminary case study, which was an important element in the research process.
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2.2

THE PRELIMINARY CASE STUDY

The preliminary case study was undertaken in order to test the conceptual framework, refine
the research question and to determine the selection criteria for the case in the main
investigation. For the preliminary study a heavy manufacturing company was selected4. The
company was suggested by the author's supervisors and finally chosen by the researcher for
three main reasons. Firstly, the company was actively engaged in product development.
Secondly, it was willing to allow the study of selected development projects, and thirdly and
most importantly, indicated that it was using a CE approach in some of its development
projects. The investigation focused on two specific product development projects (see
Appendix A for a summary of the two projects).
Over a period of 6 months, from July 1995 to January 1996, the researcher spent on average
one day per week in the company (a total of 26 days). During this time a close relationship
was established with key players in both development projects. Information was collected
through interviews, informal discussions inside and outside office hours, observations and
company documentation, (see Appendix B for more information on the data collection in the
preliminary case study). The information was cross-checked by triangulating the different
sources of data such as interviews, observational data and company documents. In addition,
the case study report was circulated among a number of key project personnel in order to
corroborate facts and evidence presented in the report and to avoid factual errors and the
inadvertent release of sensitive commercial data.
During the preliminary case study the researcher examined practices, procedures and
structural arrangements used in the company's development process with reference to the
application of CE (see Appendix C) as determined in the conceptual framework (see chapter
four). O f particular interest was the role of HRM in these projects. The author wanted to

4 The company name was changed and data anonymised in order to ensure the confidentiality
requirements set by the company.
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find out what HRM issues were considered in managing projects and by whom as well as
who applied and maintained these HRM policies and practices? Both projects were analysed
within their organisational context. Particular attention was paid to the projects' structural
arrangements and how the team members co-operated within the project, within the
company, and with customers and suppliers. The organisational context comprised the
hierarchical structure and culture of the company, team co-ordination mechanisms,
resources and support systems, communication and information systems. The analysis of the
structural arrangements covered issues such as the structural arrangements chosen, the
number of people involved, the functions represented at the project and their responsibilities
in this context.
The preliminary study increased the author's understanding of product development
processes under CE and its embeddedness within the organisation. The findings pointed to
the need to differentiate between HRM as a specialist function and organisation-wide
activity in the context of CE. With the help of the preliminary case study the researcher was
able to refine the research question and the conceptual framework, thereby gaining a better
understanding of CE.
The next section provides a background to the main case study. It discusses the
appropriateness of the processual case study approach for the selected research problem.

2.3

THE PROCESSUAL CASE STUDY APPROACH

The research focus of this thesis was on a complex organisational phenomenon, a lengthy
organisational change process within its context, where the boundaries between the
phenomenon and the context were not clearly evident5 (Yin, 1984/1989). The context w^as
manifested in the company's formal and informal structure, powder relationships, its way of

DBucciarelli's "Designing engineers" (1996) and 'Life among scientists" by Charlesworth et al.
(1989) provide two interesting studies of contemporary phenomena within their context with not
clearly evident boundaries between phenomenon and context.
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co-operating and communicating, its culture over time, as well as its external environment
such as the market it operated in and its customers and suppliers. The context in which the
process was embedded played a determining role regarding the course, shape, duration and
outcome of the process. The necessity to consider past, present and future as well as the
internal and external context in the interpretation of the organisational phenomenon, thus,
guided the decision for a processual case study. The value of processual research^ stems
from its opportunity to capture the dynamic in social processes (Van de Ven and Huber,
1990). It also allows the study of contemporary phenomena over an extended period of time
within their organisational and historical context (Johnson, 1987, p. 58) by observing how
they are shaped by the various elements, actions and politics within that context. Following
Pettigrew's (1990) requirements for a contextual analysis, the researcher was able to analyse
the change process at the vertical and horizontal levels as well as their interconnection
through time67.
In his discussion about contextualism as a theory of method Pettigrew (1990, 1997) points to
the duality of context and action and to the holistic and multifaceted causation of change, as
essential issues to address in doing processual research. For the case study it meant that not
only various internal features in their temporal occurrence, but also processes over time in
the parent company, the industry sector and market the company operated in had to be taken
into account. It was also necessary to look at various changes in the company (e.g. INTRA-

6 Over the last couple of years growing attention has been turned towards processual research, a
development which emerged "in line with an increasing emphasis on qualitative approaches to
management issues" (Ropo et al., 1997, p. 331). Complex organisational phenomena however, have
been the focus of a number of researchers for many years, see for example Allison (1971),
Mintzberg and McHugh (1985), Weick (1993a, 1993b, 1995), Huber and Glick (1993), Thomas
(1994). In order to grasp the "dynamics o f organisations and human conduct" (Ropo et al., 1997, p.
332), Pettigrew (1990, 1997) has been advocating processual approaches for more than 30 years. He
strongly contributed to its present definition and reputation.
7 The vertical level refers to the inner and outer context in which the phenomenon is embedded and the
interdependencies between its higher and lower levels. The horizontal level embraces the temporal
interconnectedness of the change process in past, present and future.
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NET installation, changes in appraisal system) as brought about by CE but which in turn
influenced the further implementation of CE.
Yin's case study framework (1984/1989), which has been applied by a number of processual
researchers (Pettigrew, 1990; Orton, 1997; Fox-Wolfgramm, 1997), guided the development
of the research design. A case study approach was chosen because the focus of research
interest was a contemporary phenomenon over which the investigator had no control (Yin,
1984/1989). As the investigation circled around "what-and why questions", a decision was
made for a single exploratory case study. This enabled the researcher to explore why things
happened in a particular way in order to develop a deep understanding of the process.
An organisation-based design was chosen, because the inclusion of the organisational
context was important. Organisational capabilities were needed to initiate and sustain the
CE. CE, in turn, had implications on the organisation (such overcoming traditional borders
of co-operation and communication, building up new integration mechanisms) which then
again influenced the CE implementation process. By looking at the CE Project in isolation,
the contextual conditions would have been neglected. Empirical data were thus collected at
three levels: the project (the CE Project), the organisation (MILSYS as company with its
particular features) and the organisation's environment (the market MILSYS operated in and
its customers).
In addition, the chosen research design allowed to employ different methods of data
collection, both quantitative and qualitative, and to deal with a variety of evidence (Yin,
1984/1989).

2.4

RESEARCH METHODS

The preceding section outlined the characteristics of the processual case study approach and
discussed it in relation to the defined research question. This section shows in more detail
what research methods were applied in order to gather, analyse, and evaluate the relevant
data. It starts with a discussion about the selection process of the case study company,
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followed by a description of the data collection techniques, distinguishing between primary
and secondary data sources. The third part provides an insight into the data analysis and
evaluation process and shows how the issues of validity, reliability and generalisability were
addressed.
The operationalisation of the author’s variables is undertaken in chapter three and four. The
indicators of CE are discussed in chapter three, and the indicators of HRM as a specialist
function and as an organisation-wide activity in chapter four.

2.4.1

S e l e c t in g T h e C a s e

One of the most difficult steps in conducting a case study takes place before the actual
investigation can get underway. It is broadly described as the search for an appropriate case.
The initial task was to find organisations that already used a CE approach in their product
development process or had the intention to implement CE within the following year. This
proved to be difficult, particularly as CE can be interpreted broadly. Though the concept of
CE is not new, a universally accepted definition of CE does not exist, and companies give
emphasis to quite different aspects. The author therefore determined specific criteria for an
appropriate case (guided by the findings from the preliminary case study). The company had
to be an Australian manufacturer actively involved in new product development processes
with a product type suitable for CE (Poolton and Barclay, 1996). It had to have the intention
to introduce or had recently introduced CE and was willing to provide access to its
organisation in order to study the phenomenon.
The search for a suitable case was supported by a related research project, the Cooperative
Research Centre for Intelligent Manufacturing Systems and Technologies (CRC) Project A7
"Concurrent Engineering: Organization and Implementation", which aimed to develop a
"catalyst" diagnostic toolkit. One of its information sources was Australian research on new
product introduction (mainly surveys and 5 case studies). These surveys confirmed that CE
was interpreted broadly and emphasis was given to quite different aspects of the process.
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Only a limited number of firms were identified intending to implement or already
implementing CE and meeting the above outlined criteria.
The selected company was planning to restructure its product development process by using
a CE approach. As with the preliminary case study company, it was willing to provide
access for the author to study the conventional development process as well as the
implementation process of CE. In contrast to the company in the preliminary case study,
however, the company in the main case study paid more attention to the organisational side
of the implementation process. This was reflected in the initiation of an overall
organisational and cultural change process. After initial talks, the author was given formal
access to the company, formal approval to talk to all relevant people and the permission to
take part in meetings and training sessions. Senior and middle managers were informed
about the author's presence in the company and were asked to support the research.

2.4.2

D a t a C o l l e c t io n

Processual research is implicitly assumed to be qualitative in nature (Hinings, 1997, p. 493).
Its representatives, however, do not restrict themselves to qualitative methods, but resort to
multiple sources of evidence, which can be of either quantitative or qualitative nature. The
data collection here was based on mainly qualitative data accumulated from three main
sources: primary data from observations and interviews with company representatives, and
secondary data from public and proprietary company documents. The change process was
studied over a period of 18 months, from February 1996 to July 1997. The main data were
collected over a 12 month-period starting in March 1996. The intensive personal presence of
the researcher was an important aspect to build not only a familiarity with the company and
its operations but also with the people studied. It was an important prerequisite to engage in
informal discussions about the change process with those affected by it.

An advantage in the data collection was the researcher's tacit knowledge (Dawson, 1997;
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Pettigrew, 1990; Yin, 1984/1989) or pre-understanding at first hand derived from her
experiences as a HR consultant (Gummesson, 1991). Advocates of processual research see
such prior knowledge as an essential requirement for fieldwork. Despite these previous
experiences, an extended period of time was required to become familiar with the specific
cultural context of the study, namely the different national, industrial and professional
cultures. It also took considerable time to grasp the whole depth and meaning of
relationships, actions and behaviour of the people involved**. The prior experience, however,
facilitated the comprehensive data collection and analysis as well as the understanding or
"output" (Gummesson, 1991) of the process under study.
Although the literature recommends conducting a case study with a team of two or three
people (Pettigrew, 1973, 1990) in order to ensure greater objectivity, the data collection and
analysis was carried out solely by the researcher. It was however possible to discuss the
information and findings with a second, experienced researcher undertaking similar
investigations in the company. He was more involved with senior managers of the company
and thus gained a closer insight into decision-making processes at senior management level.
The discussions with him provided an additional source of evidence for the data analysis.

2.4.2.1

Primary Data Sources

Data were collected from two primary data sources; participant observation and interviews.
The method of participant observation enabled the researcher to gain a deep insight into the
daily routines and subtle organisational phenomena that shaped the CE implementation
process. The author was able to gain insight into the roles of people surrounding the
implementation team as well as the formal and informal interaction of the team with other
individuals, projects and departments. In comparison to action research based on interven-8

8 Charlesworth et al. (1989) and Bucciarelli (1996) provide a detailed study of the numerous
subcultures within a given culture, which are manifested in different vocabulary and goal
orientation, different interests, beliefs, attitudes, and practices.
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tion (Gummesson, 1991), the role of participant observer restricted active interference in the
change process. But participation in meetings and related work projects was still allowed.
The approach enabled the observation of how the change process unfolded over time within
its contextual framework (Dawson, 1997). It also facilitated interviews with "key" players,
and the familiarisation with the organisational context.
The observation program consisted of regular visits to the company over a period of 18
months. During the main data collection stage the company was visited for at least two days
a week, totalling about 140 days. The author attended meetings of the CE Project Team
(held twice a week) and related meetings and events (e.g. meetings of the CE Pilot Project
Team, fortnightly meetings of the Engineering Department, etc.). A notebook was used to
record events, activities, tasks, and to capture unforeseen actions. Contextual data such as
behaviours, sequences, verbal and non-verbal expressions were also kept in the form of
fieldnotes. Subsequently the notebook was used to construct a chronology of key events
(Dawson, 1997), depict certain routines and capture the non-linearity of the change process
(Dawson, 1994). It also helped to increase the awareness of the informal organisation of
work and structure (e.g. power positions, political behaviours), and to discover discrepancies
between the various accounts (i.e. interview7, observation, documentary).

The collection of observational data was complemented by numerous interviews as the
second main source of primary data collection. The interviews were undertaken in order to
gain a better understanding of how different actors contributed to and interpreted the change
process. The guideline for the interviews consisted of a set of open-ended questions (see
Appendix D). These questions enabled the author to explore particular issues in detail, to go
beyond the activities observed and to corroborate information already obtained from other
data sources. The processual character of the study made it possible to conduct a number of
repeat interviews. They not only allowed the researcher to return to certain issues, and to
clarify contradicting data, but also to translate certain discoveries (such as the non
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involvement of the HRM department in the design and implementation of CE) into different
sets of interview questions (Dawson, 1997). 39 formal interviews were conducted ranging
from 30 to 120 minutes, with an average time of 40 minutes. The interviewees included 5
representatives from senior management level (among them the two Managing Directors), 8
people from middle management such as functional and project managers, and 13 people
from staff level (see Appendix E for list of interviewees)9. Among the latter group were
members from the CE Project Team and the Pilot Project as well as other employees
involved in the design and development process. 13 interviewees participated in repeat
interviews. One third of the interviews were taped. For the rest interview notes were taken.
In addition to the interviews, the author informally talked to people from all levels of the
organisation throughout the entire study. These discussions lasted from 10 up to 60 minutes
each and were subsequently captured in the research notebook. They were an additional
source to verily information gathered through interviews, observations and documentary
analysis. They also provided further background information about the company and the
industry sector.

2.4.2.2

Secondary Data Sources

A comprehensive documentary analysis was the third main source of the data collection. A
broad range of public and proprietary documents was analysed. They included company
newsletters, CE newsletters, CE reports and papers (see Appendix F). The company also
provided access to the results of a survey about employee satisfaction carried out by an
external consultancy and the results of an AQA (Australian Quality Award) Self
Assessment. Background information about the company and the industry sector were
gathered from company reports, public documents, as well as organisational charts. Another
data source was the internal e-mail system and the recently installed intra-net.

9 Non of the interviewees were hourly employees. No union representatives were interviewed (at the
time of the case study trade unions were not formally involved in the company).
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2 .4 .3

D a t a A n a l y s is

An intensive analysis and evaluation of the information accompanied the data collection.
There are no widely agreed upon standards for the conduct of processual research in terms
of design, data collection and analysis (Ropo, Eriksson, and Hunt, 1997, p. 332). Some
researchers describe the process as a craft involving trial and error (e.g. Daft, 1983). Others
have started to develop more systematic methods that not only support the data collection
and analysis, but guide the entire research process^. They thus defend qualitative research
against the often used argument of poor validity, reliability and generalisability. The author
accordingly decided to apply a more systematic method to ensure the quality of her research.
The mainly qualitative data were subjected to a systematic qualitative analysis. This analysis
consisted of "three concurrent flows o f activity: data reduction1011, data display12, and
conclusion drawing/verification" (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 10). The former two
activities guided the verification process, enabled the researcher to discern patterns,
explanations, possible configurations, which in turn directed the further data collection and
data reduction and display in a continuous process. How the meanings emerging from the
data were tested for their "plausibility" (Miles and Huberman, 1994, p. 11) is described in
the following paragraphs, which also discuss how at the outset precautions were taken and
certain tactics applied to increase validity, reliability and generalisability of the case study.
There are three main types of validity, namely construct, internal, and external validity,
which require different analytical approaches (Yin, 1998). Based on Yin (1998, 1984/1989)

10 Yin (1984/1989) for example provided a comprehensive framework for the conduction of case
studies, Van Maanen (1988) developed a concept for reporting fieldwork results, Van de Ven and
Huber (1990), and Fox-Wolfgramm (1997) provide a methodological framework for processual
applications.
11 Data reduction comprised the selection and sorting of data, simplification of information, as well as
the transformation of data from transcriptions and field notes. It also involved recording the decision
process about what research question, case and conceptual framework to choose and, later on,
writing summaries and memos, coding the information and organising the data in the form of
clusters.
12 Data display comprised the compression of data and their display in the form of matrices, charts and
networks (some of them are shown in other chapters of this thesis).
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three tactics were chosen to increase construct validity: the use of multiple sources of
evidence, the establishment of a chain of evidence, and the review of the case study report
by key informants. At least three independent sources of evidence were used in the
collection of data: interviews, observations and documents. They enabled the researcher to
contextualise, cross-check and cross-validate the gathered data (Miles and Huberman, 1994).
With the help of triangulation it was possible to interpret company documents as they are
commonly biased, aimed for a particular audience or follow certain motives. It also allowed
to corroborate information and clarify contradicting data from all data sources. The use of
multiple data sources facilitated the construction of a chain of evidence (Miles and
Huberman, 1994, p. 260f) "through converging lines o f enquiry" (Bums, 1994, p. 321). The
data had been continuously analysed in relation to the initial research question and
propositions up to the final conclusions (Yin, 1998, p. 249). In addition, the case study
report was circulated among key informants. Their comments helped to avoid factual errors
and the inadvertent release of sensitive commercial data.
Internal validity is concerned with the credibility or authenticity of the data. It can be
ensured by examining the gathered data in a number of analytic modes (Yin, 1998; Miles
and Huberman, 1994). The author applied a time series analysis. It led to the construction of
a chronology of the CE implementation process (see chapter seven). It incorporated
sequences and features of action, key transition points, the circumstances of the emergence
of new ideas, new key players at a given time, as well as impacting events at other related
levels of analysis.
External validity is concerned with the generalisability of the case study findings (Yin,
1984/8). Single case studies are often criticised for a poor basis for generalisation.
Processual research however confines itself to one or a small number of organisations
(Dawson, 1994). Dawson (1997, p. 404) argues that "although general trends can be
identified and typical responses recounted, under the processual framework, one [case] is
significant". The investigation here also relied on the study of a single company. The study
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focused on the "circumstantial uniqueness" of the case and "not on the obscurities o f mass
representation" (Bums, 1994, p. 326). The investigator did not emunerate frequencies
(statistical generalisation), but expanded and generalised a theory (analytic generalisation)
(McGuire, 1998). A set of empirical results was generalised to its theoretical propositions, a
theorised pattern of results, which was identified and built up in the design phase. In this,
the case study meets the requirements of generalisability and represents a significant
contribution to knowledge and theory building. It increases the understanding about the
particular area of research, and helps to refocus the direction of future investigations in the
respective research field.
The use of a formal case study protocol and the development o f a case study database
(Bums, 1994; Fox-Wolfgramm, 1997, Yin, 1998) increased the reliability or replicability of
the results. The case study protocol (a separate directory on the researcher's computer as
well as a folder with a loose collection of printouts) contained the purpose of the study,
selection criteria for the organisation, the introduction paper given to the company,
operational procedures for the data collection (e.g. selection criteria for the formal interview
partner, information sources, questions for the interviews), as well as relevant readings (see
Appendix G).
The case study database was built up continuously, and data from all sources were organised
within it (such as transcribed and annotated interviews, interview notes, fieldnotes and
documentary data, and a bibliography with added comments of all reviewed documents). All
original data was stored in a separate directory. The copies were reformatted with a margin,
information coded and collected into different files. The coding system was made up of a
number of main codes with sub-categories (such as company profile: mission/vision,
organisational structure, employees, etc.; or environment: competitors, contractors,
environmental changes) and a number of open codes (such as relationships and behaviour
patterns, functional backgrounds and individual perceptions) (see Appendix H). An initial
code list was identified through the literature review and the preliminary case study, which
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was supplemented by additional codes as the data collection progressed and more ideas were
captured. All information became subject to an intensive continuous content analysis in
order to develop and refine concepts, which enabled the presentation o f new accounts (post
analytical descriptions).

2.5

SUMMARY

The aim o f this chapter was to describe and justify the chosen research approach by relating
it to the nature of the research question. It showed how the approach was reflected in the
double-loop research process. The chapter discussed the theoretical, methodological and
practical concerns that were driving the case study. It showed what methods were applied
for the data collection, analysis and evaluation and that a more systematic approach was
taken to improve the study’s validity, generalisability and reliability.
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3

C O NCURRENT ENG INEERING

The aim of the following chapter is to locate Concurrent Engineering within the Product
Innovation literature and to show how it relates to other literature on new product
development. The chapter outlines what CE is, where it comes from, and what its recognised
core elements are. It discusses the suitability of CE for different types of organisations,
products and market approaches, and the problematic nature of the implementation of CE as
well as ways to realise cross-functional integration. The findings from the literature analysis
were summarised in a theoretical framework, the CE implementation framework, which
guided the further investigation (see Figure 2).

Concurrent Engineering Implementation
O ther
Approches

T

Sources: Zanko et al,, 1998; Schubert and Couchman, 1998
Figure 2:

Concurrent Engineering Implementation Framework

The framework starts from the assumption that manufacturing companies have to compete
increasingly in terms of time-to-market and innovativeness of their products. CE is one
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approach to improved product innovation. A central assumption is that there is no "one best
way" for implementing CE, and both organisational and technical enablers are necessary for
successful CE implementation. Furthermore, from an organisational perspective the
achievement of cross-functional integration is one of the most important aspects of this
approach. It can be achieved through a variety of organisational arrangements. Cross
functional team, however, are widely seen as central to CE, though such teams can vary
widely along a structural and a process dimension. The individual elements of this
framework are discussed in detail in the following sections.

3.1

PRODUCT INNOVATION AND CE

Manufacturing companies nowadays have to compete not only in terms of quality and cost,
but increasingly in terms of time-to-market (Aaby and Discenza, 1993; Kumar and Motwani,
1995; Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1994) and innovativeness of their products (Haddad,
1996b; Kurth, 1994; Clark and Wheelwright, 1995). Effective product innovation processes
have therefore become the focus of considerable interest. The wide range of literature on
product development and innovation can be distinguished by their level of analysis13 as well
as by their underlying perspective (see Table A). Three main strands can be identified
regarding the underlying perspective of the literature on product development and
innovation: Engineering Management (e.g. Solenhuis, 1992), Marketing (Aaby and
Discenza, 1993, Cooper, 1988), and Business Management (e.g. Myers and Marquis, 1969;
Craig and Hart, 1992).

13 Innovation research takes place at a macro- and micro level of analysis (Brown and Eisenhardt,
1995). While both levels focus on the discovery and study of determinants of successful and
unsuccessful product innovation, macro level research concentrates on the inquiry of cross-country,
cross-sector differences and differences in the innovation potential within a particular sector (see for
example Kato and Kato, 1992; Juergens, 1997). It also investigates the emergence and further
development of specific technologies within particular timeframes. By contrast, micro-level research
looks at how the product innovation process is organised, how particular products get developed and
how the process is influenced and shaped by the various inner-organisation components, such as
structure, strategy, etc.. A micro-level analysis was the chosen for the purpose of this thesis.
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Level of
Inquiry/
Underlying
Perspective
Macro-level

Micro-level

Engineering

Research/
Disciplinary
Fields
EconomicsOriented
Innovation
Research

OrganisationOriented
Innovation
Research
Engineering
Management

Marketing of New
Products or
Marketing

Business
Management

Table A:

Focus
(on)

Representative

Juergens, 1997;
Kato and Kato, 1992;
Clark and Fujimoto,
1991; Womack, Jones,
and Ross, 1990;
Eisenhardt and Tabrizi,
1995
Inner-organisational innovation process
Katz, 1982; Dougherty,
(activities, structures, etc. that influence or 1990, 1992
shape the development process)
Evolution of particular technologies over
time. Intrasector differences regarding
innovation potential. Innovation patterns
and models across countries and
industries.

Design integration and support

Grady, 1994;
Kurth, 1994; Deitz,
1995a; Salomone,
1995; Morelli,
Eppinger, and Gulati,
1995

Determinants of new product success and
failure in the market place
Determinants of the financial performance
(success) of new products: success via
superior product, attractive market,
rational organisation. (Perspective is
mostly a-theoretical and exploratory and
thus helps to broadly define the relevant
factors for product development
research.)

Cooper, 1988, 1990;
Cooper and
Kleinschmidt, 1987;
Myers and Marquis,
1969, Rothwell 1972;
Rothwell, Freeman,
Horsley, Jervis,
Robertson, and
Townsend, 1974;
Rothwell 1992

Strategic
Management or
Disciplined
Problem Solving

Strategy development and implementation
regarding new product development.
The actual development process
(development team, suppliers, leaders,
etc.)

Wheelwright and
Clark, 1992a;
Craig and Hart, 1992;
Imai, Ikujiro, and
Takeuchi, 1985

Organisational
Design or

Appropriate organisational structures and
management or

Adler, 1995; Clark and
Fujimoto, 1991;

Disciplined
Problem Solving

The actual development process - success
via problem solving with discipline
(centres on the effects)

Womack et al., 1990;
Hayes, Wheelwright,
and Clark, 1988b

Communication
Studies or
Communication
Web
(cw)

Effective inter- and intra-organisational
communication or
Narrow effects of communication on
project performance - success via internal
and external communication (theoretical
perspective in the context of traditional
research studies)

Ancona and Caldwell,
1992;
Allen, 1971;
Dougherty, 1990,
1992; Katz, 1982;

Rational Plan (rp)

Innovation Literature: Level of Inquiry and Underlying Perspective
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The latter strand may be further subdivided into strategic management (e.g. Ansoff, 1965),
organisational design (e.g. Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967b) and communication studies
(Ancona and Caldwell, 1992).
Each research strand is characterised by a particular focus on product development as
summarised in Table A. Brown and Eisenhardt (1995) offer a slightly different organisation
of the vast and diverse literature on product development. They identify three research
streams: product development as communication web, as rational plan, and as disciplined
problem solving. Each of these streams focuses on different factors and relationships as
contributors to product success. Regarding their underlying perspective, however, they can
be organised within the above identified strands.
Beyond the distinction by their level of analysis and underlying perspective, two broad
approaches were identified within the product innovation literature. One approach
comprises the empirical research based literature (Juergens, 1997; Druecke, 1995; Adler,
1995) and the other the more prescriptive literature (largely based on surveys) with a "how
to do it" approach (e.g. Poolton, 1994; Coughlan, 1992; Cooper, 1988, 1990; Cooper and
Kleinschmidt, 1987; Twigg and Voss, 1992; Page 1993).
While each research field emphasises different factors and relationships and suggests
different ways of improving the innovation process, new product development is
unanimously seen as a complex organisational process that cuts across many functions in a
company. Dougherty (1997, p. 425) defines product innovation as "the conceptualisation,
development, operationalisation, manufacture, launch, and ongoing management o f a new
product or service". New in this context refers to the newness for the organisation and can
include a new product technology, new uses, new customers, new distribution and/or
logistics, or a combination of these factors (Dougherty, 1997).
While the product development process has been given considerable attention from various
research streams, most of the studies are limited to the process itself or to particular aspects
of the process. Only few studies have sought to explain the product development process in
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more than instrumental terms. Despite few attempts to grasp how engineers actually work
and of getting insight into the "black box" of product development (Bucciarelli, 1996), the
actual process of development remains largely unexplored. Aspects such as innovation
routines, innovation creation, tacit knowledge, the different ways of problem solving of
hard- and software engineers were not sufficiently explained.
For the conventional product development process four key problematic features have been
identified and frequently documented in the research literature. First, the process tends to be
carried out in a linear sequential way, with only few activities overlapping or taking place
concurrently. Mistakes get handed over and changes take a long time to be built in. This
phenomenon is often referred to in the literature as a "throw over the wall" or "relay race"
process. Second, the various activities tend to be carried out by separate functions within the
organisation (Lettice, 1995, p. 3). Ziemke and Spann (1993) found that the larger the
organisation, the more structured are its activities. This in turn results in more specialised
functions. The more specialised the function, the more formal and standardised are
commonly the procedures it has to follow. This organisational phenomena of professional
specialisation and organisational compartmentalisation is often referred to in the literature as
"stovepiping" or "siloing" (Peters, 1987, p. 27; Winner et al., 1988, p. 55). It results in goal
displacement and ineffective cross-functional communication. Third, the integrative
mechanism employed to co-ordinate the overall development effort is frequently found
inadequate. It is often featured by bureaucratic drawing approvals and engineering change
management procedures as well as lightweight project managers who are confronted by
strong functional managers with control over resources. Fourth, "downstream issues" (i.e.
testability requirements) are often not considered at the beginning of a development project,
which leads to shortfalls in performance and requires loops in the development process and
post-release fixes to products. Dimancescu and Dwenger (1996, p. 6) report the findings by
consulting company surveying a broad cross-section of product development efforts. The
consultants found that "47 percent o f all product development work is repeated, due to
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upstream changes or late consideration o f requirements; a fu ll 51 percent o f product
development activity consists o f fire-fighting, or unplanned activities; project hand-offs are
often botched because o f poor communication
Companies in their new product development (NPD) process have adopted various
approaches, practices and tools in order to address these problems. They range from
methods that focus on individual project performance improvements to methods focusing on
performance improvements across a portfolio of projects. They all have the potential for
performance improvement. However, companies often have not achieved the expected
improvements or have been unable to sustain them. Based on an in-depth investigation of
seven organisation from various industries, McDonough and Griffin (1997, p. 3) conclude
that the limited success has been "due to the incomplete deployment o f the practice, the
inappropriate application o f the tool, or the fa ct that the practice or tool effects only certain
parts o f the NPD system". Three practices, however, have been shown to have a more
significant impact on NPD performance than others: 1) pursuing a formal new product
development process (Griffin, 1997; Hustad, 1996; Cooper, 1990), 2) setting strategies for
NPD (Griffin, 1997), and 3) the use of cross-functional teams (Hayes, Wheelwright, and
Clark, 1988a; Henke, Krachenberg, and Lyons, 1993; McDonough, 1996). According to
McDonough and Griffin (1997), the adoption of any one of these three practices was no
guarantee for continuous high NPD performance. In some cases companies were able to
generate high performance on a continuous basis, in other cases they did not achieve it.
McDonough and Griffin (1997, p.5) conclude that sustained high NPD performance requires
"the application o f several managerial practices simultaneously, ... the interaction among
multiple practices rather than the implementation o f any one practice".
CE seeks to address the above four problems of the conventional process through three
interrelated features of process organisation: functional integration, design integration and
activity concurrence. It is considered to offer the potential to achieve sustained high NPD
performance by applying the above three practices identified by McDonough and Griffin
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(1997) simultaneously. What CE is, where it comes from, and what its core elements are, is
described in the next section.

3.2
3.2.1

CONCURRENT ENGINEERING
The Origin of CE

CE is one recent approach to improved new product development, which has been
predominantly applied in industries such as especially in Aerospace, Automobile and
Electronics Industries. It seeks to achieve a balance not only between organisational and
technological but also human factors in the product development process. The concept of
CE emerged in the USA in the 1980s. It is, however, based on perspectives within the
disciplines of engineering and management that can be traced back to the early-20th centuiy
(Gerwin and Susman, 1996; Smith, 1997; Ziemke and Spann, 1993). It reinvents
perspectives from other intellectual domains, which addressed disintegration problems
associated with functional specialisation *4. Earlier studies in CE particularly addressed the
problems of specialisation and compartmentalisation associated with separate product
design and manufacturing process design (Winner et al., 1988; Boothroyd and Dewhurst,
1983; Ettlie and Stoll, 1990). Prior to 1992 little empirical research was conducted in the CE
field and most of the literature on CE was anecdotal or conceptual (Smith, 1997). The rise of
Japan's economic power, however, strongly encouraged further practical research on CE
(Gerwin and Susman, 1996, p. 118). By now an increasing number of empirical studies have
been conducted (Juergens, 1997).
Despite an increased attention to CE in research and practice over the last years, there is still
no widely accepted definition of CE. Ambiguity and uncertainty surround the term CE. It is
interpreted in different ways (e.g. as a technique, a philosophy, a paradigm, etc.) and, as a14

14 See for example Lawrence and Lorsch (1967a, b) and their discussions about the main structural
characteristics and conditions for the use of cross-functional teams in the product development
process.
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particular approach to product development, it is closely related to other "new" approaches
(such as Simultaneous Engineering, Systems Engineering15 or Life Cycle Design) (see
Table B). Furthermore, the problematic processual and complex nature of CE
implementation remains poorly understood and the requirements of successful CE
implementation are largely glossed over in the CE literature. Given these features, CE may
be considered even a "management fa d " (Abrahamson, 1996).

Different Terms for CE
Concurrent Engineering

Gerwin and Susman, 1996; Hull, Collins, and Liker, 1996;
Thamhain, 1994

Simultaneous Engineering

Yamazoe, 1990; Schonwald 1990; Eversheim, 1990;
Wallace, 1990; Knight and Jackson, 1989; Cleland,
Bidanda, and Chung, 1995; Shenas and Derakhshan, 1994;
Ranky, 1994

Life Cycle Engineering

Bylinsky, 1995

Parallel Design Engineering

Ellis, 1992

Systems Engineering

Grady, 1994; Kuhn and Garcia, 1994
Different Meanings of CE

A Concept

Winner et al., 1988

A Philosophy

Hull et al., 1996

A Distinctive and Systematic Approach Winner et al., 1988; Lawson and Miller, 1992; Lake, 1992
to Product Innovation
A Management Technique

Thamhain, 1994

A Competitive Strategy

Kannapan and Marshek, 1992; Moffat and Gerwin, 1994

Table B:

Synonyms and Meanings of CE

15 While the terms Concurrent Engineering and Systems Engineering are used in some texts
synonymously (Lake, 1992), other authors claim that despite certain overlaps, Systems and
Concurrent Engineering differ in many respects (Gardiner, 1996). For Grady (1994), a major
advocate of Systems engineering, CE is only one aspect of the integrated design and development
process, and does not comprise the whole range of components and activities as Systems engineering
with its requirement analyses and overall integration effort. Grady (1994) defines Systems
Engineering as the process of integrated product development in which Systems Requirement
Analysis (SRA) and Systems Integration (SI) form the "twin buttresses", the main pillars of support
in the design process.
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3.2.2

T h e Core E lem ents

of

CE

Three main research perspectives can be distinguished within the CE literature: engineering,
management and organisational. Many CE advocates, regardless o f their perspective, agree
that the philosophy of CE provides a "systematic approach to the integrated and concurrent
design o f products and their related processes, including manufacturing and support"
(Winner et al., 1988, p. v). CE looks at product development as a "unified whole" (instead as
of a set of independently conducted but interdependent activities). The main focus in the CE
literature is on the "design and development" component of the new product development
process rather than on product strategy or new product marketing. CE aims to establish high
levels of cross- functional integration, design integration, as well as high level concurrence
between project tasks and processes. CE is thus largely seen as a way to overcome the
traditionally

segmented,

functionally

specialised

and

strongly

sequential

product

development process. Within this context, functional integration means the establishment of
appropriate cross-functional arrangements. Such arrangements are required to overcome
functional silos and to ensure a high level of co-operation and communication between all
involved with the development process and product life cycle functions. Design integration
refers to the holistic design of the product. This can be ensured through the early (up-front)
consideration of all product life cycle and associated design issues, including aspects like
quality, cost, schedule, and user requirements (Winner, 1988; Albin and Crefeld, 1994).
Concurrence means conducting simultaneously both the new product design and the
manufacturing process design. Certain activities may be overlapped while others can be are
carried out in parallel (Shina, 1991, 1994).
CE focuses on people, processes and tools within the development process. It appears,
however, that the individual elements and relationships between them are given a different
emphasis within the CE literature. The CE literature with an underlying engineering
perspective emphasises tools (e.g. Kusiak, 1993; Ranky, 1994). Processes are the focal point

42

of the CE literature with a management perspective (e.g. Fujimoto, 1997). The CE literature
with an organisational perspective focuses on all three but with people as the primary
element (Haddad, 1997). This is also reflected in the ways the CE literature suggests to
realise integration. Three main classes can be distinguished. The first one comprises
technological means ((e.g. Computer Aided Design (CAD), Computer Aided Manufacturing
(CAM), Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM), Rapid Prototyping, Simulation), the
second procedural means (e.g. systems approach, design rules, standards), and the third
organisational means (e.g. matrix structures, different cross-functional arrangements). The
first one predominates within the engineering field. The latter two are dominant in the
managerial literature. By contrast, in the organisation literature organisational, procedural
and technological means are used in a complementary rather than mutually exclusive
manner.

3.2.3

CE from an Engineering P erspective

The engineering stream is of particular interest from the point of view that the first notions
and conceptual ideas of CE as a distinctive approach were developed within this strand. CE
research from an engineering perspective is predominantly concerned with the engineering
activities that play a part in the design and development process. It seeks to identify ways mostly in the form of technical solutions - to support and integrate these various activities
(Smith, Tomasek, Jin, and Wang, 1995; Ranky, 1994). Such a "tool-oriented" approach is
found in many CE publications with an engineering perspective (Boothroyd and Dewhurst,
1987; Hales, 1994; Joines and Ayoub, 1995; Kurth, 1994). Deitz (1995b) for example shows
that the increased use of sophisticated analytical tools and programs reduced the number of
prototypes needed to evaluate a design's reliability. They also made it easier to consider
downstream issues earlier in the design cycle, and thus shortened the development time.
DFM (Design for Manufacturing), DFA (Design for Assembly) and DFT (Design for Test)
and Design for Maintenance are just some of the often utilised analysis techniques. Joines
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and Ayoub (1995, p. 43) however argue that these techniques, "although popular, have
remained rather cumbersome". Other authors suggest networks and appropriate design
verification tools. Much literature is found on CAD and CAM, CAE (Computer Aided
Engineering), product data models (Kurth, 1994) and QFD (Quality Function Deployment)
(Hales, 1994). Hogan (1994) draws attention to an integrated and central product
information database, which simplifies design tasks. Khoshnevis, Park, and Sormaz (1994)
developed and discuss a knowledge-based computer system using a hierarchical planning
scheme and a multi-bank rule base as an effective concurrent engineering tool.
Despite the technical focus of the engineering based CE literature, many of its
representatives recognise the cross-functional team as a crucial element for the
establishment of cross-functional integration (Kurth, 1994; Joines and Ayoub, 1995).

3.2.4

CE from a M anagement P erspective

CE researchers from a management perspective tend to give rather universalistic
prescriptions on how to implement CE. They offer a set of success factors in the form of
universally-applicable "best practices" (e.g. Cooper, 1988, Hustad, 1996). This is
particularly the case for cross-functional teams, which are seen as the best way to achieve
functional integration (e.g. Trygg, 1993) (Couchman et al., 1999). They often focus on
procedural means such as effective business planning and resource allocation in order to
shorten development lead times (e.g. Fujimoto, 1997).
Other CE research, particularly from an organisational perspective, shows that these success
factors are not equally important in all industries and for all products (McDonough and
Griffin, 1997). Zirger and Hartley (1996, p. 143) for example found that only four of the 12
"techniques purported to bring products to the market more quickly" they studied were
significantly related with development time performance. King and Majchrzak (1996, p.189)
report the results of a recent survey of the computer industry, whose findings indicate that
the greater use of CE type tools and techniques "actually slowed the development process
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f or some product classes (generally those with greater environmental uncertainty)". A
central argument of CE advocates of a contingency perspective is that there is no "one best
way", no single solution for implementing CE (Poolton and Barclay, 1996; Componation
and Byrd, 1999). Rothwell (1992, p. 223) notes that "there still exists no precise
prescription or recipe fo r successful innovation". The implementation o f CE is product and
process dependent (e.g. degree of complexity, degree of novelty). It is dependent on the
industry sector (e.g. type of customer, market approach) as well as contingent on an
organisation's strategy and structure (Couchman et al., 1999). These variables will lead to
variations in the organisational arrangements for CE (Zanko et al., 1998).

3.2.5

CE from an Organisation P erspective

In many of the CE literature with an organisational perspective CE is particularly seen as an
approach to overcome organisational barriers to integration. In contrast to the "tooloriented" approach favoured by CE research with an engineering perspective, and the "best
practice" approach of CE researchers with a management perspective, CE research from an
organisational perspective applies a contingency approach. This approach is based on the
assumption that the implementation of CE depends on various organisational and
environmental conditions as well as on the product itself (e.g. Susman and Dean, 1992;
Gerwin and Susman, 1996; Hull, Collins and Liker, 1996). Furthermore, the introduction of
CE involves organisational, procedural and technological changes within a company (e.g.
Haddad, 1996b; Gerwin and Susman, 1996). The achievement of cross-functional
integration however, is seen as one of the most important aspects of this approach to new
product development (Hauptman and Hiji, 1996, 1999; Susman and Rayl, 1999). While this
involves breaking down the "silos" often found in functionally specialised organisations, re
integration does not necessarily require the formation of teams. Other cross-functional
arrangements are possible (see for example Adler, 1995; Liker et al., 1996). Representatives
of organisational CE research emphasise that both organisational and technological enablers
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are necessary for effective CE, but that technological enablers are, however, of secondary
importance (King and Majchrzak, 1996; Lettice, 1995; Haddad, 1996b; Susman and Rayl,
1999). This is based on the assumption that CE, despite the technical connotations of the
term, is an organisational issue in the sense that its full effectiveness is only achieved and
sustained in a company with appropriate organisational structures, a team-oriented culture
and team-oriented HRM policies and practices (King and Majchrzak, 1996; Schubert and
Couchman, 1998). This latter perspective has been adopted in this study.

3.3

SUITABILITY OF CE

There have been few studies to date of the appropriateness of CE for different industries,
organisations, product types and national cultures (Poolton and Barclay, 1996). While an
increasing amount of empirically based research has been conducted, including field surveys
with reasonable sized samples conducted in many countries (Susman and Rayl, 1999;
Hauptman and Hiiji, 1996; Liker, Sobek, Ward, and Cristiano, 1996; Hull et al., 1996;
Zirger and Hartley, 1994), attention has been paid mainly to industries such as automobile,
aircraft or electronics, which develop complex products and sell them to customers in
markets (see Table C).
Few studies have focused on the development of complex products, but which were
developed under contract for a single customer. These few studies however indicate that CE
is applicable for companies with different market approaches or starting points of the
development process (e.g. Winner et al., 1988). As shown in Figure 3, two main classes of
market approaches can be identified: Processes that start off with a product made to order
[contract type] and processes that start off with a concept for a certain market or product
[concept type].
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Industry

Product
Complexity

Literature

Aircraft Industry

Complex
product

Cleland et al., 1995; Sabbath, 1996; Singh, 1992; Schräge, 1993;
Hauptman and Hirji, 1999
Liker et al., 1996; Juergens, 1997; Shenas and Derakhshan, 1994;
Haddad, 1996b; Walklet, 1989; Wallace, 1990; Yamazoe, 1990;
Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Calabrese, 1999
Liker et al., 1996

Automobile
Automotive
Prarts Suppliers
Computer
Industry
Machinery/Mac
hine Building
Electronics
Defence
Cable
Manufacturer

Complex
product
Complex
Product
Complex
product
Complex
product
Complex
product
Complex
product
Relatively
simple product

Druecke, 1993, 1995; Hauptman and Hirji, 1999
Juergens, 1997
Zirger and Hartley, 1996; Dimancescu and Dwenger, 1996;
Shina, 1991; Hauptman and Hirji, 1999
Winner et al., 1988; M addux, M artin and Farrington, 1994
Albin and Crefeld, 1994

Country

Manufacturing
(generally)

Australia
Sweden
Germany
USA
Canada
Italy
UK
Japan

Table C:

Literature
Hauptman and Hirji, 1996, 1999
Trygg, 1993
Eversheim, 1990; Schonwald, 1990; Juergens, 1997
Haddad, 1996b; Hull et al., 1996; Cleland et al., 1995; Sabbath,
1996; Schräge, 1993; Liker et al., 1996
Hauptman and Hirji, 1999
Druecke, 1993, 1995
Lettice, 1995; Smart, Lettice and Evans, 1995; Hauptman and
Hirji, 1996
Juergens, 1997; Fujimoto, 1997; Liker et al., 1996

Appropriateness of CE for Different Industries, Products, and Countries

The first class can be further divided into three sub-classes relating to the different types of
customers:

military systems customer, commercial systems customer,

commercial

downstream customer. The second class falls into two sub-classes, concepts for the
consumer market (e.g. washing machines, automobile, consumer electronics) and concepts
for the industrial market. In the latter subclass a distinction can be made between an
endproduct (e.g. mining equipment), or component of an endproduct (e.g. compressors).
Many investigations focused particularly on the second class and here again on concepts for
the consumer market (Couchman, 1998).
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Appropriateness of CE
Com pany
S ize

Com plexity
erf Product

targe

highly ccomplex

M arket
Approach

M anufacturing
System

Concept fo r C ertain M arket
or Product
(Concept Typ e)

mecSum

(C ontraci Type)

individual jo b

Endproduct

C oncepts fo r the
Industrial M arket
C oncept for C ertain M arket

Concepts fo r the
Consum er M arket

or Product (C oncept Typ e)
M arket
Approach
Product M ade to O rder
(C ontract Type)

appropriateness bnoatfly empirically shown
appropriateness for a number of cases empiricaily shown
■

appropriateness not or not vridety empirically shown

Source: Couchman, 1998
Figure 3 :

Appropriateness of CE

The contract type commonly starts off with a request for tender, followed by contract
negotiations and the win of the contract (when successful). This phase is commonly referred
to as bid-phase. The bid phase is followed by the actual design and development phase
comprising stages such as preliminary design, detailed design, etc. (see Winner et al., 1988).
The applicability of CE for companies of different size, with different manufacturing
systems and differences in the complexity of their products is not equally investigated.
Many studies focus on highly complex products and a mass-production type of
manufacturing system. Hull et al. (1996, p. 135) show that CE has a greater impact on the
performance of mass-production type in contrast to batch type of manufacturing systems.
Lau's findings (1994), however, indicate that CE is also an appropriate approach for batch
manufacturing. Bradley (1995) points out that the application of CE to bespoke product
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development is as relevant as applying it to volume or low production run products. Albin
and Crefeld (1994) even assume that CE can benefit companies of any size regardless of
their manufacturing system and the complexity of their products.
Based on existing research it appears that "although concurrent engineering is associated
with leading-edge, large companies producing highly complex products like defense
systems, aircraft, and automobiles", it is also applicable for medium and small-sized
companies producing relatively simple products (Albin and Crefeld, 1994, p. 50), for
companies with different market approaches and different manufacturing systems (see
Figure 3).
Little has been found about the dependence of CE on organisational conditions. Despite a
few studies of organisational barriers (e.g. Adler, 1995; Trygg, 1990) (often based on earlier
organisational contingency research, e.g. Bums and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and Lorsch,
1967b, Galbraith, 1973), it is not clearly understood whether and how the organisational
structure of a company (i.e. flat vs. highly hierarchical organisations; functional, matrix, or
project organisation) impacts on CE.
The review of the CE literature indicates that CE is appropriate for different conditions (i.e.
market

approaches,

product

complexity,

company

organisational structure and strategy). Variations

size,

in these

manufacturing

system,

internal and external

environmental factors, however, are likely to require different cross-functional arrangements
or types of cross-functional teams for achieving effective integration (Zanko et al., 1998).

3.4

CROSS-FUNCTIONAL INTEGRATION IN CE

While the division of labour among departments is necessary to ensure expert knowledge,
from a CE point of view it is an essential requirement to realise functional integration and
unite the scattered functional expertise in order to achieve timely and cost-effective project
outcomes. Addressing the issue of disintegration, the CE literature takes up perspectives
from the earlier organisational literature (e.g. Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967a, b; Galbraith,
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1973) regarding the problems associated with functional specialisation and the main
structural characteristics and conditions for the use of cross-functional teams.
It is widely agreed upon that cross-functional integration can be realised through various
structural arrangements (Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967b). The organisation
and CE literature suggests a variety of organisational arrangements. They include liaison
roles, inter-departmental committees, integrating departments, and inter-departmental
mutual adjustment (e.g. in-depth design reviews to assess DFA/DFM/DFT) (Durand, 1995;
Ancona and Caldwell, 1992; Shenas and Derakhshan, 1994; Moffat and Gerwin, 1994;
Zanko et al., 1998; Adler, 1995). A company can use different cross-functional
arrangements for different types of projects and depending on its organisational conditions.
Though cross-functional integration does not necessarily require the formation of teams, the
cross-functional, collocated and project-dedicated team is widely seen as central to CE
(Trygg, 1993; Nicholas, 1994; Lettice, 1995; Moffat and Gerwin, 1994; Clausing, 1994;
Hauptman and Hirji, 1996).
The CE literature largely refers to the cross-functional team in very generic terms. It is
mostly research from other fields (e.g. Ancona and Caldwell, 1992; Campion and Higgs,
1995; Parker 1994) that addresses the effectiveness of project teams and that has detected
that cross-functional teams can vary widely along a structural and a process dimension (see
Figure 4), as discussed later. A number of typologies of cross-functional teams have been
proposed. They take into account criteria such as leadership, decision making power, and
functional representation (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992; Durand, 1995; Pinto and Pinto,
1991; Thamhain and Wilemon, 1987). These typologies, however, lack the depth and
flexibility to reflect the changing requirements in structure and integration in the product
development process over time. The issue of different strategies of cross-functional
integration in CE (with the cross-functional teams as only one particular form) at different
stages/phases in the development process has not yet been investigated in detail (Adler,
1995).
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A number of aspects of the structural and process dimension of cross-functional teams are
discussed respectively in more detail in the following sections.

Classification Scheme for Cross-Functional Team s

Process Dimension

Structural Dimension
Leadership
(Heavy-, Lightweight)
Team Composition
(Representation of Functions, Customers, Suppliers)
Degree of Involvement
(Core-, Subteam)

Task Conditions
(e.g. Technical Risk, Complexity, etc.)
Cooperation/Communication
(Relation internal-external activities & interactions
vertical-horizontal communication)
Empowerment
(Execution, Innovation, Governance)

(Number of Subteams)
Dedication
(Full-, Part-time)
Location
(Dispersed, Collocation)
Integration within Organisation
(Standalone Project, Project Environment)
Sources: Ancona and Caldwell, 1992; Campion and Higgs, 1995; Clark and Wheelwright,
1992
Figure 4:

Classification Scheme for Cross-Functional Teams

3 .4.1

T h e S t r u c t u r a l D im e n s io n

of

C r o s s -F u n c t io n a l T e a m s

The structural dimension of cross-functional teams includes aspects of team composition,
size, degree of involvement, dedication, location, leadership, and extent of integration
within the organisation. Susman and Dean (1992) refer to the structural dimension as the
integrative mechanism and define it as the policies and practices that facilitate CE within the
product development team.

3.4.1.1

Leadership

Largely agreed upon, both in the CE literature and in other literature on project teams, is the
critical importance of the team leader for the success of a development project (Hayes et al.,
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1988b; Adler, Riggs, and Wheelwright, 1989; Bowen, Clark, Hooloway, and Wheelwright,
1994a, b, c; Thamhain and Wilemon, 1987; Thamhain, 1994). Brown and Eisenhardt (1995,
p. 369) assert that "even though the cross-functional team is the heart o f efficient product
development, the project leader is the pivotal figure in the development process ... [and]
critically affects both the process performance and the effectiveness o f the product".
Bucciarelli, (1996), in his in-depth study of three design projects in three different firms,
shows the importance of the project leader for building consensus within the team, and
building and maintaining alliances within the company. Susman and Rayl (1999) argue that
strong team leaders have a positive influence on project outcomes because they have the
power, authority and respect to assure that project goals are balanced against function goals.
The project leader is often seen as the linkage between the project team and senior
management (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). S/he has to rely more on informal influencing
strategies to motivate and inspire "followers" rather than on traditional formal authority and
coercion (Buchanan and Badham, 1998, pp. 89-90). Based on their study of a product
development project with a heavyweight project team in Motorola Telecommunications,
Clark and Wheelwright (1992) distinguish between four types of product development teams
with associated leadership styles: the functional, lightweight, heavyweight, and autonomous
or "tiger" team, as summarised in Table D. A "heavyweight" leadership style is often seen as
a guarantee for an integration of business strategy and product concept (Hayes et al., 1988a;
Adler et al., 1989). This leadership style is connected with great power, sometimes even
aggression as in autonomous, 'Tiger', or 'Wolfpack' teams (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992;
Anonymous, 1994). Emphasised is the different nature of their work compared to those of
traditional managers. Heavyweight project leaders carry out their role in a different fashion
to lightweight project managers. They are described as champions of the basic concept by
ensuring that those who work on sub-tasks of the project understand the project concept
(Wheelwright and Clark, 1992a, b).
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Functional Team

Lightweight Team

Heavyweight Team

Autonomous
(Tiger) Team

People grouped by
discipline, working under
direction of specialised
sub-function or functional
manager.

Each relevant function
appoints a liaison person
to represent it on a
project co-ordinating
committee.

Co-ordination through
detailed specifications all
parties agree to at the
outset, and through
occasional meetings
where issues that cut
across groups are
discussed.

Project structure, but
person belongs to
function (have this role
added to their other
duties).

Includes a group of
core cross-functional
team members who are
dedicated (and usually
physically collocated)
for the duration of the
development effort.
Typically there is one
core team member
from each primary
function of the
organisation

Individuals from
different
functional areas
are formally
assigned,
dedicated, and
collocated to a
project team.

Over time, primary
responsibility for the
project passes
sequentially from one
function to the next "throw over the wall".

Representatives work
with a "lightweight
project manager" who co
ordinates different
functions' activities.
Approach often used
supplementary to
traditional functional
organisation

Less frequently
observed in practice
though it has big
potential for a wide
range of organisations.

Often in larger, more
mature firms
Leadership

Direction given by
specialised sub-function
or functional manager.

"Lightweight" in two
respects:
1) generally a middlejunior level person who,
despite considerable
expertise, usually has
little status or influence,
2) key resources
(including engineers on
the project) remain under
control of respective
functional managers (no
power to reassign people
or reallocate resources).
Typically, spend no more
than 25% of their time on
a single project - working
at a desk to confirm
schedules, update time
lines, expedites across
groups.

Direct access to and
responsibility for the
work of all those
involved in the project,
"heavyweight" in two
respects:
1) senior managers
with expertise,
experience,
organisational power;
may even outrank
functional managers.
2) primary influence
over people working
on the development
effort and supervise
their work directly
through key functional
people on the core
teams.

Project leader, a
"heavyweight"
in the
organisation, is
given full
control over
resources
contributed by
the different
functional
groups.
Project leader
becomes the
only evaluator
of the
contribution
made by
individual team
members.

Core group often full
time dedicated and
collocated

Source: Clark and Wheelwright (1992)
Table D:

Types of Product Development Teams and Associated Leadership Styles
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Their task comprises the co-ordination of group activities, planning the work, organising
resources, leading the personnel, and monitoring progress (French and Hellriegel, 1971;
Rosenau, 1990, 1996). One of their most significant roles is the stimulation and facilitation
of group internal and boundary spanning communication (Ancona and Caldwell, 1990b,
1992), and thereby cross-functional integration (Buchanan and Badham, 1998).
Clark and Wheelwright (1992) found that heavyweight leaders spend little time at their
desks, but communicate with all project contributors in order to ensure decisions are made
and implemented whenever and wherever needed. In order to do so, Buchanan and Badham
(1998, p. 98) assume, they have to be able to "work the bureaucracy" and play "positive"
organisational politics16.

3.4.1.2

Team Composition and Degree of Involvement

A distinction between core and sub-team is often found in the literature regarding the degree
of involvement of the various functions and people associated with the product development
process. Clark and Wheelwright (1992) refer to the core team as the team that manages the
total project and the co-ordination and integration of individual functional efforts, while as
individuals, core team members represent their functions and provide leadership for their
function's inputs to the project. Grady (1994) asserts that as a minimal requirement the core
team should consist of three key functions: marketing, engineering and manufacturing17.
They are to meet on a regular basis and co-operate, co-ordinate and communicate from the
very start to the project end. They have joint responsibility to manage the project and
authority to pull in resources as required. The representation of engineering and

16 In Kotter's view (1998, p. 99) "positive” organisational politics involves: creating visionary
agendas and resource networks, collecting and using information (political diagnosis), monitoring
relationships, identifying directions of mutual interest, developing good working relationships
(different types of relationships with various groups), and establishing credibility.
17 The discussion here does not distinguish among the various categories of manufacturing employees
(e.g. process engineers, production managers, quality personnel, assemblers and skilled trade
employees). Such distinction may as well have influence on the team and thus be investigated by
future research.
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manufacturing in the core team is largely agreed upon (Shenas and Derakhshan, 1994;
Gerwin and Susman, 1996). In addition, a number of authors suggested having
representatives from HRM, marketing (Aaby and Discenza, 1993; Kumpe and Bolwijn,
1994), accounting/finance, and purchasing at the core team (Haddad, 1996b; Clark and
Wheelwright, 1992; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995). In several electronic firms, Clark and
Wheelwright (1992) found core teams consisting of six functional participants, design
engineering, marketing, quality assurance, manufacturing, finance, and human resources,
with design occasionally represented by two core team members, one for hardware and one
for software engineering. Sabbath (1996, p. 71-72) shows that the product teams in the
Boeing 777 project had all the people "necessary to design the structure, design the tools,
develop the manufacturing plan, write the contracts - everything is in that little company
[team]".
According to Aaby and Discenza (1993) the human resources representative has to be
particular active in the early stages of the development process when sub-team positions are
defined and jobs posted. Then s/he adopts an important subsequent role in training and
development. The accounting/finance person is seen as invaluable in "costing out" different
options and performing detailed analyses of options and choices identified during the course
of the project. The role of marketing they see in ensuring an effective and rapid
commercialisation. The marketing representative has to ensure that "no surprises" occur in
the transition from prototype to commercial product.
Some authors also recommend the involvement of company-external people such as key
suppliers, sub-contractors and customers into the core team (Gerwin and Susman, 1996;
Liker et al., 1996). The involvement of customer representatives would help to ensure the
"voice o f the customer" is incorporated into the design (Eversheim, 1990; Wheelwright and
Clark, 1992c). Other participants, especially from design engineering early on and
manufacturing later on, are usually not part of the core team, even though they may
frequently be dedicated to a heavyweight team for several months and over time develop the
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same level of ownership and commitment to the project as core team members. They work
primarily within a single function or sub-function (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992)
"Effective product and process development requires the integration o f specialized
capabilities" (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992, p. 9). For Brown and Eisenhardt (1995)
functional diversity increases the amount and variety of information available for the
product development process. It helps team members to understand the design process more
quickly and fully from a variety of perspectives, and thus, improves the design process
performance. But some researchers see functional heterogeneity as a disadvantage and
source of conflict for CE teams (Nicholas, 1994; Amason, Hochwarter, Thompson, and
Harrison, 1995). Diversity in the form of different "thought worlds" (Bucciarelli, 1996, p.
76; Dougherty, 1992), but also different hierarchical levels and status, and different
personalities may hamper the establishment of effective teamwork. Nicholas (1994) assumes
that functional diversity is particularly critical for strong functional organisations because
they commonly have strong functional subcultures.
Although problems of disciplinary specialisation (in terms of different orientations, goals,
subcultures) have been acknowledged in the team literature (Parker, 1994), they have so far
not been widely addressed in CE implementation concepts.

3.4.1.3

Location, Size and Dedication

Because of the complexity of product development projects (including CE projects) and the
uncertainty and ambiguity of the innovation task, physical collocation is often recommended
in the literature (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992, 1993, 1995; Bucciarelli, 1996; Componation
and Byrd, 1999). Even when the best on-line communication is available, collocation is
often considered to be preferable to a dispersed location or "physical distance" (Hauptman
and Hirji, 1999). Grady (1994) views the "direct, face-to-face human interchange with
verbal language" as the single most important communication channel within the product
development process. Druecke (1993), however, warns that collocation is not automatically
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a guarantee for effective development work, joint ownership or identification with the
project as a whole. He notes that the enthusiastic effect can easily wear off if not allowed to
develop into effective collaboration. Other authors have shown that even a world-wide
dispersed product development team can have a competitive advantage (Teresko, 1995).
Such virtual teams are increasingly been used and feasible through the use of advanced
computer and information technologies (Grady, 1994).
A general consensus exists in the literature regarding the size of cross-functional teams. It is
widely agreed, that a cross-functional team is most effective when it is comparitively small,
with up to ten (Parker, 1994; Campion and Higgs, 1995), or occasionally up to 20 members
(Sabbagh, 1996, p. 71-72). For complex development efforts, which require many
participants, Grady (1994) suggests a project team organisation with a core team and up to
four different types of sub-teams.
Regarding dedication, the innovation and CE literature often recommends a full-time
dedication of the core team members and their assignment to only one project (Clark and
Wheelwright, 1992). In practice Clark and Wheelwright (1992) found, however, that core
team members were often dedicated to two or more core teams. Sometimes this was due to a
limited pool of relevant people in an organisation, sometimes because the need for a full
time person from a function such as finance was not realised.

3.4.1.4

Extent of Integration within the Organisation

A CE Project can be carried out as a rather isolated effort in a strong functional oriented
matrix organisation. It can also be carried within a matrix organisation that is team and
project focused and has established respective structures18.

18 According to Grady (1994) a project oriented matrix organisation is characterised by functional
departments led by a supervisory hierarchy, which provide qualified personnel, tools, and standard
procedures to the project organisation. The project organisation on the other hand, is responsible for
blending these resources into a set of effective product-oriented cross-functional teams and manages
these teams to achieve project success in terms of customer satisfaction.
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Regardless of the type of matrix, the matrix organisation is described in many instances as
an imperfect attempt to combine the advantages of a project and a functional organisation
and avoid their negative aspects (Kurth, 1994, p. 164; Larson and Gobeli, 1987). The dual
membership of functional experts to both a function and a project team is often seen as a
problematic feature of matrix organisations. Kurth (1994, p. 164) however notes that the
dual membership of CE team members is not a question o f serving "two bosses" but a
question of which boss is responsible for which activities. In a stronger function-oriented
matrix, functional experts are stronger bound to their home function than to the project.
According to Shenas and Derakhshan (1994) their "loyalty" is first to their department and
only second to the team.

3.4.2

T h e P r o c e s s D im e n s io n

of

C r o s s -F u n c t io n a l T e a m s

Not only do cross-functional teams vary according to their structure, they also vary
according to a process dimension. The process dimension refers to the size and nature of the
task upon which they are engaged (task conditions). Based on the Susman-Dean model for
predicting design for manufacturability or CE effectiveness, Gerwin and Susman (1996)
assume that a large technically complex project has a much higher need for effective intra
group processes (supplemented by effective inter-group processes) than a small project with
a simple product. In addition, the process dimension encompasses the team's capacity for
problem solving and decision-making (degree of empowerment) and the way they
communicate and co-operate within the team and with the environment, as reflected in
Figure 4.

3.4.2.1

Communication and Co-operation

Communication and co-operation are highly important aspects of cross-functional team
work and cross-functional integration, and thus CE teams (Haddad, 1996b, p. 128;
Thamhain, 1994). Ancona and Caldwell (1992) distinguish between intra- and inter-team
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interaction in the communication and co-operation relationships of cross-functional teams.
The inter-team dimension refers to the co-operation and communication of the cross
functional team with multiple groups of others regarding information, resources, and support
as well as the delivery of products and services to others. Some authors refer to it as
boundary management or boundary spanning (Ancona and Caldwell, 1990b). Ancona and
Caldwell (1992) assume that the type of communication development teams engage in with
others, and not just the amount of communication, determines the performance of the team.
They identified a set of 15 distinct activities19 and developed a typology of four main types
of external interactions: ambassadorial, task co-ordinator, scouting and guarding activities.
They found that external activity is related to internal cohesion and internal task processes.
Moreover, they assume a direct link between external activity and internal processes. But
because external activity affects internal processes through its impact on performance such
direct link is hard to prove.
The intra-team dimension refers to the communication and co-operation between the
functional experts in one particular product development project and how they link their
actual work in time. This relationship shapes the nature of cross-functional integration
(Clark and Fujimoto, 1991). Wheelwright and Clark (1992c) distinguish between four
different modes or styles of upstream- and downstream interaction: the serial mode of
interaction, the early start in the dark mode, the early involvement mode, and the integrated
problem solving mode. Their key differential is the extent to which work is done in parallel.
Table E briefly describes the pattern of work and communication of the upstream and
downstream group in the four modes interaction.
In order to achieve integrative problem solving within the product development process,
specific demands are placed on both groups. The upstream group has to meet performance

19 They comprise mapping, gathering information and resources, scanning, feedback seeking, opening
up communication channels, informing, co-ordinating, negotiating, moulding, allowing entry,
translating, filtering, classifying, delivering, and protecting.
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objectives in a way that complements downstream work and makes use of what the
downstream group can do. Wheelwright and Clark (1992c) call it the design of "down
stream-friendly" solutions, which requires: a) knowledge about downstream constraints and
capabilities and skills, and b) capabilities that go beyond the narrow technical ability to
accomplish the upstream task. The downstream group on the other hand needs to engage in
early actions and an extensive dialogue with the upstream group. Such dialogue needs to
include the frequent exchange of constraints, ideas and objectives in order to take early
action to prevent costly mistakes downstream.
Furthermore, research shows that effective integration and problem solving not only requires
basic changes in the way development works. It also relies on a specific set of capabilities,
attitudes and relationships of both up- and downstream participants which management must
enforce and build over time (Wheelwright and Clark, 1994; Ancona and Caldwell, 1992),
and thus specific training and development requirements. People in the upstream group, for
example, must be willing to share preliminary information early with their downstream
colleagues and give up their rather isolated work style20. Likewise, people in the
downstream must be willing to take risks based on their best forecast of the future. Both
groups must feel comfortable in a very ambiguous environment, which requires mutual trust
based on the mutual commitment to each other's success. Wheelwright and Clark (1992c)
assume that without such commitment, engineers are less likely to expose themselves to the
personal risks inherent in integrated problem solving. They would be hesitant to expose
what actually goes on in their respective departments and to reveal weaknesses, mistakes
and limits.

20 Druecke (1993) found that average designers spend up to 80% of their work time in front of the
computer without talking to each other.
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Pattern of W ork

P attern of Communication

Example/Beneflt

Serial Mode of Interaction
downstreamers wait until
upstreamers have completely
finished design...

that then is transmitted to
downstreamers in a one-shot
transmission of information

"throwing over the wall"

Early Start in the D ark Mode
links upstream and downstream
group in time...

... but continues to employ a batch
style of communication

although downstream and
upstream group work in
parallel, and in this sense are
"concurrent"...

they still operate without
information and the problem
solving cycles in the two groups
are not linked

occurs where
downstreamers face a
deadline and need an early
start. But upstreamers
communicate only at the
end of its work, so
downstreamers have to
begin in the dark

Early Involvement Mode
move towards real integration
upstream group still involved in
design well before downstream
group begins its work ...
downstream group waits until
design is complete before start
problem solving in its own
domain

upstreamers and downstreamers
engage in two-way communication
of preliminary, incomplete
information
downstream group develops insight
about the emerging design and
participates through feedback and
interaction in the design process

downstream group
benefits:
- part design reflects better
understanding of process
and design;
- able to complete work
with fewer delays and
downstream changes

Integrated Problem Solving Mode
links upstream and downstream
group in time

links upstream and downstream in
the pattern of communication.

downstream engineers
participate in ongoing dialogue
with upstream counterparts and
use that information to get
flying start on their own work,
what changes content of
downstream work in the early
phases of upstream design

changes likely to occur in the
content of communication between
the two groups

less design changes,
greater timeliness, higher
quality, better customer
focus

Source: Wheelwright and Clark, 1992c
Table E:

Pattern of Up- and Downstream Co-operation and Communication

3.4.2.2

Empowerment

A further differential feature of cross-functional teams and factor affecting team
effectiveness is the degree of empowerment of the team (Holahan and Markham, 1996;
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Jassawalla and Sashittal, 2000). Badham (1999) distinguishes between three levels of
empowerment: work execution, innovation and governance. In the first level the team has
authority over the execution of certain work process and activities. It carries out day-to-day
business decisions including the rate of productivity, quality, work methods. Lawler (1990,
p. 24) found that this type of decision-making is often delegated to work teams in
organisations with a participative management approach. Majchrzak (1988) assumes that a
work group is more autonomous the more functions or tasks are integrated in its work
process. In contrast to Majchrzak (1988), Badham (1999) looks at the importance of the
tasks and to what extent the group is given accountability for it. At the innovation level, the
team additionally influences (via suggestions) the change of certain work and work related
issues and the creation of an appropriate work environment and climate. In the third and
highest level the team has control and decision making power over the design and execution
of work and work-related issues (processes, project management and people issues). It is a
highly empowered team that has all the skills, information, tools and authority it requires to
make the necessary decisions for the development process to proceed and to ensure high
effective teamwork (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992; Haddad, 1996a, b; Kumpe and Bolwijn,
1994) . It can take the form of a heavyweight or an autonomous team. When the borders of a
heavyweight team are not clearly defined and it is given insufficient direction by senior
management it is likely to turn into an autonomous team (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992,
1995). Haddad (1996b, p. 131) however found that cross-functional CE teams are often
insufficiently empowered. Citing an engineer from her case study of a major U.S.
automotive firm, she writes that the cross-functional team was often unable "to execute what
was agreed to in the team because they [functional experts] would go back into their
management, which is still in a different organization, and they get told that they could not
do it this way and they had to do it that way. And sometimes fo r good reasons, budget
reasons, time ..." She thus, concluded that the establishment of highly empowered
development teams requires organisational changes (structural changes plus the adoption of
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a "human resource strategy - a revised performance appraisal system - that would support
the new organizational structure") in order to allow the team a maximum control over its
decisions.
Overall, it appears that the cross-functional team is a key success factor for consistent high
performance in the new product development process (Jassawalla and Sashittal, 1999;
Holahan and Markham, 1996; Drickhamer, 1999; Barber, Huselid and Becker, 1999). It is
thus, not surprising that companies emphasised in theory and practice "actions which
directly operate on improving team abilities" (McDonough and Griffin, 1997, p. 14). Often
they focus on team training to build up broader and improved interpersonal skills and to
establish team orientation. According to McDonough and Griffin (1997, p. 11) these team
characteristics are however, only a "subset o f the set o f elements required to make teams
truly effective". The other essential factors arise from the organisational context in which the
teams are working and in which they are embedded. McDonough and Griffin (1997) argue
that unless teams are placed in an organisational context with an appropriate infrastructure,
consistent high performance in the development process can not be sustained and replicated
organisation-wide. The infrastructure needs to enforce attitudes and behaviours required for
teamwork, for example through appropriate HRM policies and practices, supportive
managerial processes and an organisational culture built on trust (Hauptman and Hirji, 1999;
Susman and Rayl, 1999).

3.5

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF CE

While it has been claimed that CE has been widely adopted by companies in many
industrialised countries, there are few detailed research accounts of the implementation of
CE (e.g. Lettice, 1995; Maddux and Souder, 1993). Even though CE implementation is often
described as protracted and difficult (Smart et al., 1995), most empirical studies have not
adequately addressed this problem. Accounts of the problematic nature of CE
implementation are mostly of general character. Existing research concentrates largely on
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prescriptive knowledge drawn from surveys (e.g. Levy, 1994; Coughlan, Voss and Hon,
1992). Buchanan and Badham (1998, p. 122) note that "stories o f failures to achieve the
predicted benefits o f implementing CE are widespread and regularly confirmed in surveys".
A number of explanations have been offered for the high failure rates and limited
effectiveness of CE. Most of them point to inappropriate organisational conditions (Liker et
al., 1996; Holahan and Markham, 1996). Factors mentioned include lack of senior
management commitment and the failure of senior management to support the establishment
of a team-oriented environment and respective structures (Susman and Dean, 1992; Gupta
and Wilemon, 1990; Fleischer, 1999; Hauptman and Hirji, 1999). Other explanations point
to a lack of real empowerment of the project team (Haddad, 1996; Holahan and Markham,
1996), a failure to exploit the boundary spanning and integrative potential of new
technologies and a narrow focus on cost cutting (Willcocks and Grint, 1997).
In order to realise the full potential of CE and achieve high levels of cross-functional
integration, changes are required not only in the technical environment, but most
importantly in the organisational context (Gerwin and Susman, 1996; Pullin, 1999). Haddad
(1996b, p. 125) stresses that while technology can play an important role, cross-functional
teams, organisational and human resources management changes are the more effective
enablers and more critical to success (see also King and Majchzak, 1996). They "can serve
either to block or enhance" the CE process (Haddad, 1996b, p. 125). Therefore Haddad
developed a CE implementation model that centres on the establishment of product-focused,
cross-functional platform teams. Its "effective operation" is supported by appropriate
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conditions in the form of organisational and technological enablers21. Table F gives an
overview of some main organisational and technological enablers.

Enabler

Characteristic

Organisational
The extent and scope of functional integration and membership pattern to achieve integration
Cross-Functional Arrangements
product focused
(e.g. Cross-Functional or
cross functional
Platform Team)
responsible for all development functions
manufacturing integration
customer/supplier integration
Cross Group Communication
meeting of technical specialists across platform teams;
collocation
staff engineer empowerment in decision-making;
Decentralisation and
fewer levels of hierarchy;
Participation
early, substantive, involvement of downstream function
employees
organisational culture shifts;
Human Resource Practices
performance appraisal system;
training matrix;
cross functional job mobility;
dual career ladders;
modified incentive compensation
Technological
The extent to w lich the latest technology is available and utilised
Building Design
conference and meeting rooms with sufficient equipment
promote collocation where possible
Computer Networking
local area network;
electronic mail
3-D solid figure creation/modification
CAD
availability of earlier versions promotes organisational learning
accessible to all team members

Source: Haddad, 1996b, p. 126
Table F:

Organisational and Technological Enablers of CE

21 Haddad (1996, p. 125) defines organisational enablers as the "changes in the organizational
structure and practices that permit platform team to achieve functional integration, to share
information across work group or status based boundaries and to collaborate across these boundaries
to solve project problems by consensus. These changes include cross-group communication,
decentralized and participatory decision-making, and human resource practices that encourage a
breaking down of traditional knowledge boundaries and control". Technological enablers are
defined as structural artifacts, equipment, systems [like communication systems and analysis tools],
and physical space designs that support cross-functional team cohesiveness, information sharing and
collaborative problem solving (Haddad, 1996, p. 125). Technological enablers also enable
geographically separated individuals to access constantly changing information about design,
manufacturing, marketing, materials, etc. (Albin and Crefeld, 1994).
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Susman and Dean (1992) offer a model for predicting design for manufacturability
effectiveness. It contains three major categories: integrative mechanisms, group process, and
codification/ computerisation, which are said to be the major independent contributors to
project outcomes. The first two are largely identical with what Haddad (1996a, b) calls
organisational enablers. The category "codification and computerisation" is more or less
equivalent to Haddad's technological enablers. Gerwin and Susman (1996) introduce a
fourth category to the Susman-Dean model: task condition. This category includes all the
variables that moderate one or more of the relationships between the first three categories
and project outcomes (e.g. technical risk and goal difficulty). The broadened model is
summarised in Table G.

Integrative
Mechanisms
- team boundaries
(suppliers,
customers)
- fewer projects
assigned
- collocation
- assign downstream
personnel upstream
- goal setting and
formal reviews
- performance
evaluation
- team-based rewards

Group Process
(Behaviour/Attitudes)
- ease of decision
making
- number of
influences
- two way
communication
- overlapping tasks
(pre-emptive,
iterative, distributive)
- release and use
of incomplete
information
- set-based design
- activity concurrency

Codification/
Computerisation
- common language
- design heuristics
- virtual collocation
- interface
technology
- scope of design
rules
- speed of access to
data
- goal programming
- computer
integration
technology

Task Condition
- newness
- riskiness
- uncertainty
- complexity
- interdependence
- design
evolution
- design
sensitivity
- early/late
product
life cycle

Source: Gerwin and Susman, 1996, p. 119
Table G:

An Organising Framework for CE Implementation

In addition to the above factors senior management was consistently found important to the
success of a CE Project (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Dimancescu and Dwenger, 1996; Albin
and Crefeld, 1994; Lettice, 1995; Kumpe and Bolwijn, 1994). CE requires far-reaching
organisational changes. They are not feasible without the strong support of senior
management.
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The implementation of CE and with it the achievement o f "high-performance new product
development" is a complex undertaking. It requires not only "a series o f single faceted
efforts undertaken sequentially", but the improvement o f various organisational aspects
simultaneously (McDonough and Griffin, 1997, p. 15).

3.6

SUMMARY

This chapter located Concurrent Engineering within the Product Innovation literature. It
showed that CE is one recent approach to improved product development, which seeks to
achieve a balance between organisational, technological and human factors in the product
development process. It also showed that CE does not have a unanimously agreed upon and
coherent definition. However, the establishment of high levels of cross-functional
integration, design integration and concurrence are seen as the core elements of CE by all of
its proponents. Even though only a few studies have discussed the appropriateness of CE for
different industries, organisations, product types and market approaches, most indicate the
general suitability of CE. Different contexts may however lead to modifications in the
means

for

realising

cross-functional

integration.

While

different

cross-functional

arrangements are possible, the cross-functional team is widely seen as a critical success
factor for CE. Such teams can, however, vary widely along a structural dimension and a
process dimension.
The chapter finally discussed the problematic nature of CE implementation. It showed that
to date there have been few detailed studies reflecting the complex and problematic nature
of the process. Despite the technical connotation of the term, CE is an organisational issue
in the sense that its successful implementation essentially requires organisational changes.
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4

H UM AN RESOURCE M ANAGEM ENT IN CONCURRENT
ENGINEERING

4.1

INTRODUCTION

While there has been an emphasis in the CE literature on technology (i.e. the technological
tools and systems to facilitate cross-functional integration), it has increasingly been
recognised that the organisational dimension is decisive for the successful implementation
of CE (DeLorge, 1992). Dunphy and Stace (1994) claim that organisational changes (like
CE) would not be effective unless accompanied by fundamental changes in a company's
approach to HRM. Clark and Mallory (1996, p. 8) take a similar position. They assume that
"there is little point in launching a culture change programme ... when reward systems and
management systems fa il to reward behaviours consistent with [the new values] serving
instead to demoralise employees". Yet, surprisingly, HRM (as a problematic concept22 and
practice) has received little attention in the CE literature, or in the product innovation
literature generally (Atuahene-Gima, 1996). Even in recent international studies comparing
CE implementation processes in various countries, HRM is given only marginal attention
(see e.g. Juergens, 1997).
While to date the role of HRM as a specialist function has not been addressed in the CE
literature (Zanko et al., 1998), a number of HR issues have attracted attention. They have
mainly been HR issues that are directly concerned with cross-functional integration, such as
team building (Thamhain and Wilemon, 1987), team leadership (Gemmili and Wilemon,
1994; Susman and Rayl, 1999), team processes and performance (Hauptman and Hirji,
1996; Moffat and Gerwin, 1994). Gerwin and Susman (1996) argue that the establishment of
cross-functional teams is no guarantee for cross-functional integration, if it is not buttressed
by supportive recruitment training and other team-oriented HRM policies and practices.

22 See for example Legge's (1995a,b) analysis of HRM and Keenoy's (1997) "HRMism
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It appears that almost all aspects of managing the new product development process under a
CE approach are linked to people management. This ranges from the selection of
appropriate cross-functional integration mechanisms to the selection of supporting
management and organisational arrangements. Holahan and Markham (1996) distinguish
between factors relating to the organisational support for cross-functional teams and factors
relating to the management of the team. The first category comprises appropriate HR
policies and practices, including performance appraisal, career management, pay and
promotion, as well as the organisational culture. The second one includes aspects of
leadership, team size, team sponsorship, team member and leader selection, team training,
and team empowerment.
However, it has been claimed that the HR issues identified in the above studies "are treated
broadly in isolation from other HRM activities; no account is made o f the need fo r
functional integration - where HRM program areas need to be treated and linked as a
systemically related whole" (Zanko et al., 1998, p. 132). Moreover, HRM issues in the wider
context of a CE integration effort have been broadly neglected. No detailed research has
been conducted, for example, on the HR implications for functional areas with the
establishment of cross-functional teams (such as the loss of expertise for the function,
absence coverage, responsibilities for career management, or professional development).
On the other hand a broad range of literature, managerial as well as organisational, has
emphasised the increasing significance of human resource management in contemporary
organisations (Storey, 1995a, b; Clark, 1993; Guest, 1995; Guest and Peccei, 1994). This
view is broadly based on the recognition of "people as the most valuable resource" in an
organisation (Sims and Sims, 1994), with HRM enabling an organisation to develop
company-specific competencies and skills that are difficult to copy and thus offer a
competitive advantage (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992c; Atuahene-Gima, 1996). In many
cases, however, this recognition is not consonant with organisational reality, despite the
rhetoric of many company vision and mission statements (Schubert and Couchman, 1998).
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Furthermore, there is no consensus in the literature about HRM and its relationship to
product development and CE. A variety of meanings and features are attached to HRM
(Keenoy, 1997; Legge, 1995a,b).
Based on the literature analysis, this chapter provides an overview of two main views of the
term HRM (HRM as synonym for personnel management and HRM as a broadened
approach to personnel management) that are commonly used in the literature. The chapter
also outlines why the author adopted the view "HRM as a broadened approach to personnel
management". The findings from the literature are summarised in the HRM in CE
framework (see Figure 5).

Human Resource Management in Concurrent Engineering

Organisational Enablers
k

HRM for CE
using the performance
enhancing potential of
HRM

- different XF arrangements
- different XFTs
- different phases of NPDP
require different HRM policies & practice

Focus
Stakeholders
Expertise
Panning Horizon

r

Personnel

>

(

Ç
l-RM

I
V

Strategic
HRM

Spedalist Firtcfion
and
Organisation-vàde Activity

Sources: Zanko et al., 1998; Schubert and Couchman, 1998; Delery and Doty, 1996; Storey,
1992;
Figure 5:

Framework: HRM in CE Implementation

The framework reflects the view of HRM as a broadened approach to HRM and
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distinguishes between HRM as a specialist function and as organisation-wide activity. It
indicates HRM's potential role in CE by establishing its contribution to organisational
performance. The individual elements of the framework are discussed in the next sections.

4.2

DIFFERENT VIEWS ABOUT HRM

The notion of HRM originated in the USA in the early 1980s and appears to increasingly
replace the term personnel management and industrial relations (Guest, 1987, 1995; Storey,
1989, 1992, 1995a,b). Two main views of HRM as a management practice are commonly
found in the literature: 1) HRM as synonym for personnel management, and 2) HRM as a
broadened approach to personnel management (Legge, 1995b).

4.2.1

HRM

as a

Sy n o n y m

fo r

P erso nnel M a n ag em ent

HRM is sometimes applied as a synonym for personnel management. Guest (1987), Legge
(1989), and Storey (1989) talk about a "modem-sounding" substitute for an "old-fashioned"
term and see HRM in this sense as a passing fad. Legge (1989) points out that HRM in this
view is no more than a rhetoric, which serves different groups of "stakeholders"23 of HRM
to prove their "legitimacy" and masks the "intensification and commodification o f labour".
(Legge, 1995a). Legge (1995a, p. 34) argues that although some changes "have taken place
in the management o f the labour process and in employment relationships, this largely
reflects a pragmatic response to opportunities and constraints in the present socio-politicoeconomic environment, rather than constituting expressions o f a coherent new employment
philosophy".

23 Legge (1995a) identifies three groups as major stakeholders of HRM: academics, line managers and
personnel managers.

71

4.2.2

HRM a s

a

Broadened Approach

to

P er so nnel M anag em ent

In another view, HRM is used as a broadened or improved approach to personnel
management, based on its welfare and professional traditions (Sisson, 1995). Storey (1992)
distinguishes between two qualitative different approaches within this view: HRM as
indicator for the more integrated use of the various "levers" of personnel management (such
as reward, appraisal, recruitment, etc.), and HRM as indicator for a more business-integrated
approach to labour management. Others see them as two distinct stages in the development
of HRM. The first one comprises the development from personnel to HRM, the second one
the development from HRM to strategic HRM24. Beaumont (1993, p. 10) describes this
development as an evolutionary process in which employees are increasingly viewed "as a
valuable resource (rather than a cost to be minimised) which, if managed, rather than
administered, effectively from the strategic point o f view, will contribute significantly to
organisational effectiveness, and thus will be a source o f competitive advantage to the
organisation

concerned".

Advocates

of the

"broadened approach

to personnel

management" view talk about a broadened focus, expertise, stakeholder base and longerterm planning horizon with the development towards strategic HRM (see Figure 6).
The view "HRM as a broadened approach to personnel management" was adopted in this
thesis as the author shares the view that "human assets, as opposed to others, can increase
in value. An employee who develops skills and abilities becomes a more valuable resource"
(Schuler, Dowling, Smart, and Huber, 1992, p. 53). In order to survive, companies need to

24 Beaumont (1993) identifies three ways the term "strategic" is commonly applied to HRM. 1) the
organisational level at which key decisions are made (top level) and their planning horizon (long
term) (suggesting that strategic HRM is strongly influenced by top management decisions, in a direct
or indirect way, and HRM specialists are represented at the top level of a company. 2) the coverage
of employees by HRM practices (including the abolition of the sharp distinction between blue and
white collar employees and their different management). 3) the explicit (two-way) linkage between
the substantive nature of HRM decisions and the substantive nature of the external, competitive
strategy of the individual organisation (i.e. the strategic integration or "strategic fit" of HRM with
business strategy, Guest, 1987; Legge, 1995).
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secure employees' knowledge and gain their commitment to which HRM and participative
management approaches provide an important key.
With the emergence of new forms of partnerships, networks, strategic alliances and other
boundary-spanning relationships not only employees of the home organisation but also
employees of other companies contribute to the outcome and success of a project and thus,
the organisational performance. Zanko et al. (1998, p. 134) refer to them as "cross
organisational members" of the CE team, individuals under foreign "contracts fo r service”.

HRM - A Broadened Approach to Personnel Management
Personnel
l_______ -

Employees of own company. ...................
Employees of own company (Incl. team s).
..... Sharp dlstrictlon between blue/white
Individual employee seen as resource, which
o f p o licy collar. Individual employee seen as cost
contributes to organisational effectiveness,
& p ra c tic e to be minimised.
when managed rather than administrated.

Areas of
Expertise

Personnel Administration, W elfare
Service & Industrial Relation
Short-term planning horizon.

Stakeholders

Personnel Specialists
"Clerks, Contract Managers'

Integration with
Business Strategy

Largely not
considered.

Strategic

HRM

HRM

Employees of own company, but also
customer/supplier representatives involved
in team s of own firm.
Single status.
H R seen as competitive advantage.
Long-term planning horizon.

Unrelated H R functions put into relation to
each other.
More individual employee-oriented practices
and arrangements.
Strategic perspective/orientation introduced.
Longer-term planning horizon.................

Distinction between HR M as specialist and
generic organisation-wide activity.
H R M Specialists: "architect" activities
H R M as organisation-wide activity:
H R M line accountability with managers and
team s supported by H R M systems
administrators and consultants.

H R M Specialists
Functional Managers, Project Managers,
(Project) Team s

H R M Specialists ("Architects" represented
at highest company level)
Functional & Project Managers, Teams
Top M anagement

Patchy and incomplete.
(Contributions to business strategy formulations.)

Integration achieved.
H R M specialists involved with formulation
of business strategy.
Tw o way relationship between business
planning/strategy and H R planning/strategy
consistence with "architect" activities.

Sources: Storey, 1992, 1995c; Sisson, 1995; Clark, 1993; Guest 1987
Figure 6:

HRM - A Broadened Approach to Personnel Management

They may be representatives of suppliers, customers, or sub-contractors. Zanko et al. (1998)
suggest that with the globalisation of co-operation and employment relationships the focus
of conventional HRM policy and practice broadens. It increasingly embraces not only the
internal environment (i.e. employees) but also the external environment (in the form of
cross-organisational team members and other cross-organisational players). The external
environment increasingly considered in the design of appropriate HRM policies and
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practices (i.e. implications for involvement in team building events, training, and rewards)
that promote innovation and cross-functional teamwork.
With the growing significance of HRM, personnel matters are said to be not only a concern
and task of HR managers, as discussed later. Some researchers see this trend as a threat to
the HR function25. Others see it as a need to redefine the HRM function and its roles and to
stronger differentiate between HRM as a generic organisation-wide activity and HRM as a
specialist function (Tson and Fell, 1986). The HR literature offers a differentiation of HRM
into three distinct HRM areas or functions: HRM strategy, HRM line accountability and HR
systems (Boxall and Dowling, 1990; Wittingslow, 1997). This follows the common
distinction between three levels of managerial work (strategic, managerial, operational
level). Dunphy and Stace (1994) suggest a fourth function, a HRM change consultancy.
Each area/function is the domain of one or more particular stakeholder groups and requires
specific expertise. These main stakeholder groups are: HRM strategists, HRM change
consultants, HR systems administrators, senior management, and line management (Russ,
Galang, and Ferris, 1998; Boxall and Dowling, 1990; Wittingslow, 1997; Dunphy and Stace,
1994). Table H summarises the roles and respective tasks of the stakeholders in each HRM
area.
HRM strategists have been commonly described in the literature as a small but high
influential group of HRM professionals (Dunphy and Stace, 1994; Boxall and Dowling,
1990). They focus on HRM strategy formulation and adjustment, closely co-operate with

25 See for example Wittingslow's (1997) argument about HRM's risk of extinction as a traditional
oriented and a controlling function, its decreasing impact on the survival of an organisation, which
seem to be supported by trends towards a decline in staff of HR Departments (Brewster and
Hegewisch, 1994; Sisson, 1995). Other authors perceive the rundown of personnel departments as a
response to the integration of personnel matters into business strategies (see Purcell, 1995,
Armstrong, 1989; Legge, 1989), and the diminishing need for traditional core expertise in collective
bargaining (Guest; 1995) or explain the trend with the efficiency gains of information technologies
and the data processing capability of modem HRM information systems, which enable companies to
rationalise and simplify their data processing also in the personnel area and thus contribute to the
reduction of staff in this area and the increased outsource of traditional HRM activities like payroll
(Andrewartha, 1997).

74

senior management and proactively influence business and change strategies.

FIRM Area/
Function

HRM
Strategy

HRM Line
Account
ability

HR Systems

HRM
Change
Consult
ancy

Stakeholder Group / Role
senior management; HRM
strategists - small high
empowered group, actively
involved in development of
corporate business strategy, incl.
overall HRM strategy
functional managers, project
managers, teams - carrier of
HRM line accountability

HR systems administrators
responsible for design,
functioning and delivery of
operational HR systems
HRM change consultants
working with line and project
managers and teams to reach
agreed goals for change

Task
- environmental monitoring
- strategy formulation
- design of change programs
- development of HRM strategies
- design of organisational culture
- development of executive elite
- personnel selection
- work systems analysis, development
- employee development, appraisal
- application of policy systems
- team building, organisation development
such as
- personnel information systems,
- reward and incentive schemes
- superannuation schemes,
- performance management systems,
- workforce planning systems
- advisoiy/consultancy role in areas as work
design, skills formation, training and
development
- change catalyst/process facilitation

Source: Dunphy and Stace, 1994
Table H:

Differentiation of HRM into Distinct HRM Areas or Functions

Thus, they have a significant impact on the survival and success of a company and its
organisational performance (Boxall and Dowling, 1990, p. 195). Following Tyson and Fell's
(1986) differentiation of HRM as a generic organisation-wide activity and specialist
function, HRM strategists basically represent HRM as a specialist (function)26.

26 Tyson and Fell (1986) define HRM as a specialist function (respectively HRM specialists) as a
function (or person) concerned with the development and implementation of a HRM strategy linked
to the company's business strategy, as well as the elaboration and establishment of appropriate
employment policies and practices that support the achievement of the organisational goals in
conjunction with and through line managers and employees. The specialist function can be taken up
by external or internal representatives, and does not necessarily fall together with the HR
Department. Rather than having a centralised department and a HR director it is conceivable that the
company's HRM strategy is formulated and driven from senior management (Mansfield, 1997, p.
15).
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According to Wittingslow (1997, p. 108), their ability to "generate new solutions” and
influence change processes with their "level o f knowledge" will strongly determine the
future reputation of HRM. Sisson (1995, p.100) however found that the HR function in the
UK is still largely made up of "clerks o f works" and "contract managers" who perform
relatively routine administrative functions. The number of "architects'^ 7 on the other hand
remained relatively small. These findings were based on the three Workplace Industrial
Relations Surveys (WIRS, carried out in 1980, 1984, 1990) and the two company-level
industrial relations survey (CLIRS, carried out in 1985 and 1992). Moreover, the position of
personnel specialists towards organisational change programs is often reactive. They do
usually not instigate the programs. This in turn deprives them "of control over the nature
and pace o f change" (Marks, Findlay, Hine, McKinlay, and Thompson, 1996, p. 2).
In contrast to HRM as a specialist function, HRM as a generic organisation-wide activity
comprises an organisation's efforts, services and intentions, both explicit and covert, towards
the management of its employees. It finds its expression through the HRM strategy, HR
policies and practices, and is thus represented by all of the above HRM stakeholder groups
(Tyson and Fell, 1986). With the development from HRM to strategic HRM (as HRM
becomes strategically significant in an organisational sense), senior management is evolving
as a particular significant stakeholder group of HRM. Beer et al. (1985) argue "that HRM is
too important to be left to these [HR] specialists" (Guest and Peccei, 1994, p. 222). HRM is
becoming "increasingly vested in senior and middle line management, not ju st as a delivery
mechanism fo r new approaches in employee relations, but as 'the designers and drivers o f
the new ways'" (Legge, 1995b, p. 133). Dunphy and Stace (1994, p. 8) talk about the need of
"a better integration o f organisational effort so that the maximum synergy is achieved
between business, change and human resource strategies".27

27 See Tyson and Fell, 1986, p. 21-27, for a description of personnel roles: "clerk of the works",
"contracts manager", "architect".
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This requires a close co-ordination and co-operation between HRM strategists and senior
managers.
In addition, HRM accountability becomes more and more a responsibility of line
management. According to a variety of surveys (Brewster and Hegewisch, 1994; Sisson,
1995, p. 92) line managers are already spending a large proportion of their time on
personnel matters and their qualification in this area has increased significantly. Line
managers have become the initiators of many changes in current HRM policies and practices
in many organisations (Storey, 1992). Legge (1995b, p. xv) calls it the "internalisation o f
the importance o f human resources on the part o f line managers". Moreover, not only line
managers, but also project leaders and teams, take increasingly responsibility and ownership
of many HRM aspects at the operational level (Dunphy and Stace, 1994). Sisson (1995, p.
106) however sees the devolution of HRM responsibility to line management, as the
"corollary o f fundamental changes in working arrangements, rather than any inherent belief
in the H RM approach itself.
According to Dunphy and Stace (1994), HRM consultants may support the carriers of HRM
line accountability. HRM consultants may play an advisory or consultancy role in areas such
as work design, skills formation, training and development. They also work as change
catalysts or process facilitators, as line managers as a rule are not HRM professionals and
thus do not have a great exposure to HRM concepts and methods. The differentiation
between HRM strategists and consultants may be useful in larger organisation. For smaller
companies it is conceivable that HRM strategists cover this area.
HR systems administrators, finally, constitute a group of few, very knowledgeable HR
personnel, who are responsible for the design, functioning and delivery of operational HR
systems. They also function as a point of contact particularly for the carrier of HRM line
accountability as they have the knowledge about the formal requirements and procedures in
all employment questions.
The above analysis of HRM as a broadened approach to personnel management and the role
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of the main HRM stakeholder groups guided the investigation of HRM in

the CE

implementation process in MILSYS. As mentioned earlier, it was necessary to distinguish
between HRM as a specialist function and as an organisation-wide activity. The preliminary
case study brought about that company representatives commonly equated HRM with the
HR Department. But the HR Department does not necessarily fall together with HRM as a
specialist function. A restriction of the investigation to the HR Department does not provide
a full explanation of HRM issues, HRM policies and practices that play a role in the
implementation of CE. It does not explain line managers', senior managers' and project
teams' perception and understanding of HRM in the CE implementation process.

4.3

HRM AND ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE

An important issue in the discussion about the strategic significance of HRM is its impact on
organisational performance and thus - in the context of this thesis - its impact on the
performance of cross-functional teams in the product development process under a CE
approach. People are increasingly seen as important source of sustainable competitive
advantage and the effective management of human capital may be the ultimate determinant
of organisational performance (Youndt, Snell, Dean, and Lepak, 1996). With its
development from personnel management to strategic HRM, HRM becomes increasingly
concerned with performance improvement. According to this view, HRM contributes more
and more to the overall organisational performance and thus, the success of the company in
the market place (Delery and Doty, 1996).
Despite the criticism of being too anecdotal and empirical, and being without a sound
theoretical foundation, the literature on strategic HRM adopts three theoretical positions in
explaining the relationship between HRM and organisational performance. They are referred
to as the universalistic, the contingency and the configurational perspective (Delery and
Doty, 1996, p. 802). Not all three approaches are equally appropriate for explaining the
relationship between SHRM and organisational performance. Delery and Doty (1996) even
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argue that they do not necessarily exclude each other but may exist simultaneously as
reflected in Figure 7.

Source: Delery and Doty, 1996
Figure 7:

4.3.1

HRM and Organisational Performance

U n iv e r s a l is t ic P e r s p e c t iv e

Representatives of the universalistic perspective adopt a "best practice" approach. They
claim that certain individual HR practices are more suited than others in achieving better
organisational performance regardless of the kind of organisation, strategy or environment
(Walton and Susman, 1987; Wright and MacMahan, 1992). Delery and Doty (1996, p. 806)
identify seven key strategic HR practices that are consistently considered strategic important
in a diverse literature, and viewed as "critical characteristics o f employment systems in
organisations". They comprise training systems, internal career management, resultsoriented appraisals, profit-sharing, employment security, employee participation, and job
description. Various studies (see Becker, 1976; Huselid, 1995) support the direct
relationship between HRM practices and organisational performance. They indicate that the
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"universalistic perspective is a valid theoretical perspective fo r SHRM theories" (Delery
and Doty, 1996, p. 807). Howes (1997, p. 45), on the other hand, agues that there is no such
"best practice" model. He notes "while many trends are strong, there are notable
exceptions". Research has shown that the appropriateness of these practices is dependent on
certain strategic conditions (Delery and Doty, 1996), which is more consonant with a
contingency perspective.

4 .3.2

C o n t in g e n c y P e r s p e c t iv e

In contrast to the linear, unidirectional view of the universalistic perspective, the
contingency perspective is built on the assumption of a more complex, interactive
relationship between HRM and organisational performance (Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick
Hall, 1988; Sisson, 1995; Lawler, 1990). Its proponents claim that there is no "one best way"
or set of "bestpractices" an organisation can readily adopt, because such a view does not
take contextual conditions into account (Howes, 1997; Purcell, 1995). Any given business
strategy requires certain HR practices in order to positively influence organisational
performance (Youndt et al., 1996; see also Beaumont, 1993, Schuler and Jackson, 1987). A
number of researchers (Dunphy and Stace, 1994; Beer and Spector, 1985) go a step further.
They claim that the relationship between HRM and business strategy is not a direct one, but
depends on the required degree of change. The business strategy affects the HRM strategy,
but the organisational change strategy modifies the relationship. In line to the
configurational perspective, they argue that "HRM strategies are much more strongly
related to strategies fo r organisational change than to business strategies" (Dunphy and
Stace, 1994, p. 118).

4.3.3

C o n f ig u r a t io n a l P e r s p e c t iv e

Advocates of the configurational perspective apply a systems view. They argue that certain
patterns (Wright and McMahan, 1992), configurations or bundles (MacDuffie,1995) or
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combinations (Ischniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi, 1994) of HR practices are more
appropriate to certain types of business strategies than others. They also claim that the better
the fit, the higher the performance gains. They use a holistic approach that is based on the
definition of ideal types of HRM or employment systems. Their research is concerned with
"how the pattern o f multiple independent variables is related to a dependent variable rather
than with how individual independent variables are related to the dependent variable"
(Delery and Doty, 1996, p. 804). They claim that organisational effectiveness can only be
reached if the HRM system ensures horizontal (internal consistency of an organisation's
HRM policies and practices) as well as vertical fit (congruence of the HRM system with
other organisational characteristics such as firm strategy).
For Delery and Doty (1996, p. 828) all three perspectives are "viable and lead to different
assumptions about the relationships among HR practices, strategy, and organisational
performance". Some HR practices always seem to have a positive effect on organisational
performance, while the relationship between some HR practices and organisational
performance is contingent on a company's business strategy.
For the investigation of HRM in CE, Delery and Doty's (1996) research implies that the
application of certain individual HRM practices, just as the application of HRM practices
which are contingent on the organisation's business strategy, will have a direct impact on the
performance achieved in product development projects under CE. It suggests that
organisations can positively influence the achievement of high project performance in
product development under a CE approach by establishing "internally consistent, mutually
supportive HRM" and HRM practices consistent with the behaviours emphasised in CE
(Zanko et al., 1998, p.132).

4.4

HRM IN CE

Organisational enablers play a decisive role in the implementation of CE and are comprised
largely of HRM issues. As discussed earlier, many aspects of managing the new product
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development process under a CE approach are linked to people management (such as the
selection of appropriate cross-functional arrangements or the selection of tools and
techniques appropriate for cross-functional teamwork) (Zanko et al, 1998). They require the
consideration of various HRM issues (e.g. team member selection, performance
measurement and rewards, career management, team member development and team
building) (Susman, and Rayl, 1999; Hauptman and Hirji, 1999; Barber, Huselid and Becker,
1999). However, as also outlined earlier, the CE literature has not adequately addressed the
importance of HRM. Although growing attention is paid by CE research to organisational
factors and people management issues particularly for achieving cross-functional integration
(Haddad, 1996a; Ruchala, 1995; Calabrese, 1999), no detailed empirical studies of the
implementation of CE have so far analysed the role of HRM in this process (AtuaheneGima, 1996).
Addressing the issue of cross-functional integration, CE research takes up perspectives from
the earlier organisational studies literature (e.g. Bums and Stalker, 1961; Lawrence and
Lorsch, 1967a, b; Galbraith, 1973). Lawrence and Lorsch (1967b) discuss integration28 as
an overriding principle for an effective product development process. They argue that the
segmentation into departments influences behaviour and performance because departments
strive to reach the best possible result for their sub-function even if this leads to
complications or problems for other functions or departments.
Based on a review of the product innovation, team, organisation and HRM literatures, the
author identified a number of key areas where HRM policies and practices could support
and facilitate CE and for which CE may have significant implications respectively. These
areas are: performance measurement and reward, training and development, selection and
staffing, job design, career management, and employee relations (Campion and Higgs, 1995;

28 Lawrence and Lorsch (1967b, p. 11) define integration as the "quality of the state of collaboration
that exists among departments that are required to achieve unity of effort by the demands of the
environment.
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Holahan and Markham, 1996; Forrester and Drexler, 1999; Calabrese, 1999; Hauptman and
Hiiji 1999). Research suggests that these areas are interrelated (Zanko et al., 1998), but an
holistic strategic approach to organisational integration has not yet been developed.
Although the interdependence of the various HR elements is recognised within HR research,
it has so far not been applied to CE.

4.4.1

P erformance M anagement

Performance measurement (Hauptman and Hirji, 1996, 1999; Thamhain and Wilemon.
1987; Pullin, 1999) or performance appraisal (Holahan and Markham, 1996) or performance
evaluation (Susman and Dean, 1992) for teams is widely discussed as a critical issue for
effective teamwork (Katzenbach and Smith, 1993; Ancona and Caldwell, 1990a; Shaw and
Schneier, 1995). However, team-based performance measurement systems are not widely
applied and their linkage to compensation and rewards is not well established (Parker,
1994). As numerous studies have shown, many organisations still manage teams as though
the individuals were simply working on their own (Haddad, 1996a). Moreover, research and
development and product development activities generally are seen as processes that are
difficult to measure, and thus often get neglected. Cross-functional teams that rely on
traditional performance measurement systems often fail to synchronise and link the different
functional strategies and performance goals. They do not achieve the project goal because
its team members tend to focus more on their functional responsibilities (Parker, 1994).
Team performance is not easy to measure. Team performance is the results or outcome
achieved by the team but also the team process and the individual team members' behaviour.
Ancona and Caldwell (1992) found that external activity, internal processes, and
performance interact with and influence each other. They also found that the pattern of
external activities is a better predictor of team performance than the frequency of
communication. Beyond it they suggest that stages in the development of a team play a role
in team behaviour. A strategy that works in the early life of a group may not support positive
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performance over time. Ancona and Caldwell point out that teams not only need to manage
the work flow structure but also the power structure in order to maintain a high level of
performance over time (see also Zurger and Modesto, 1990). In addition Cenek (1995)
assumes that team member behaviour is an equally important measure of team performance.
Measuring only outcome, or process or behaviour or two of them, he argues signals or leads
to the recognition of wrong results, processes or behaviours.
A number of authors agree that an appropriate performance measurement process for teams
is not limited to the actual performance measurement, or goal tracking (Ancona and
Caldwell, 1992; Feldman, 1996; Campion and Higgs, 1995). It consists of a circle of
activities with three related stages - goal setting, goal tracking and feedback. Goal setting
requires clarifying who is responsible for setting individual and team goals, to determine
what these goals are and how they are linked. It also requires to determine how the various
factors are measured, who is measuring them and how often (Haddad, 1996b; Parker, 1994;
Barber, Huselid and Becker, 1999). In the feedback process feedback needs to be provided
to both the team and the individual. Team and individual goals are adjusted according to the
respective stage of the development process and the progress in the team formation (Parker,
1994).

4.4.2

Rew ards

The relationship between performance measurement and rewards is often discussed in the
literature as another critical issue in establishing highly effective teams (Barber, Huselid and
Becker, 1999; Clark and Wheelwright, 1992; Shaw and Schneier, 1995; Drickhamer, 1999).
The reward system is an important determinant of behaviour in organisations and a
motivational means in the sense that it guides people's beliefs about the consequences of
their actions. According to Lawler (1990, p. 28) "people are motivated to perform an action
when they perceive that the consequences o f the action are favourable to them". Rewards
include remuneration as well as intrinsic and non-monetary extrinsic benefits. In the context
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of CE many researchers view appropriate rewards for cross-functional development teams as
an important enabler of CE (Gerwin and Susman, 1996; Haddad, 1996b; Nicholas, 1994;
Ruchala, 1995). Hauptman and Hirji (1999) argue that a reward system for teams needs to
reward joint outcomes rather than individual technical or functional excellence. They
discuss group-based rewards as the proportion of influence of group outcomes both on the
group members' rewards and on performance evaluations. Susman and Rayl (1999) talk
about "project-based rewards" and argue that such rewards have a positive influence on
project outcomes because they motivate team members to focus at least as much on projectbased goals as on function-based goals. Feldman (1996, p. 216) however found that only
few organisations have adjusted their reward and compensation systems in order to
recognise team work appropriately. The reward systems in many organisations focus solely
on individual behaviour and hence can obstruct teamwork (Parker, 1994, p. 118; Armstrong
and Murlis, 1995). The development of group incentive plans, such as gainsharing, skill or
knowledge-based pay and various group bonus schemes (see Appendix I), is seen as a
possible solution regarding team rewards. Cleland et al. (1995) found that such plans have
become more widespread. Most of these schemes, though, do not focus on service areas and
are rarely operated among knowledge workers who form the majority of team members in
cross-functional development teams (Parker, 1994; Feldman, 1996). More widely used are
non-monetary rewards to recognise team efforts. Non-financial incentives in the form of
awards of various kinds are used on their own as well as a complement to financial
incentives. Despite the broader application of non-monetary rewards, their motivational
value is frequently underplayed in practice (Feldman, 1996).
Parker (1994, p. 134) suggests a number of guidelines for the development of team reward
systems. Firstly, the system needs to be well communicated and transparent. Secondly, team
and individual awards must support the cross-functional team concept and emphasise the
importance of teams for the company. The third point is that the rewards need to be clearly
related to the team's performance (line of sight concept), but individual team members need
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to be recognised as well. And fourthly, cash and non-cash rewards as well as informal
methods for recognition should be used in a frequent manner. In addition, Feldman (1996)
suggests that individual and team rewards for project teams should be balanced according to
role of the individual in the team and the amount of time he/she spends on the team(s).
In an environment appropriate for CE, functional departments take on support character^.
They will be responsible for maintaining the high and up-to-date knowledge base of thenstaff members (through small improvements in training, tools, and procedures based on
lessons learned from product development projects and the continuing study of available
technology, tools, methods and the capabilities of competitors). They will also need to
enable them "to apply department-approved standard best practices and tools in the
development and production o f products" (Grady, 1994, p. 23). Grady (1994) thus argues
that the functional management personnel should be awarded on the basis of thencontribution to the product development success. On one hand this contribution should be
based on the aggregate performance of their personnel on development projects (in the form
of major review results, budget and schedule performance, and noteworthy personal efforts
recognised by project management). On the other hand it should include departmental
conditions like toolbox excellence, and personal training program effectiveness.
So far it appears that the literature on rewards systems for teams has not specifically
addressed reward schemes for cross-functional development teams (Lawler, 1990; Belcher,
1991; Kessler, 1995), though appropriate reward schemes appear to be a critical factor for
sustaining the long-term success of CE.29

29 Grady's view is that functional departments provide personnel to development projects and monitor
the performance of their specialists on the product development team. They provide coaching and
on-the-job training. But they are forbidden to provide project work direction for those personnel in
terms of what tasks to do nor when them to do (but may provide help and advice in how to do thenprogram tasks).
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4.4.3

T r a in in g

and

D evelopm ent

Working in a team requires other skills and behaviours both from employees and managers
than working individually (Campion and Higgs, 1995; Kormos, 1998). Team training is
thus, widely seen as a key issue in the successful establishment of cross-functional project
teams and effective teamwork (Fleischer, 1999; Componation and Byrd, 1999). The
literature strongly emphasises the importance of team building at the beginning of a project
in order to overcome divergent expectations, reach consensus and agree to a common goal
(Thamhain and Wilemon, 1987; Clark and Wheelwright, 1992; Grady, 1994). Different
functional specialists have different functional interests, perspectives, different object or
term worlds, and different ways of "work" (Dimancescu and Dwenger, 1996; Bucciarelli,
1996; Kurth, 1994; Wheelwright and Clark, ). Druecke (1994, p. 241) argues that if a joint
ownership of the project (in the form of a mutual agreement and common goa) is missing, it
is very likely that team members "will continue to be oriented on the interests o f their
(home) departments at the expense o f an optimisation o f the project as a whole". Clark and
Wheelwright (1992) suggest the creation of a contract book on the basis of a team charter
(provided by senior management) as one of the initial team building events. While the team
charter lays out the team's mission in broad terms, the contract book defines in detail, the
basic plan to achieve the stated goal. Componation and Byrd (1999) talk about the need for a
Memorandum of Authority (MOA) which clearly defines roles and responsibilities and team
leader authority, and deals with the team member different expectations.
Though the leadership of a team is crucial, as discussed earlier, it is important that
everybody involved in the project team has an understanding of effective problem solving.
Bowen et al. (1994a, b, c) argue that the way "the development team takes action ..., the way
it frames and defines the problem, generates alternatives, organises and conducts tasks, and
implements solutions, determines the speed, efficiency and effectiveness o f problem
solving". This points to social and methodological skills training as a significant element of
team training. Lawler (1990) and Wheelwright and Clark (1992c) suggest that team training
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should consist of problem analysis, decision-making and conflict management techniques,
meeting and communication rules as well as interpersonal skills. These training components
would enable problem solving and communication across traditional functional boundaries
and qualify the team members to deal better with uncertainty, ambiguity, and confusion (see
e.g. Hauptman and Hiiji, 1999).

4 .4.4

S e l e c t io n

The selection of the team members was identified by the author the fourth key area where
HRM policies and practices could support and facilitate CE. The composition of the cross
functional team has a significant impact on a team's effectiveness and thus requires not only
the consideration of technical but also interpersonal skills. According to Jassawalla and
Sashittal (2000) this consideration is particularly critical in the selection of the project
leader. The literature suggests the consideration of criteria such as status, hierarchy level,
interpersonal attributes, knowledge and experience in the selection of employees for the
cross-functional team. Haddad (1996b) and Nicholas (1994) assume that different status or
hierarchical level of functional experts has implications on the teamw ork process and make
cross-functional communication and co-operation more difficult.
Controversy exists about the required knowledge of team members (Klein and Maurer,
1995). Parker (1994) takes the view that the cross-functional team requires specialists. He
asks, "how can specialisation be out when at the same time cross-functional teams are
composed o f experts. What else are experts than specialists?". By contrast, other researchers
assume that the team members should be more generalists. According to Clark and
Wheehvright (1992, p. 16) "the team achieves an effective system design by using generalist
skills applied by broadly trained team members, with few er specialists and, on occasion,
less depth in individual component solutions and technical problem solving". Klein and
Maurer (1995, p. 93) argue that it is necessary to "retain technical experts" but who also
posses "integrative knowledge across multiple functions". Campion and Higgs (1995)
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discuss the employee's preference for a certain type of work as a critical selection criterion.
Such preferences may influence an employee's reactions to a job and can impact on team
effectiveness. Some employees prefer to work in teams and are good team players, others
prefer to work alone and are better as individual contributors.
A number of authors talk about particular team roles that should be represented at the team
and thus taken in consideration when staffing a cross-functional team (Belbin, 1981).
According to Kormos (1998), a Canadian bus manufacturer turned to psychographic
profiling (known as Belbin analysis) to help select CE team members. The analysis showed
who was likely to be compatible with what kind of team-mates and would pull in the same
direction as the rest of the group. Johne and Snelson (1988) identify three roles critical to
product innovation: the creative scientist, the entrepreneur, and the project manager.
From the discussion it appears that the technical skills and expertise of a team member are
not sufficient if not accompanied by interpersonal skills as well as the attitudes and values
that support teamwork and integrated problem solving (Holahan and Markham, 1996).

4.4.5

J o b D e s ig n

Job design is discussed in the literature as another key issue of cross-functional team
effectiveness30. According to Campion and Higgs (1995), job design in a team environment
needs to consider aspects of participation, task variety, task wholeness and interdependence.
Task interdependence is seen as the dependence of team members on one another in
completing a project and sharing resources. Task variety includes the opportunity to engage
in different team tasks, allows members to use a wider range of their skills and increases
flexibility and understanding. Hauptman and Hirji (1999), for example, argue that job
rotation is an effective way of lessening cultural tensions and overcoming language barriers
in cross-functional teams. Task wholeness, the level of responsibility for an entire project,

30 These discussions are largely based on earlier research on job design, see for example Hackman
(1979); Hackman R., and Oldham, G.R. (1980); Slocum and Sims (1980).
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increases motivation by enhancing each team members' sense of ownership and control over
a meaningful piece of work. Participation refers to the empowerment of the team to make
decisions that increase the team members' sense of responsibility and ownership towards
team processes and results. Susman and Rayl (1999, p. 233) argue that "team-decision
making" impact project outcomes directly "by motivating team members to act in the best
interest o f the project without mediation by group process". Black and Gregersen (1997)
assume that team-decision making has a positive influence on project outcomes because it
broadens the team's problem-solving capability and encourages team members to internalise
project-based goals.
As shown earlier, the issue of empowerment is given broad attention in the CE and
innovation literature, (Badham, 1999; Clark and Wheelwright, 1992, Haddad, 1996a, b).
Gerwin and Susman (1996, p. 118) argue that in order to realise the full potential of CE,
changes are required in the organisational environment and its traditional power structure as
decision making authority inevitably has to be transferred from functional managers to the
project manager and CE team (see also Hauptman and Hiiji, 1999). This includes a
redefinition of the role of functional departments and functional managers. As discussed
earlier, functions will become the provider of support for projects, for example, in the form
of qualified personnel. But the project leader, who is also responsible for the team budget
and schedule, gives the direction for the project work and becomes responsible for project
personnel. Componation and Byrd (1999) in this context talk about the need of modified
personnel reporting procedures that allow the team leader rather than the functional manager
to prepare and carry out team members' performance evaluations.

The project leader

however works closely with the functional managers regarding the performance evaluation
of the team members. These data will then be integrated into the "department ranking and
rating list used as basis fo r all administrative actions" (training needs, compensation
adjustments, promotions, status quo, setback decisions, program assignment considerations)
(Grady, 1994, p. 24).
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Another aspect of job design in a team environment, particularly in product development
teams, relates to the balance between order and stability and creativity (Kumpe and Bolwijn,
1994). Grady (1994) argues that a tight, hands-on management of innovation, rigid
prescriptions and a lack of rewards for new ideas destroy creativity31. Disciplined reviews
and formalised processes on the other hand are viewed as essential in order to ensure the
timeliness and quality of the design process, to ensure that customer requirements are met,
and to prevent that errors get passed on (Grady, 1994; Fleischer, 1999; Kormos, 1998).
Purcell (1995) argues that it is the balance between creativity and discipline that ensures
high performance and the desired innovation potential.

4 .4.6

Ca r eer M a n ag em en t

The issue of career management in the context of cross-functional teamwork in product
development has not been widely addressed in the literature. A number of authors suggest
the establishment of a dual career path and a shift from predominantly vertical to more
lateral promotions (Holahan and Markham, 1996). Haddad (1996a) criticised the traditional
career system because it does no promote technical excellence equally to a managerial
career. In order to be promoted past a certain point (and qualify for a higher compensation
level and bonus), she notes, engineers become managers regardless of whether they have the
inclination or talent for a managerial position. A dual career path system, by contrast,
provides the opportunity to excel in either a management or a technical position. With the
shift from predominantly vertical to more lateral promotions, team members have the
opportunity to broaden their knowledge and expertise in other than the home area. Kumpe
and Bolwijn (1994) argue that such a practice increases mutual understanding and fosters
communication and co-operation within the team.

31 See for example Armabile (1998) for a detailed discussion about creativity.
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4 .4.7

Culture

of

Tr u st

For successful cross-functional teamwork in general and under a CE approach the literature
repeatedly suggests

a participative management approach,

commitment,

and the

establishment of a culture of trust (Forrester and Drexler, 1999; Jassawalla and Sashittal,
1999; Thamhain and Wilemon, 1987). A number of authors look at the issue of trust among
team members, others discuss it as an interorganisational dimension.
Trust is a context specific and conditional relationship with mutual obligations and the aim
to keep a balance over time between various partners. Thamhain and Wilemon (1987) found
mutual trust within the cross-functional product development team as a "driver”32 to high
team performance. Jassawalla and Sashittal (2000) found that "higher levels o f trust"
attribute to a team climate, where members are more likely to admit mistakes when they
occur, share and solicit information openly and are willing to participate in dialogues that
reduce hidden agendas that impede product development activities. King and Majchrzak
(1996) argue teams have to overcoming differences in professional status (i.e. between
design and production engineers including differences in social and financial treatment).
Other authors argue that the establishment of mutual trust is influenced by whether the
different parties (i.e. up- and downstream groups) share a common vision and direction and
how this vision is translated into clear, specific objectives (Susman and Dean, 1992);
Katzenbach and Smith, 1993). Trust develops when all partners support these objectives,
have a common time frame for achieving them and are provided with clearly identifiable
benefits. They also need to be committed to a collaborative decision-making style that
enables partners to identify synergies. Attitudes like finger pointing and blaming are
counterproductive in establishing trust and thus, result in reduced commitment to the project
and a less successful development process (Druecke, 1994).

32 Thamhain and Wilemon (1987) define "drivers" as factors associated with the project environment
that are enhancing team effectiveness.
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Trust as an interorganisational dimension becomes increasingly recognised as a strategic
tool and essential prerequisite for successful design processes (Sabbagh, 1996, p. 331;
Bucciarelli, 1996, 144). Companies must learn to trust their people and encourage them to
use neglected creative capacities33, argues Kanter (1989). As with far-reaching
organisational improvement initiatives, building up trust requires time, hard work and open
communication (Howarth, 1997; Cenek, 1995). Trust, as an organisational concept, requires
other values, attitudes and behaviours on the part of the management than the conventional
management approach with a "low trust relation". A crucial role in establishing new
organisational values is played by senior management (Haddad, 1996a). Holahan and
Markham (1996, p. 126) argue that senior management needs to clearly communicate the
new values throughout the company (and reflect them in the organisation's performance
appraisal, career development, and reward systems). Based on the assumption that
"employees engage in behavior they believe will be rewarded and pattern their behavior
after senior people in the organisation", they argue, senior management needs to "be a
model multifunctional team if the values and attitudes needed fo r effective multifunctional
integration are to become firmly established in the organization".

4.5

THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This section finally brings together CE implementation framework from chapter three and
the HRM in CE implementation framework from chapter four. The combined framework
(see Figure 8) does not only reflect the complexity of the implementation of CE but also the
assumed role of HRM in CE. As the combined framework guided the processual
longitudinal case study, its main elements and relationships are briefly summarised again
before discussing the main case study finding.

33 The literature on trust is large and diverse. Kramer and Tyler (1996) explore some of the
dimensions of dependability in their book "Trust in organizations". Rogers (1994) and McCoy
(1996) emphasise information sharing for responsible consistent behaviour in an organisation.
Hackman (1990) discusses trust in the context of effective teamwork and their barriers.
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Human Resource Management in Concurrent Engineering

Figure 8:

The Combined HRM in CE Implementation Framework

As discussed in chapter three, CE is one recent approach to improved product innovation.
CE seeks to achieve a balance between organisational, technological and human factors in
product innovation and aims to overcome key problems of conventional product
development processes. It addresses these problems through three interrelated features of
process organisation: functional integration, design integration and concurrence. There is no
"one best way", no single solution for implementing CE. The implementation of CE is
product and process dependent, as well as contingent upon an organisation's strategy,
structure and the market it operates in. These factors will lead to variations in the
organisational arrangements for CE.
Both, organisational and technical enablers are necessary for the successful implementation
of CE. Organisational enablers, however, are of primary importance. To achieve the full
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potential of CE, companies considering the introduction of CE, require an appropriate
organisational environment, which fosters teamwork and cross-functional co-operation and
communication. Their HRM policies and practices need to enforce desired attitudes and
behaviours.
Almost all aspects of managing the new product development process under a CE approach
are linked to people management. This ranges from the selection of appropriate cross
functional arrangements to the selection of tools and techniques suitable for teamwork, the
consideration of leadership, team sponsorship, team member selection, performance
measurement and rewards, team training and development. Based on the performance
enhancing potential of HRM, these issues point to the critical role of HRM in CE in
realising cross-functional integration and high performance.
The introduction of CE involves organisational, procedural and technological changes
within a firm, but from an organisational perspective the achievement of cross-functional
integration is one of the most important aspects of this approach to new product
development. While this involves breaking down the "silos" or "stove-pipes" often found in
functionally specialised organisations, re-integration does not necessarily require the
formation of teams. Cross-functional integration, as realised in lateral communication, co
ordination, co-operation, can be achieved through a variety of arrangements, such as liaison
roles, inter-departmental committees, integrating departments, or inter-departmental mutual
adjustment. A company can use different cross-functional arrangements for different types
of projects. Cross-functional teams, however, are widely accepted as central to CE. They
play a number of important roles, such as mobilising the company's resources, capabilities
and specialisation, and providing a medium through which different functional
specialisation can communicate, share views and jointly make decisions. Cross-functional
teams can vary widely along a number of factors. They basically fall into two dimensions, a
structural and a process dimension. The different structural and process characteristics of
the cross-functional team may change during the development process.
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CE, despite the technical connotations of the term, is an organisational issue in the sense
that its successful implementation requires appropriate organisational culture, skills,
structures, and interpersonal relations. It implies a major shift in an organisation's approach
to HRM (in the form of changes in focus, expertise, stakeholder base and planning horizon),
and the deliberate and systematic consideration of supportive HRM policies and practices. A
distinction is made between HRM as a specialist function and as a generic organisation-wide
activity.
According to the contingent nature of CE, there is no "one best set" of HRM practices for
CE. HRM practices for CE may differ depending on the organisational arrangements for CE.
Different cross-functional arrangements may require different HRM arrangements (Zanko et
ah, 1998). The decision for a cross-functional team will be more complex, resource
intensive and risky from a HRM perspective than a liaison role. But cross-functional team
arrangements may differ as well (e.g. heavy- vs. lightweight team). They may require
different HR practices (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992b) and vary in their capability for HRM
influence. Even different phases of the development process may require different degrees
and types of interdependence and co-ordination, and thus different HRM practices.
In the context of CE, HRM as a specialist function gets involved in both the implementation
process of CE and the actual design and development process. In the implementation
process HRM proactively influences the conceptualisation of CE and the design of the
implementation concept. It ensures the translation of the overall business strategy into an
appropriate HRM strategy and the design of environmental conditions (in the form of HRM
policies and practices as well as an organisational culture) most appropriate to CE.
HRM as an organisation-wide activity in CE, on the other hand, forms part of the
operational task of the project leaders, functional managers as well as the CE team itself. It
involves the application and adjustment of HRM practices according to the cross-functional
arrangement or type of cross-functional team chosen as well as the different stages of the
development process. The individual areas of HRM and HRM practices are interrelated and
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form a systematic holistic approach to HRM within CE. Without the systematic application
of supportive HRM policy and practices, it seems unlikely that a high-level of integration of
departmental functions and product design would be achievable. Conventional personnel
policies and practices tend to reinforce what CE seeks to change.

4.6

SUMMARY

The aim of this chapter was to investigate what research was available regarding HRM in
the design, implementation and anchoring of CE within an organisation. First the chapter
distinguished between two main views of FORM (as a synonym for personnel management
and as a broadened approach to personnel management) in order to outline what constitutes
HRM. HRM as a broadened approach to personnel management was adopted for this study
and delineated as an improved approach to personnel management with a broadening focus,
expertise, and stakeholder base with the development towards strategic HRM. A distinction
was made between HRM as a specialist function and HRM as generic organisation-wide
activity. The chapter then related the significance of HRM to its performance-enhancing
potential. It identified three theoretical positions in this regard: the universalistic, the
contingency and the configurational perspective, which however do not necessarily exclude
each other but may exist simultaneously. The chapter finally suggests a number of HRM
areas that could support and facilitate CE, namely performance management, training and
development, rewards, career management and employee relations.
A number of theoretical and empirical knowledge gaps were discovered regarding the
investigation of HRM in CE. The innovation literature has not adequately addressed the role
of HRM in product innovation processes (Atuahene-Gima, 1996). Few studies have
considered HRM in its double perspective as a generic organisation-wide activity and as a
specialist function in product innovation. For CE this distinction has not been applied. The
CE literature has not addressed the involvement of HRM as a specialist function in CE,
more specifically its role in CE implementation. Furthermore, the role of HRM as
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organisation-wide activity in individual development projects under a CE approach has not
been investigated in detail. This lack of attention to HRM in CE is not consonant with the
claimed growing significance of HRM in contemporary organisations (Russ et al., 1998).
Neither does the literature discuss any constraints that prevent HRM from supporting the
product development process in a profound way, and no model or approach has been offered
that indicates ways how HRM could work within the constraints.
Two further knowledge gaps were identified in this area. The operational aspects o f the
integration of HRM with corporate and business strategy at an inter-functional level
(Beaumont, 1993; Beer and Spector, 1985; Schuler and Jackson, 1987) have not been
discussed in detail, though the inter-functional level is of particular concern in considering
organisational arrangements most suitable for implementing CE. While the HRM literature
has focused on many aspects of cross-functional integration, this discussion remains
fragmentary and a holistic strategic approach to organisational integration has not yet been
developed. Moreover, although the interdependence of various HRM elements (such as
training, job design, selection, recruitment, rewards, and performance) has been recognised,
this recognition has not been applied to CE yet. It thus appears that HRM is the hidden
agenda of CE.
The chapter finally brought together the two parts of the theoretical framework. The
combined HRM in CE framework guided the case study in exploring the role of HRM in CE
in MILSYS. Part two will discuss the case study findings. During the case study it became
apparent, however, that this framework was insufficient. Organisational power and politics
emerged as a key factor in the CE implementation process. How the play of organisational
power and politics influences both the implementation of CE and the role HRM in this
process is discussed in chapter nine.
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PART TWO
Part one introduced the conceptual framework and the methodology applied in this thesis. It
also discussed the literature on CE and HRM in CE as well as the knowledge gaps that exist
within this literature.
The purpose of the second part of this thesis is to present the findings from the longitudinal
case study of a project which sought to introduce CE into an Australian manufacturer of
defence electronics systems. The study covered the period between February 1996 and July
1997. The case study investigates the conceptualisation and implementation of CE and
explores the role of HRM in these processes. It also shows how organisational power and
politics influenced the shape of the project and the role HRM played in this process.
In chapter five and six the context in which the CE Project was embedded is introduced. As
outlined in chapter three, the context (both organisational and environmental) needs to be
given thorough attention. It influences not only the implementation process and what
organisational players are involved with it, but also the shape of the company-specific CE
concept. First, in chapter five, a general profile of the company is presented. It includes an
overview of the company's history and the industry sector in which MILSYS (as the case
study company is referred to) operated. It is complemented by a description of the
company's traditional development process, its organisational structure as well as the
company's change program (of which the CE Project was one element). The role of HRM in
MILSYS as a specialist function on one hand and as generic organisation-wide activity on
the other is separately analysed in chapter six, though it forms part of the context of CE.
Chapter seven discusses the actual CE Project. It provides an analysis of the structural
determination of the CE Project Team, followed by an outline of the course of the CE
Project and the introduction of the company-specific CE concept.
Aim of chapter eight is it to show how the conceptualisation and implementation of CE and
the role HRM played in this process were affected by the play of political power and
politics. Chapter nine, finally, summarises the research findings and points out several
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critical questions that remain unanswered, but for which the presented thesis provides a
reference point for further research in this area.

5

THE CONTEXT OF THE CE PROJECT

5.1

INTRODUCTION

With increased competition in terms of time-to-market and innovativeness of products,
effective product innovation processes have also become the focus of considerable interest
of the case study company. MILSYS addressed this challenge through an organisation-wide
change program. The initiation of the CE Project in 1995 was one part of the program, and
the set up of the Innovation Project in 1996 another.
All system development projects at the beginning of the case study in February 1996 were
marked by time and budget blowouts. Following a comprehensive business analysis by an
external business consultancy in early 1995, the company identified a need to restructure its
traditional design and development process in order to sustain and strengthen its market
position. CE was recommended as a promising approach because of its potential to increase
the timeliness and quality of development projects. In October 1996 the CE Project Team
(established in February 1996) proposed its CE "solution set", which was applied on a CE
Pilot Project. In February 1997, the CE Project Team and senior management resolved the
CE Project's way ahead and agreed the next steps in the CE implementation process. Table I
provides a comparison of the design and development process as it was before the
implementation of CE, at the beginning of the CE implementation process (at the start of the
Pilot Project), and provides an overview of the to expecting (planned) changes. This
comparison guides the reader through the following three chapters.
Table I shows that with the introduction of CE, changes were proposed and introduced in
varies areas relating to product development, particularly changes to the project team. A
formal team structure was elaborated and team building training approved for new projects.
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Issues

"as was"

"as is"

"to be"

( c o n v e n tio n a l d e s ig n

(s itu a tio n a t O c to b e r

( p la n n e d c h a n g e s a f te r F e b r u a r y

& d e v e lo p m e n t

1996)

1997)

pro cess)

Project
Leadership

lightweight PM

still lightweight PM
but gaining power

more heavyweight PM

Team
Preparation

no

occasionally

structured team building

elaboration of formal
team structure

formal team structure;

Team Structure

people got involved
as project moved
through various
stages

Location

dispersed

dispersed

partly collocated

Integration of
Customer,
Supplier

little customer
integration

little customer
integration

customer and main supplier
integration

Integration of
Downstream
Function

no

early information;
occasionally early
involvement

from right the beginning

Team
Responsibilities

purely task related;

task related, starting to
consider process and
HR issues (project
leader becomes
involved in appraisal
for team members)

Responsibilities for
- product,
- process, and
-team (team training, goal
setting, performance
management, role
determination)
individual and team - open
reward system, linked to team
performance

no HRM
considerations

formation of core and sub-teams

Reward*

on individual basis

individuals and teams quiet or secrets reward
system

Relation to
Function

function superior to
project

function superior to
project

project superior to function

Selection
Criteria

availability;
selection carried
out by functional
manager

availability; selection
decided by functional
and PM

availability and team + task
criteria; selection decided by
functional and PM

Organisational
Fit / Company
Culture*

focused on
individual, culture
of blame

organisational change
underway towards
team orientation and
open communication

integrated;
team oriented, open
communication, culture of trust

Process

disintegrated

towards CE

CE

* Issues predominantly addressed outside the CE Project by the OCC Project
Table I:

Comparison of MILSYS' Design and Development Process "as was", "as is",
"to be"
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More heavyweight project leadership was discussed (with the project leader becoming
stronger responsible for decisions in the product development process), as well as stronger
team responsibility for project aspects. Changes were also proposed regarding the
integration of customers in projects and some HR policies and practices. How the changes
were brought about and what they comprise in detail is discussed in the following sections.

Figure 9 illustrates the complex nature of the implementation process (Yin, 1993) by
showing the various elements that influenced and shaped the implementation of CE in
MIL SYS. For this analysis they are subdivided into three areas: environmental,
organisational, and interpersonal and individual.

Figure 9:

Influences on the CE Implementation Process

Environmental influences comprise elements such as the peculiarity of the industry sector,
market conditions and the customers the company dealt with (see section 5.3). The
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organisational area is made up of elements such as the company's organisational structure,
its traditional product development process, the company’s business strategy and culture and
its relationship to the parent company (see section 5.4). The interpersonal and individual
area reflects the attitudes, backgrounds, personalities, and interests of the key players in the
CE implementation process and their interactions. The influence on the part of individual
key players on CE like the CE Project Leader or the team members, the Technical Managing
Director or the project champion, are described throughout the text, but are given particular
attention in chapter eight. In that chapter a discussion takes place about the play of
organisational power and politics as determining factor in the shaping of CE in MILSYS.
The various elements together set the internal and external context in which the CE Project
was embedded (Pettigrew, 1973; Dawson, 1996). A particularly important factor in grasping
the contextual conditions for CE, however was MILSYS' organisation-wide change
program. A number of projects in the program were concerned with aspects that were also of
importance to CE or closely related to it, like the creation o f an innovation- and team
oriented environment. These projects and their linkage to the CE Project are described in
section 5.5.
The internal and external context was determined by developments in both past and present.
The most important processes and activities with a direct or indirect impact on the CE
Project that took place in the years before and during the case study are captured in Figure
10, and are briefly discussed below.
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C o m p any-In ternal P rocesses And Factors Im pinging Upon The C E -Im plem entation
process
Visit of Parent Company
Representatives 11/96
TOP Pi

l

J 1994

L

r yi4"|

*

Joint TOP Meetings, 5/1996

°h

TOP Discovery Phase,
Business Analysis by
Parent Company, 1993/4

1-4.1995

TOP - IT Strategy
T O P - Organisational and Cultural Change
TO P - Software Process Improvement
TO P - Design Documentation and Control

Business Analysis by
External Business
Consultants,
early 1995

T O P - Paperless Documentation System in Manufacturing
T O P - Concurrent Engineering, 11/1 99 5 -

Determination of 4 Core
Competencies, 1995

Suggestion Scheme
Initative, 1995/6

"A" Team 10/1996

Reorientation of Sales
Dept. 1996

Remuneration Project

M anagem ent

_______________________;

Training, mid 1996

1. A QA Self-Assessm ent Process
________ (11 /19 95 -9 /1 99 6)
Project M anagem ent

1. Attitude

A ssessm en t 6/1996

Survey (5/1995)
1.Presentation by M D to

Innovation Project 9/1996 - 1

whole Company (5/1995)
Business Analysis by
Parent Company, 1991

Publication of Company

IN TR AN ET Project
6/19 96 -3 /1 99 7

Newsletter since 6/1995
Introduction of
"Double Head"

Initiation of Regular

Structure. 1992

Departm ental Meetings, 1995

From Project A reas in 1990 — ►to Business Units in 1 9 9 2 /3 ------► [ Changes in Project M anagement ] — ► to a Project Group as such in 1995
From a Manufactunng Based Company in 1990 -------------- ►
From about 1000 Employees in 1990

----------- ►

[ Business Reorientation ] ------------ ► to Systems House Type Company in 1995Æ
[ Reduction of Staff ] ----------------------- ►

to about 400 Employees in 1996

Reduction of Hierachical Levels to 4 Levels in 5/1996 and Restructuring of Functions
Low Intervention by
Parent
Subsidiary

Takeover 2/1990

Strong Intervemtion
I
by Parent

Easing Intervention by Parent

G erm an Subsidiary
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7; 8 9 10
1 995
1
— Mam Data Collection Penod —
ig g 7
__________________ ____________________
Extended Data Collection Period
__I

Figure 10:
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Company Internal Processes and Factors Impinging upon the CE
Implementation Process

5.2

BACKGROUND TO MILSYS

The case study focused on a medium sized company, which was established in NSW in the
1950s. Prior to 1990, the organisation had been a wholly-owned subsidiary of a leading
British multinational electronics and telecommunications equipment corporation. In the
early 1980s the original company had been primarily involved in manufacturing telephone
exchange equipment. Underwater systems for defence customers constituted the second
main part of the business. The manufacturing of telephone exchange equipment was
gradually wound up and all contracts in this area finished in 1985. The process was
accompanied by major retrenchments. About 400 jobs were made redundant. Other aspects
of telecommunication work were however continued, including communications systems for
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the defence industry. In 1987/8 the company merged with another organisation in the
telecommunications business. Most of the remaining people involved in non-defence
telecommunications moved off site to finalise the establishment of the new business (150
people were transferred, and 50 people retrenched at this point in time). O f around 2000
employees in the early 1980s about 1400 were left.
In 1988/9 the remaining part of the original business was split up again, and the take-over by
two international concerns finalised in 1989. The defence communications operation was
purchased by a German multinational. The underwater systems business went to a subsidiary
of a British company. People working in underwater systems projects became employees of
the British subsidiary, and those working on defence communication employees of the
German subsidiary. People in service functions, such as Finance, HRM, Purchasing, and
Insurance were split up between the two organisations. In March 1990 the two new
organisations officially started their new businesses.
From 1990 on, the case study company, referred to as MILSYS, operated as a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the German enterprise, becoming one of a number of the new parent
company's subsidiaries in Australia. Defence electronics was MILSYS core business, and it
became a member of the Defence Group of the parent corporation. MILSYS designed,
developed, manufactured and supported complex electronic systems and equipment,
particularly command and control, surveillance and electronic equipment, defence and
government communication systems and air traffic control systems.
According to the Technical Managing Director of MILSYS in 1996, the German parent
company did not exert a strong controlling influence over its new Australian subsidiary in
the first two years after the take-over: "For two years they left us reasonably alone and we
ju st went the way we thought they may want us to run [the business]".
From 1990 onwards, MILSYS shifted its strategic focus from manufacturing to systems
development projects. This move was due to profound changes in the market and changes in
technology (e.g. there was an increasing customer preference for COTS - "commercial off
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the s h e lf systems and components instead of expensive in-house manufactured ones). It
transformed from a manufacturing-oriented company towards a systems house type of
business. Software and hardware development, installation work, and systems integration
work became more important and manufacturing made up an increasingly minor part of their
project work. This move was accompanied by changes in the composition of the workforce.
In 1990 the organisation had about 1000 employees, with about 70% of them shop-floor and
shop-floor related employees. By 1996 only about 36% of the 360 employees were factory
staff.
MILSYS employed 50 contractors-^ besides the 360 permanent employees in 1996.
Contractors worked in all different departments and were usually employed for a specific
task (e.g. test engineering). Contracts varied from short-term up to two-year contracts. The
involvement of contractors started in 1993 (due to a staff establishment restriction and an
embargo on new permanent employment). In 1996 some contractors were given an
opportunity to become staff members.
The reorientation towards a system house was accompanied by two main alterations in the
business structure. First the business, which was initially concentrated around so called
"project areas" (a small number of large projects) was restructured into business units. It
was seen as an opportunity to take into account a broader spectrum of projects and to
consider other opportunities outside a particular field defined by a big project. This move
led to distinctly new projects for MILSYS. In 1995 however, the business unit structure was
changed into a project group.
Until the mid-1990s MILSYS' business was based on few but large, and long-lasting
projects. Apart from a few large contracts (referred to by interviewees as "cash cows 'j more
contracts were then won in the "lower volume market sector, with customers typically

in contrast to permanent employees, contractors had a clearly defined temporary contract and were
paid a fixed amount, they did not get any additional benefits.
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expecting to purchase only a handful o f systems as part o f any one contract" (Internal
Document C3). The increasing demand for higher flexibility (smaller projects) as well as
higher efficiency (as a result of increased international competition and preference of
COTS) required a re-orientation of the organisation's work processes.
From 1992, and in contrast to the first two years after the take-over, the parent company
started to exert a greater influence. The company had to undergo an intensive analysis
earned out by its parent, and changes in its organisational and reporting structure were
introduced. The introduction of the "double-head" structure in 1992 (discussed in section
5.4.1), based on the so-called "four eye principle", was one visible indication of these
changes. On the part of the Technical Managing Director the "double-head" structure was
seen "a sort o f control mechanism. We all found this a bit de-motivating. It is like some
people were observing what you are doing". Another indication o f the stronger influence
was the introduction of representatives from the parent company on the management team.
One representative from the parent organisation was appointed Managing Director Business
Administration, another Director of Manufacturing. Representatives from the Australian
management team depicted the new situation as having a stronger business and more market
focused approach, while at the same time having a more "patronising feel" with the parent
company now setting the main direction and rules. For MILSYS it meant decreasing local
autonomy in terms of its geographic scope, choice of technology and capital expenditure
(e.g. projects over A$ 20m had to be approved now by the parent company). According to a
Project Manager (2) in 1996, MILSYS had to comply with market constraints from the
parent company "concerning the markets in which we are allowed to compete". This
concerned both the geographic and the industry market. The Technical Managing Director
in 1996 was more precise. According to him, MILSYS was restricted to a "narrow market
focus, in our case it is defence electronics", though certain technologies may have been
"applicable to other areas" in which the parent company's subsidiaries were engaged.
MILSYS tried to discuss such opportunities with the parent company. According to the
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Technical Managing Director, this was however perceived by representatives of the parent
company's management team as "encroaching [someone else's] patch". Furthermore, the
other subsidiaries of the German parent in Australia "very aggressively defend[ed]" their
industry and product area. In addition, MELSYS had to comply with the parent company's
bidding principles and pricing system. MILSYS had to "strictly bid [the parent company's]
technology" and "price along to [their] principles, not marketing principles. We can't go
lower than a certain value. I f you go lower ... you have to make provisions ...s o stuff the
market as you follow [their] principles. And we lost every time we bid [their] technology"
(as it was very expensive).
In 1994, after a business analysis by the parent company, the close regulation eased and,
according to the Technical Managing Director, the parent company "started to feel relaxed"
that MILSYS co-operated with other companies and used technologies others than those of
the parent company. They consented, for example, to proposals made by MILSYS to
approach new markets outside the Defence sector. Also the decision how to improve its
business within the framework of TOP, a corporation-wide efficiency program, was broadly
given into MILSYS' authority. The implementation of the Time Optimized Processes (TOP)
Program was one major development at the parent company from about 1993 onwards. Its
main objective was to achieve significant reductions in the corporate costs in all areas. A
key aspect of the program was to remove interdepartmental barriers and change the way in
which core research was funded. Aim was also to improve the research focus and to
dramatically reduce the time from the commencement of research to the practical
application of technology. In order to achieve this goal, a cultural change component was
included in the program two years after its commencement.
At the end of 1994 MILSYS initiated its own company-specific TOP-Program. It started
with a "discovery phase" in early 1995 in which an external business consultancy analysed
the organisation and carried out an employee attitude survey. Based on their findings the
consultants came up with a number of recommendations. CE was recommended as a
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promising concept for restructuring the company's traditional product development process.
It was said to be an approach, which would help to achieve higher quality and greater
timeliness in development projects. They also suggested that immediate steps be taken to
improve the internal communication processes. As a result of the consultants'
recommendations 6 individual projects were set up under the umbrella of the TOP-Program.
Complementing the TOP-Program a range of other initiatives and projects were brought into
being. One was the formal specification of the four core competencies of MILS YS, another
the initiation of the Australian Quality Award (AQA) self-assessment process. In 1996, a socalled Innovation Project was set up, which sought to identify how the innovativeness of the
company might be improved. An INTRANET was also implemented and several structural
changes finalised (e.g. restructuring of the Engineering Department). Both MILSYS' TOP
Program as well as projects and initiatives outside TOP and their impact on the CE Project
are discussed in more detail in section 5.5.

5.3

THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT: THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY IN
AUSTRALIA

At the time of the case study, MILSYS was one of the main players in the defence
electronics and communications industry in Australia. The Australian defence market,
however, is relatively small and an insignificant player in the global arms market. Australia's
defence expenditure put Australia 17th of the top 20 nations in 1991/2 (The Allen Consulting
Group, 1992; Department of Defence, 1992b), with a total Defence export income of $54.5
million. This accounted for only 0.13% of the world total in 1995-96 (Hawkins, 1997)35.
Most defence exports came from aerospace and electronics and communications companies.

35 For more details on Defence exports see Department of Defence (1992b) and Department of
Defence (1998).
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Despite the ease of cold war tensions36 and the expected fall of expenditure in NATO
countries and Eastern Block nations, Australia's Defence expenditure remained high. The
changes in the global environment, however, led to a Government Defence reform in
Australia. Its aim was to "structure Defence fo r war while adapting it fo r peace ", resulting
in a smaller but more efficient Defence organisation (Department of Defence, 1998, p. 2)37,
The Defence production and export were not very significant internationally, and the design
and development proportion was even smaller. Only about 2.3 per cent ($250 million) of the
Defence outlays in 1997/8 was allocated to the Defence Science and Technology
Organisation (DSTO), Australia's second largest research organisation (Joint Standing
Committee, 1998). However, due to efforts of the Defence Science and Technology
Organisation and innovations, Defence expenditure from 1982 to 1992 was reduced by $2,6
billion. It also led to the placement of major Defence procurement contracts with the
Australian industry (Department of Defence, 1992d).
Defence co-operated with a large number of companies and spread its expenditure over
many different sectors. Companies in the Defence electronics and communications sector
conducted a broad range of specialised research and development activities (see Table J).

36 For more details about the implications on Defence and Defence industry with the end of the cold
war period see Keller (1995) and Krause (1992) with their analysis of the global arms trade; see
Coopey, Uttley, and Spinardi (1993) for discussions about the relationship between Defence and
civil industry in a mostly British context; see O'Neill and Homer (1982) for an analysis of the
Australian Defence Policy of the 1980s, and Sanford (1997) for trends in the American Defence
Industry (many of which are also observable in Australia, such as the attempt to enter commercial
markets, create mergers, and to become more efficient by increasing flexibility); see Jennings (1994)
for an analysis of the changing nature of warfare and its implication on Australia's defence policy as
well as a critique of Australia's current defence policy.
37 In 1998 for the first time a strategic approach has been taken to Defence industry policy directly
addressing a range of issues raised by industry and defence. Some of the expected benefits were an
earlier and better consideration of industry' issues in the capability development process, a greater
industry involvement in defence decisions that affect industry, and a procurement reform
(Department of Defence, 1998, p.iii). For each of the three aspects the paper discusses a number of
key initiatives. With this policy was also aspired to establish the knowledge edge as the highest
capability development priority by exploiting information technologies, whereas intelligence,
command and its supporting systems including communications were said to be particularly
important (p. 2).
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Air traffic control systems
Airborne early warning systems
Antenna systems
Communication systems and equipment
Electronic warfare
Fire control systems
Gas detection systems
Infra-red technology
JORN systems
Local area networking
Message switching
Micro-circuit design
Radar and surveillance systems
Microwave components
Ship command systems
Signal processing
Simulation and guidance systems
Submarine detection (sonar buoys)

Nobeltech; Rockwell Systems
Ericsson Defence Systems
CEA Technologies
British Aerospace;
CEA Technologies
AWA; Nobeltech;
CEA Technologies
EOS; Nobeltech
Gas Tech (Australia)
British Aerospace
ATS (AOTC)
AWA
Compucat
AWA
CJ Abell;
CEA Technologies
Mitec
Nobeltech; Rockwell Systems
British Aerospace; AWA;
CJ Abell; GEC Marconi
Auspace; Compucat
AWA; GEC Marconi

Source: The Allen Consulting Group (1992) Defence and Australian Industry.
Report to the Department of Defence
Table J :

Defence Electronic and Communications Research and Development
Activities

Many of these research and development activities were related to Defence requirements for
specific technologies. 32% of the expenditure of the Defence Industry Development (DID)
program was allocated to communications (Department of Defence, 1992c). The Allen
Consulting Group (1992, p. 118) noted that Defence not only drew heavily on but indeed
shaped the defence related electronics and communications sector. Most of Australia's
medium to long term technologies to meet Australia's special defence requirements are
developed in this sector.

"Defence Projects are big business and the business is getting bigger. Every
year about $2.5 billion is earmarked fo r Defence procurement programs. ...A
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big slice o f Defence Reform Program savings across the next decade is likely to
be added to the acquisition program in accordance with the government's
determination to build up Defence's sharp end." (O'Connor, 1997, p. 21)

Nonetheless, mega-projects on the scale of the submarine project, the ANZAC frigate or the
Raven project (see Figure 11) have become rare.

Source: Department of Defence, 1998, Defence & Industry: Strategic Policy Statement, p.
18
Figure 11:

Approved Major Capital Equipment

The 1990s were marked by a major shift away from large-scale production programs
towards a greater number of smaller projects.
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Forward planning38 provided for some $ 6 billion for new decisions on capital equipment to
the turn of the century. But major new projects such as the minehunter coastal and new
helicopters only accounted for some 25% of the $6 billion (Dibb, 1992). Most companies in
the Defence sector, including the case study company, were not able to rely any longer on
winning multi-million Dollar projects. MILSYS won its last two large contracts in the early
1990s. From then on, and in line with other companies in the sector, MILSYS was
increasingly forced to get involved in smaller projects.
The reliance on smaller projects implied changes in the market and business approach of the
company and forced it to greater market awareness. According to a Project Manager (1), in
previous years the company had been able to rely on large-scale defence production projects
to compensate for periods of less active project activity:

I f your business is fundamentally doing projects and you don't keep winning
them, then eventually your business closes down. ... We have been lucky, we
had this manufacturing line, ... that kept the business ticking along. "

In order to win new, also small contracts MILSYS was required to better respond to
customer requirements (e.g. in the form of lower costs). The greater cost awareness was
reflected in the increasing use of COTS ("commercials o ff the s h e lf systems) in contrast to
fully customised systems (developed and made specifically to meet a particular customer's
requirement). MILSYS, in line with other companies in the sector, had to increasingly
consider systems already developed (or systems made up of commercially-available
components), in order to reduce development efforts and subsequently costs and time. The
move towards COTS and the associated reduction in development costs and time strongly
influenced the position of manufacturing in MILSYS. Manufacturing was reduced to a

38 Two most commonly identified areas for improving Defence relations with companies in this sector
related to tender and contract administration processes (reduce tender costs, establish fixed tender
time-frames, pre-qualification of bidders and reduction in changes to tender specifications) and
Defence planning /collaboration with the companies in this sector (Allen Consulting Group, 1992).
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minimum, even faced with the possibility of closure, as the following quote by the HR
Manager reflects:

"We did face a situation only a few months ago that i f we had not been able to
achieve the [nerw] project, we would have had to diminish our manufacturing
capability. Still, there is a little bit o f a difficulty at this point in time in being
able to keep people actively employed [in manufacturing]."

Despite the growing prospect of projects by customers other than the Australian government
and the Australian armed forces (e.g. foreign governments), MTLSYS1 main customer has
remained the Australian Government. Whereas in the past, MILSYS' main competitors were
Australian companies, with the increasing globalisation and complexity of the market,
however, increasingly MILSYS had to compete against foreign companies (as it was the
case in one of its recent project wins). This was a challenge to MILSYS and other
Australian companies, which they did not face in previous years, when the Australian
Defence industry produced for a protected home market39.
With the pressure to continuously compete for new, predominantly small projects (in
contrast to the reliance on few large long-term supply contracts as in the early 1990s),
MILSYS started to consider markets outside the Defence sector and Australia. It began to
analyse its products, which were traditionally developed and produced exclusively for the
Defence sector, regarding their sales conditions in the civilian market. But the high cost

39 As outlined in various documents (e.g. Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce, 1992,
Defence and Industry Policy) the government industry policy over the past two decades shifted from
an essentially inward orientation based on barrier protection, to an outward looking approach which
exposes industry to international competition in order to internationalize and globalize Australian
industry. 'Integral to this has been the growing recognition that the international competitiveness of
Australian industry will be largely dependent upon their ability to develop better linkages and
networks through international partnerships and joint ventures.... An example of this new approach
is the Partnerships for Development Program which was announced by the Government in 1987.
Under the program, transnational corporations commit to achieving increased levels of exports and
R&D within Australia, in return for exemptions from civil offset obligations. The use of offsets in
the Defence context has also been reduced as Defence procurement policy developed through the
late 1980s, especially following the 1987 Defence White Paper" (Dept, of Industry, Technology and
Commerce, 1992, p. 2).
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factor (partly caused by large overhead costs and also by the requirements of Defence
procurement contracts) made it difficult to approach markets outside the military sector. A
Project Manager (2) described the problem as follows:

"Our ability to enter markets other than Defence is constrained by our cost
structure. ... We are not a low-cost operation. The overheads in this place are
huge."

Another factor accounting for the high costs of MILSYS' products was seen by interviewees
in the defence requirement expectations of Defence customers (in terms of quality,
performance, customisation, etc.) which required comprehensive quality systems. The
commercial market in comparison, despite growing quality awareness, was largely lacking
such a high quality orientation, and thus not willing to bear the related costs. By
comparison, however, the paramilitary area, the Civil Defence, police, fire fighting,
ambulance or the geological sector (such as oil exploration companies) were subject to the
same or similar quality requirements as the military. While these sectors in general were
more cost sensitive and did not have the huge expenditure of the Defence industry, they
were seen as potential new markets for MILSYS, particular if approached globally. The
approach towards new markets, however, was partly restricted by constraints set by the
parent company, as noted previously. Table K summarises the barriers experienced by
MILSYS and other companies in this sector in finding civilian markets for Defence
products.
Another development in the Australian defence area in recent years has been the significant
achievement in companies' expertise in electronics and the integration of various systems. It
has been seen as an important advance for Australia, because the development and
maintenance of a Defence systems capability was critical for the local Defence industry.
This shift has reflected a departure from the traditional understanding, where the user was
seen responsible for maintenance (Defence Industry and Logistics Program of the ADFA,
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1997, p. 17). The new approach was reflected in MILSYS among others in its move from a
manufacturing based company towards a systems house type o f organisation.

Barrier

Industry Structure

Description
Civilian industry may offer no profitable opportunities
Defence companies with high overheads cannot compete in
price-sensitive industries

Different Specification

Products designed to military specifications are over-engineered
for civilian markets

Marketing Skills

Selling to civilian markets requires different skills

Licence Limitations

Overseas licence holders preclude commercial development

Security Controls

Many state-of-the-art defence products may not be made
commercially available for security reasons

Source: The Allen Consulting Group (1992) Defence and Australian Industry.
Report to the Department of Defence
Table K:

Entry Barriers for Defence Products in Civilian Markets

Despite these gains in expertise, the Australian Defence Studies Center (ADSC) of the
Defence Force Academy found that most organisations in the Defence sector had room for
improvement (Defence Industry and Logistics Program of the ADFA, 1997). Its analysis of
j Q projects

conducted in the 1980s and 1990s revealed that many projects suffered from

problems like a lack of strategic control and development. Projects failed to develop a
detailed operational requirement document that rigorously set the aims and scope of the
project. Numerous projects were marked by too many design changes that increased the cost
and time frame in a mainly uncontrolled and undisciplined manner. In addition, numerous
projects struggled with over-specification of requirements that frequently led to limited
choices, disproportionate costs and escalated risks during production.
At the beginning of the case study in 1996, projects in MILSYS generally shared these
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characteristics. All projects were overrunning their schedule and budgets. MILSYS realised
that, in order to sustain or improve its market position, it needed to get involved in Defence
Projects early, preferably at the requirements identification stage, and had to put forward
more cost-effective innovative solutions. With MILSYS' traditional approach to product
development this was difficult to realise, and thus led to the consideration of improvement
initiatives such as CE.
The above section described the environmental context, the conditions MILSYS faced as a
company in the Defence industry in Australia such as the competition against foreign
companies in a formerly protected market and a shift from large-scale production programs
to smaller capital equipment contracts by Australia's Defence, MILSYS' main customer. The
challenges in the market place as well as the higher demands on the part of the customers
were a main driver for the restructuring of the development process in MILSYS. The
internal factors that contributed to the restructuring decision are discussed in the next
section.

5.4

THE ORGANISATIONAL CONTEXT

This section outlines the organisational determinants of the company, such as MILSYS'
organisational structure, its culture and business strategy. It also describes the traditional
design and development process. Although the company's approach to HRM is also part of
the organisational context, it is analysed separately in chapter six as it is of particular
importance for the discussion of the role of HRM in the implementation of CE in MILSYS.

5.4.1

O r g a n is a t io n a l S t r u c t u r e

MILSYS was a matrix organisation with strong functional emphasis, as illustrated in Figure
12. In 1996 it had six major departments: Engineering, Sales and Projects, Manufacturing,
Material Planning and Control (MP&C), Quality Assurance, and Business Administration.
The HR Department was not one of the main departments. This was reflected in its position
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within the organisational structure below the six main departments. The role of the HR
Department in MILSYS is discussed in chapter six.

O rganisational Structure
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Figure 12:

Organisational Structure, June 1996

Project-based lateral arrangements were used in MILSYS' design and development process
(the project organisation is discussed in detail in section 5.4.4). This structure was broadly
consistent with Larson and Gobeli's (1987) project matrix management structure. The
function of Project Management was in a subordinate role to the functional management and
consolidated in the Sales and Projects Department. The acquisition of projects and project
management until the contract award (bid phase) was assigned to the Sales Department. The
management of the projects after the contract award was assigned to the Projects
Department, in which the Project Managers were based.
MILSYS changed from a multi-level, rigid hierarchy into a flatter organisation with four
hierarchy levels in 1996. One of the last structural changes in this period was the
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consolidation of previously nine Engineering Departments into five in May 1996. As the
Business Administration Manager of the Engineering Department explained, this structural
change was undertaken to ensure a better interaction between administration and technical
management.
Formally each function and project was jointly managed by a Technical Manager and a
Business Administration Manager. As noted above, this construction was called a "double
head" structure, which had been imposed on MTLSYS by the parent company in 1992. It
was accompanied by the introduction of a second managing director, a representative from
the parent company, filling the position of the Managing Director Business Administration.
The second Managing Director had a deputy status. The final decision-making power rested,
as before, with the de facto CEO of the company, the Technical Managing Director.
According to the Director of Quality Assurance the two Managing Directors were "partners
in a sense. [The Technical Managing Director] looks at new business acquisitions, and how
we do business today. [The Managing Director Business Administration] looks at finance
and administration. They are a pair. But it does not mean because they are a pair they are
o f same rank. ... At the end o f the day [the Technical Managing Director] is the CEO o f this
organisation".
The new structure rested on the "four-eyes” principle. This principle was based on the
assumption that there was a clear agreement about the division of responsibility for work
(technical vs. commercial/business) and the need to jointly review and approve decisions
that were made in the separate areas of responsibility. According to the Managing Director
Business Administration "the main consideration behind it was th a t... team work basically
leads to better results than individually isolated performance. ... The four eyes principle is
to ensure that business activities make sense from a technical point o f view and from a
commercial point o f view". The Business Administration Managers of the four main
technical departments (Engineering, Manufacturing, MP&C, Sales and Projects) reported to
the Managing Director Business Administration. The Technical Managers of those
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departments reported to the Technical Managing Director. The Technical Managers of the
four main technical departments were directors of the company. At the time o f the case
study (1996/7), the Sales and Projects Department was headed by the Technical Managing
Director. A so-called Projects Executive was responsible specifically for the design and
development projects, and was reporting to the Technical Managing Director (in his position
as head of the Sales and Projects Department). The individual Project Leaders reported to
the Projects Executive. The head o f the Quality Assurance Department and the head of the
Finance Department were also directors, though the Finance Department was subordinate to
the Business Administration Department.
All directors were members of the Executive Committee (EC). In 1996/7 the Executive
Committee was consequently made up of the Technical Managing Director, the Managing
Director Business Administration, the Engineering Director, the Director o f Quality
Assurance, the Manufacturing Director, the Director of Material Planning and Control, and
the Finance Director in his role as Company Secretary. Sales and Projects were represented
in the Executive Committee by the Technical Managing Director. Neither the Projects
Executive nor any individual Project Manager was a member o f the Executive Committee.
The head o f the HR Department was neither a director nor a member o f the Executive
Committee.
According to the Director of Quality Assurance, the Executive Committee met reguiarlv on
a fortnightly basis in its role of managing the company, to "review what we have achieved
and what needs corrections and adjustments". In addition, the Executive Committee had an
annual strategic planning meeting, where it "would go o ff site fo r a couple o f days and
review how well the company is performing, what does the future hold, and what do we need
doing to ensure we own the future". Beyond it, it met on a "needs basis". The Director of
Quality Assurance recalled that

"With TOP we [the Executive Committee] met fa r more often, had many extra
curricular type meetings ... [and] long sessions o f planning and running
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through the tools and techniques to drive ideas out. Brainstorming sessions. ...
First o f all trying to get the grips what we needed to do. The TOP-Program
became a series o f projects then. And each project needed management by a
person appointed."

In the preliminary design phases of the TOP projects the Executive Committee had the role
of setting targets for the projects. It was a sounding board for the ideas the Project Managers
had come up with. It was also the panel who discussed and approved the budgets proposed
by the Project Managers. After the budget approval, the Project Managers o f the individual
TOP projects reported to the Executive Committee on a quarterly basis by presenting their
project status.
Decisions were commonly made by consensus. But there were other ways as well.
According to the Director of Quality Assurance, it occurred that when the Technical
Managing Director "could not get consensus, then he had the obligation to sometimes make
decisions and we had to stick with that". Sometimes he made decisions in an authoritarian
style "saying I don't care what you are saying, that is what we are going to do". However,
"more often than not it was towards a democratic end than an authoritarian end", explained
the Director of Quality Assurance.
In addition to the formal organisational structure, MILSYS possessed a strong informal
network in the form of a larger group of long-serving employees. The influence of those
people was not always visible in their official position in the hierarchy and the importance
o f their job was "not always reflected in the organisation chart” (Hofstede, 1994, p. 134). It
was based among other things on their knowledge and their experience within the
organisation. They "manage[d] to get things done not so much through the official channels
but through knowing the right people" explained a Project Manager (3). An indicator for the
informal position and influence of a person was also his/her involvement in the
organisation-wide change program. In projects initiated by the Technical Managing Director
he himself chose the people for the respective project teams. This was done on the basis of
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personal favouritism and regardless of their involvement in other teams.

5 .4.2

Culture

of the

O r g a n is a t io n

The culture of an organisation can be perceived "as something emerging from social
interaction - something an organisation 'is'" (Legge, 1995b, p. 186). It is a determinant of
change processes (Dierkes, 1997) like the implementation of CE in MTLSYS Moreover,
following Meek (1988) and Whipp, Rosenfeld, and Pettigrew (1989), culture is seen as
both the shaper o f human action and the outcome o f a process o f social creation and
reproduction" (Legge, 1995b, p. 186). In this sense, culture can not be created or destroyed,
only be altered in the process of social reproduction (Meek, 1988). But it does not mean that
senior management can not influence the culture of the organisation. It needs to know
however "what aspects o f organisational life cause, comprise or are manifestations o f
organisational culture" (Legge, 1995b, p. 187).
Schein's (1985b) model of culture provides a useful starting point for the examination of an
organisation's culture. The model distinguishes between three levels of culture and their
interaction. On the surface level it consists of visible artifacts and creations that are "easy to
identify but difficult to interpret without an understanding o f the underlying logic" (Legge,
1995b, p. 189). The second level consists of values that govern the behaviour and explain
why groups behave in a particular way. The third level is made up of basic or taken-forgranted assumptions, which determine the perception, feeling and thinking of group
members.
Applying this model to the case study company, it was possible to identify at least three
observable, partly interrelated phenomena, certain patterns of behaviour apparently
informed by a particular attitude with influence on the CE implementation process. One was
an organisational behaviour described by company representatives as "laid a bit backwards,
living still a bit in the past" (Business Administration Manager of the Engineering
Department). The attitude that informed this behaviour derived from the time (1980s, early
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1990s), when MLLSYS could rely on multi-million dollar projects. Back then the company
did not have to be overly concerned with cost and schedule over-runs. Further, it could rely
on manufacturing to compensate for periods of less active project activity and operated in
well-protected home market. In 1996 this attitude was reflected in poor control of MILSYS'
development projects. It was also manifest in the many design changes that increased the
cost and time frame as well as the risks during production. Despite substantial gains in
expertise in electronics and systems integration, the traditional understanding, where the
user was seen responsible for maintenance was still dominant in the thinking of many
engineers and managers. Consequently, little emphasis was given to product life cycle issues
and customer involvement. Also downstream issues such as testability, manufacturability,
assembly were still more an afterthought than an issue considered at the early stages of a
project. Downstream functions were usually not involved in the early stages of the product
development process.
This attitude was accompanied by a focus on individual performance in contrast to
teamwork. In addition, many managers did not recognise people management as a critical
part of their responsibility or employees as the main key to organisational performance and
success.
Another prevailing behaviour pattern was a so-called culture of blame. This could be seen in
the low tolerance towards failure, and was another barrier in the implementation of CE and
the overall change process. It prevented mutual trust and commitment to each other's success
and discouraged risk taking and shared ownership. Functional representatives in projects
reported that they were hesitant to expose themselves to the personal risks inherent in
integrated problem solving. They did not want to lay open to function-externals what
actually went on in their respective departments or reveal any functional weaknesses. Many
employees interviewed criticised managers at all levels for making individuals solely
responsible for mistakes or misjudgements. "There is very much a blame mentality still, ...
very much focusing on the low level people not doing their job properly. I think, this is the
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prevalent culture among the executives" claimed the CE Project Leader. But even managers,
who criticised this practice, were exercising it, as a number o f incidents during the case
study revealed (see for example the Incident Report in chapter eight).
Many managers were not aware of the consequences of the "blame mentality" and the
impact it had on their employees. Employees were upset about the practised "culture o f
blame" and the little or no recognition for additional efforts and were thus hesitant to get
involved in teams or to take up new or additional responsibilities. Managers did not analyse
this hesitation and reactive behaviour towards change. They did not recognise that people
were afraid of change, because in the past changes in the company had often been harmful to
the interests of individual employees (e.g. in the form of dismissals, loss of power or status).
It was common practice to confront people with a final concept or solution and expect from
them to accept and follow it without further discussion. Beyond this, managers
underestimated the time and effort it takes to achieve cultural change. Many managers
expected rapid changes in the attitudes and behaviour of their employees, even though they
had not changed themselves. Many of them were still caught in old behaviour patterns and
attitudes (e.g. placing blame, not devolving responsibility, seeing people as a "trouble
factor , giving little recognition of team efforts, etc.). The HR Manager [and some senior
managers] however speculated that "most people would support the changes, in particular if
they can see th a t... the company tries to accommodate people in the course o f the changes
rather than discard them".
A number of the above described attitudes and behaviours can also be traced back to
MILSYS' traditional, Tayloristic organisation of work, where work was broken down into
simplified tasks and areas of responsibility (Druecke, 1995). The product development
process was largely carried out in a sequential manner {"throw over the wall,r).
Communication and co-operation was mediated through highly departmentalised functions
{"stove pipes"). This resulted in uncooperative compartmentalisation and prevented
identification with the overall development task and the final product.
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The strong engineering background o f many managers and employees in the company was
another factor that determined MILSYS' culture. About one third o f the overall staff in
MILSYS in 1996 (and most managers) were professional engineers. It was mostly
technologists, who acted as change agents in MILSYS, Their training and experience were
largely based "on technical and economic factors, with little if any recognition o f the human
and social implications" (Bailey, 1993, p. 190). People with a "technical mindset" tend to
solve problems by technical means (i.e. the introduction o f new tools and techniques) and to
resort to universally applicable "bestpractices" (Couchman et al., 1999), which corresponds
with their engineering or similar technical education and work experience. In MILSYS this
was reflected in the scope of the change program in general and of the CE Project in
particular. The introduction of the INTRANET and the focus on new and revised manuals
indicated that faster and more efficient electronic communication and computer technology,
combined with better procedures were perceived by the management as most likely to lead
to better communication and higher degrees of integration. Organisational enablers (such as
HR practices, cross-group communication) were not recognised as critical to change by
them. Hence, little or no emphasis was given to the design and promotion of constructive
interpersonal relationships, which engenders communication, trust, teamwork, and personal
growth. Issues such as how to support people through the change, how to match thenaspiration with the need of the business and how to ensure their ownership of the new
processes, were not considered.

5.4.3

T h e C o m p a n y ’s B u s in e s s S t r a t e g y

Another component of the organisational context, in which the CE Project was embedded,
was the company's business strategy. MILSYS' business strategy was formalised in the so
called "Blue Book", the organisation's 5 year plan. In 1994 the focus of MILSYS' business
strategy shifted from a quality-oriented to an innovation-oriented company, and this led to a
reformulation of its business objectives. MILSYS' new business objective was stated to be
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to supply communication equipment, systems, and support to the information market that
meet our customers' needs in the most cost-effective and technically innovative manner"
(Internal Document C4).
With the initiation of the company-wide change program in the same year, the company
started to identify ways to ensure its transformation towards an innovation-oriented
company. One initial step was the specification of a small number of core business skills, as
it was impossible to "equally concentrate on so many skills" explained the Technical
Managing Director. From an initial catalogue of 24 significant skills, four skills were
selected that, according to the Technical Managing Director, were thought to contribute
most significantly to "success in the future". Marketing, Bidding, Project Management and
Systems Engineering were the skills selected, while Manufacturing, for example, was not
seen as crucial. The Technical Managing Director described the selection process as
follows:

For a core skill to qualify we used several filters. The hardest filter to survive
was the customer filter. For instance Production, which is an important part o f
the company, did not survive. So Production is not a core competency. ... The
customer does not really care whether the green boxes we make are
manufactured here as long as the customer gets what he wants with the quality
and [it is] on time. But things like Project Management and Systems
Engineering became core competencies because the customer is interested that
you do things on time and within budget. "

Systems Engineering was seen as an essential core competency for the organisation, as it
aimed to establish an integrated product development process. This competency was based
on the rigorous process execution and reviewing process required by military standard
{"MilStand") (Grady, 1994), which coincided with MTLSYS plans and requirements.
Systems Engineering was perceived as having a "significant overlap in terms o f practice and
tool approach with CE" as the Managing Director Business Administration explained. The
decision for Systems Engineering as one of the four future core skills, resulted in the
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establishment of a Systems Engineering Department and with it the appointment of a
Systems Engineering Manager.
In addition, marketing and innovation were seen by the Technical Managing Director as "the
only profitable businesses" for a company, "the rest are all costs". Marketing, therefore, was
decided a core competency, and the Sales and Marketing Department was given a stronger
strategic focus. Up to 1996 the Sales and Marketing Department was largely engaged in
building up and sustaining good customer relations, particularly during the bidding process.
Its role was to identify customer needs and wants in different market segments, and to
ensure that contracts met those needs. From 1996 onwards the Department became more
marketing-oriented. It gradually took on board other tasks like the search for new markets as
well as the development of market and product strategies. The information about new
opportunities was captured in the company’s newly developed "Opportunity Database". This
was a comprehensive database, which was seen as an important instrument to guide and
support marketing decisions and thus, ensure MtLSYS' strong market focus.
The new character of marketing was also visible in the company’s altered approach to
bidding. Bidding was selected a core competency, because the way the organisation
approaches bidding was seen as a major success factor in winning contracts, and thus crucial
for the survival of the company. MILSYS appointed a so-called "A-Team" within the Sales
and Marketing Department that was solely responsible for the bidding stage. Previously,
bidding was scattered over various departments. The Technical Managing Director
described the change as follows: "We invented a new way o f bidding. We have a core team
that does nothing else but bidding. We reduced bidding from the old upheaval process,
where everybody had to help".
The "A-Team" managed the entire project planning in the pre-contractual phase. This
approach was taken to ensure bids and projects were highly customer-oriented and
documented in a consistent manner. Previously, department managers within the functional
areas were responsible for producing estimates for cost accounts as subsets of project scope,
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schedule, and budget during the bid phase. The Technical Managing Director was assured
that if MILS YS was the "best in industry" in those four competencies (Project Management,
Systems Engineering, Bidding and Marketing), it "will survive".
The shift in MILSYS' business strategy more towards innovation was also reflected in the
Technical Managing Director's vision in 1996 of "becoming a knowledge-based company "4^
and in changes in existing HRM policies and practices. The Organisational and Cultural
Change Project, one of the projects of the TOP-Program, was primarily responsible for the
design and implementation of changes regarding organisational culture and HRM to
promote innovation-orientation and teamwork.
The shift in the company's business strategy in 1994, and its accompanying and planned
changes in the overall running of the organisation, appeared to be an ideal premise for the
implementation of CE. The company realised that its shift to an innovation orientation could
not only be enforced via technological enablers but also needed to be supported by farreaching organisational and behavioural changes. This could have opened up a significant
role for the HR function. But the HR function did not evolve as a key player in any change
initiative in MILSYS, as discussed later.

5 .4 .4

T h e T r a d it io n a l P r o d u c t D e s ig n

and

D ev elo pm en t Pro cess

While the preceding section gave a short summary of recent changes in MILSYS' business
strategy and the main considerations behind it, the following section outlines MILSYS'
traditional product development process. It also analyses the perceived necessity for its
restructuring.40

40 There is no consensus whether knowledge management is a new emerging field of management
practice or a new management fad. For a detailed discussion on knowledge management and case
examples on how to create a knowledge based company see for example: Field (1998), Allee (1997),
Computerwoche Special (1999).
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5.4.4.1

Project Structure

The majority of development projects in MILSYS were focused on communication
equipment. Only a small number of projects were concerned with other areas of business,
such as command control systems. The nature of MILSYS' marketing approach and the
market sector it operated in - defence electronics - was reflected in the basic structure of its
projects. MILSYS designed and developed complex products under contract for a single
customer, mainly the Australian Government. This required the company to comply with the
Australian Defence Procurement Process4^ and the basis for all project planning and control
in MILSYS was governed by requirements of the Australian Department of Defence4142. At
the highest level it required the development of an adequate basis for responsible decision
making by both MILSYS and the Customer.
In compliance with the Australian Defence Procurement Process, MILSYS' development
process was very structured with various customer driven and internal reviews. All projects
were typically subdivided into two main phases: a bidding or tender phase, and a design and
development phase, which commenced with the awarding of the contract. In the tender

41 The Australian Defence procurement policy developed through the late 1980s, especially following
the 1987 Defence White Paper (Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce, 1992, Defence
and Industry Policy). The Australian Defence procurement process is designed to meet Defence's
special requirements within an overall government purchasing framework which embraces a wide
range of policy aims in areas such as industry development and purchasing. In order to meet its
requirement within this framework, Defence purchasing has evolved particular procurement
structures. For example, for high value procurements it demands a centralised, for capital equipment
acquisitions a highly centralised process. The highly centralised process includes an approval
process, requests for tender, invitations to register interest, requests for proposals, procurement
process and project management (see The Allen Consulting Group, 1992, p. 14). In 1998 for the
first time a strategic approach has been taken to Defence industry policy directly addressing a range
of issues raised by industry and defence (Defence's procurement practices for example were
criticised by industry representatives as excessively project-based, which frequently worked against
the substance of indigenous industry capability. Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Defence and Trade, 1998, p. 88). A procurement reform was one of the expected benefits. The
Defence procurement reform among others strives to establish a systematic approach and achieve
international best practice to its procurement process; will use partnering relationships - embrace
industry as partners in developing, manufacturing and supporting Defence's capabilities; minimizing
time and cost for projects (Department of Defence, 1998).
42 like DEF (AUST) 5655 - Australian Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria; Standard. DEF
(AUST) 5657 - Australian Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria Implementation Guide. DEF
(AUST) 5658 - Australian Cost Schedule Status Reporting (CSSR) Specification and
Implementation Guide.
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phase the company responded to a Request For Tender (RFT). The procurement process,
however, in most cases commenced already before an RFT, with activity occurring for both
parties, MIL SYS and its customer. For MILSYS it involved concept exploration and
definition and the preparation of a business case [Feasibility Study; Environmental Impact
Study; Obtain Approval and Funding for Phase 1]. In some cases it involved preparatory
research and development, or discussions between prospective suppliers and the customer to
refine the request specifications. The proposal was considered by a number of committees
within Defence. It was followed by the tendering and contract formation phase [Preparing
RFT; Tender Evaluation; Contract Negotiation; Responding to RFT]. After winning the
contract award, the actual design and development process commenced. It commonly moved
through the formal stages: concept (or systems) design, detailed design and development,
manufacturing and deployment, as portrayed in Figure 13.
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Source: Internal Documents C4, A6
Figure 13:

Product Development Process Before Change

Concept design comprised, among others things, Technical Design, System Design, Systems
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Analysis and Control [including Configuration Management], Project Management
[including Project Staffing and Project Planning] and Management of Design Changes. In
this phase a systems specification (top-level design) was created based on the customer's
requirements, which was used to identify the Configuration Items43 (CIs) as basis for a Cl
list. The Project Engineering Manager created a project Work Breakdown Structure44
(WBS) equivalent to the top-level design. The customer driven Systems Requirement
Review (SRR), which approved the top level specification and top level design, completed
this phase, and once this approval was obtained the detailed design phase would be initiated.
Depending on the scope of the project, the detailed design phase included various design
tasks, different production, prototyping and testing tasks. The specification and design
developed through successive layers of detail. Components of the system were designed and
built according to the lowest level of specification, then the components were integrated and
tested to verify the sub-system and system level performance met requirements. Typically
three major reviews were carried out during this phase. The Systems Design Review (SDR)
approved the subsystem specification and design. It was followed by the Preliminary Design
Review (PDR), which approved the module specifications and the block level design. When
the design was completed and all modules developed, the Critical Design Review (CRD)
took place the design was released to production if the customer approved of the final
detailed design.
In the manufacturing phase the system or product, which was delivered to the customer, was
produced. The phase comprised volume system assembly, site assembly and installation, and
factory acceptance testing. Deployment commonly involved packing and shipping as well as
on site acceptance testing.

43 The Term "Configuration Item" was defined as "an aggregation of modules or sub-systems that is
designated for separate configuration management", an aggregation of software or hardware, each of
which satisfies a particular user need or requirement (Internal Documents Al 1, A 17).
44 A project Work Breakdown Structure was defined as a bundle of tasks in form of a generic
checklist (Internal Document C4).
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5.4.4.2

Project Management

MILSYS' project planning and control system was a formal Cost/Schedule Control System
consisting of a structured series of policies, processes, procedures and instructions, and
computer-based systems. The system of management provided the basis for organising,
planning, authorising, monitoring, controlling, and reporting project work. As shown in
Figure 14, the Cost/Schedule Control System (C/SCS) comprised thirteen processes within
five formal C/SCS categories (Organisation, Planning and Budgeting, Accounting, Analysis,
and Revision and Access to Data).
In 1996 MILSYS was running about 20 projects of various sizes, which were handled by 10
Project Managers. According to a Project Manager (1) "big projects have one full-time
Project Manager. With small projects, one Project Manager can handle two to four
projects". But even the big development projects did not have a permanent project team,
only a project management group. Staff was drawn into the process when required for a
clearly defined task. Even then they were often only part-time dedicated to the project. A
project team existed only informally. The team members were commonly one homogeneous
bunch under the Project Manager.
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Cost/Schudule
Category

Process

Project
Phase

Internal Project Planning
Bidding

Organisation

J

Work Definition and Assignment

Planning and Scheduling

Planning & Budgeting

Estimating and Budgeting

Project Initiation

Detailed Planning

Work Authorisation

Doing the Work

Data Accumulation & Reporting
Accounting
Subcontract/Materials Mgt.

Indirect Costs and Rates
Monitoring
Performance
Variance Analysis

Analysis

Estimates at Completion

Corrective Action Planning

Revision & Access to
Data

Baseline Maintenance

Source: Internal Document C4

F ig u re 14:

M IL S Y S ' C ost/S chedule C ontrol System , 1995

Realigning the
Project
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Figure 15 shows the typical organisation structure of a Project Management Group in
MILSYS in 1995.

P ro ject O rg anisation in M ILS YS, 1995

Engiieering
Director

Quafity Assurance
Director

Projects Director

Director
Business Administration

T

Project M anager

Project Business
Administration Manager

▼

Quality Assurance

Technical Functions

Business Administration
Functions
Commercial

En gin eering
Financial
ILS
Accounting
Configuration Management
Security
Planning & Scheduling
Administration
etc. as required
etc. as required
The above 'functions' did not necessarily imply specific positions within a M ILS YS project team.
One or more functions could be handled by one individual, depending on the size of the project and the nature of the work involved.

Source: Internal Document C4
Figure 15:

Project Organisation, 1995

Formally, corresponding with the overall company structure, each project was jointly
managed by a Project Manager (Project Leader) and a Business Administration Project
Manager. The Project and Business Administration Project Manager worked together in
planning and budgeting the project. Project planning was largely the domain of the Project
Manager, and budgeting that of the Business Administration Project Manager. However, it
was the Project Manager, who was primarily responsible for the project. The Project
Manager was nominated by the Projects Executive. But the fmal decision rested with the
Technical Managing Director. For larger projects a Project Engineering Manager was
appointed as well. The Project Engineering Manager was usually nominated by the Project
Manager in consultation with the Engineering Director. In one project in 1996 (which later
became the CE Pilot Project), however, a Project Engineering Manager was nominated
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before the Project Manager. The Project Engineering Manager ran the project until a Project
Manager was appointed. Other positions in the Project Management Group included those
of the Cost Account M anagers), the Project Scheduler, Project Accountant, and the Project
QA Manager.
Functional managers made decisions about many aspects of the projects, such as the
selection of staff, timeframes, and departmental budgets. Within the bid phase, functional
managers were responsible for project estimates. After the contract award functional
managers became responsible for planning, authorising and controlling all aspects of thencost accounts. In addition, they provided functional support, personnel and equipment to the
various project management groups. Their high level of responsibility7for many aspects of a
development project but also the linear sequential way of the conventional development
process is portrayed in the classical responsibility assignment matrix in Figure 16.

Responsibility Assignment Matrix - Classical
MILSYS, 1995/6

Project

Configuration
item (Cl) 1

Cl 2
I__

Source: Project Management Course Notes For CE, 1996
Figure 16:

Example for a Classical Responsibility7Assignment Matrix

Cl 3
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The classical responsibility assignment matrix represents the narrow functional focus of the
organisational elements charged with project activities. Projects shared common corporate
resources that were organised in functional areas "by the mechanism o f functional cost
accounts at the intersection o f organisation breakdown structure and project work
breakdown structure" (Internal Document A17). Although the Project Manager was the
focal point for directions and control of the project, he/she had little authority and
responsibility over the people involved in the project. The project members mostly remained
locally and administratively located in the home department. Functional managers were
generally responsible for providing the right people for the project. The Project Manager as
a rule determined what skills, background and experiences were needed for a project (e.g.
what computer programs needed to be known). S/he^ could also indicate from what
disciplines s/he liked people from and their degree of experience. But it was the functional
manager who made the final decision about who was selected for a particular project.
Besides the formal criteria set by the Project Manager, it was the resource availability
(decided by the functional manager) that was a major factor in the final selection process.
Aspects like a person's ability or desire to work in a team were usually not taken into
consideration. It was possible for people to raise their hands to work on a particular project,
but very few people tried to do that. Most of them who tried that were successful in getting
into the project they wanted. In 1996 projects were predominantly staffed with permanent
employees. Before 1995/6 it was common to resort to contract workers (in 1996 MILSYS
employed 50 contractors in addition to 360 permanent employees). With a much tighter
work situation, managers were then "discouraged to use contractors except fo r very
specialised tasks" (e.g. where no in-house know-how was available). According to a Project
Manager (2) "you have to give preference to people who are already within the
organisation. ... But invariably there are positions you can't fill. ... [Then] you can use45

45 One of the 10 Project Managers was a woman.
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contractors".
Computer software played a significant role in project management in MELSYS and were
seen by those project and functional managers interviewed as an important means for
communication. For the bid preparation either Micro-frame Project Manager (MPM),
Microsoft Excel or Access were used. Pariss Enterprise (PE) or Viewpoint (VP) was applied
for project

scheduling.

Manufacturing/F inancials,

Controlling
including

and

planning was

PCC (Project

Cost

supported

by

CINCOM

Control),

and

MRPLi

(Manufacturing Requirements Planning and Control). Key milestones were used to measure
actual project achievements against the planned schedule. The design of systems and
components, particularly software design, however, was treated as an art, a creative process
that can't be fully controlled. According to a team member of the CE Pilot Project "Design
Engineers take as long as they need to solve a problem". Thus, schedule overruns in projects
were veiy common.

5.4.43

Discovered Problems

The above described design and development process had significant deficiencies, as the
findings from the analyses by the CE Project Team ("As is" Analysis and Cost-Benefit
Analysis in 1996) and an earlier internal analysis by the former Director of Engineering (in
1994/5) revealed. As typical for traditional Tayloristic organisations, MILSYS’ development
process was not treated as a single co-ordinated effort by a single unified team. It was
marked by a lack of integrated thinking and action. Prior to 1995, product development
projects were being conducted in a conventional way. This was reflected in a strong linearsequential project process. Work packages were handed over as "hand-offs" from
department to department. Activity concurrence, however, was realised as a result of a rigid
project procedure and the strict external review process the company was subject to as a
firm in the defence sector. The stringent review process ensured customer involvement
though only on a basic level. Suppliers were commonly not directly involved in projects,
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although, according to the Managing Director Business Administration, up to ”50 to 60 % o f
all costs are driven from outside. Therefore it is absolutely important that people
understand the consequences o f making certain decisions in term o f components, parts,
whatever". His expectation of CE was "that those who have to live with the result o f the
design are involved in the design from right the beginning. Not ju st manufacturing, but also
our suppliers".
The horizontal break-down of tasks resulted in departmental "egoism" and status thinking, a
"throw it over the wall" behaviour, often without much interest as to what happens next.
This conception was shared by many employees, as indicated by Figures 17, 18 and 19,
which show illustrations of MELSYS' conventional design and development process
produced by participants in the CE Introduction Training.
The drawing in Figure 17 is an illustration of the problem of poorly defined customer
requirements in MILSYS. The customer was not involvement in projects. As a result,
customer requirements were often not met. The customer ended up with something that was
not exactly what he had in mind.
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Source: CE Introductory Training, Pictorial Representation of MILSYS'
Traditional Product Development Process
Figure 17:

Illustrations of Departmentalisation in MILSYS (1), 1996

The drawings in Figure 18 were an indication of the breakdown in communication between
the departments (and the customer) in the development process. The individual departments
(as well as the customer and senior management) were presented by the participants as
isolated islands (sometimes referred to as "islands o f excellence"). It occurred that
development problems were left unsolved, as they did not reach the right person, team or
department ("message in the bottle'). In order to integrate the individual departments in the
product development process the project manager had to navigate the project through a
dangerous ocean full of sharks in form of departmental egoism and a "don't care what
happens next" attitude, with individual departments pursuing different goals and interest
without much consideration of the overall project goal. The individual person was caught
between the interest of the home department and those of the project team.
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Source: CE Introductory Training, Pictorial Representation of MILSYS'
Traditional Product Development Process
F igure 18:

Illu stratio n s o f D epartm entalisation in M IL SY S (2), 1996
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The drawings in Figure 19 illustrate the problems with MILSYS' sequential development
process as seen by the training participants. An integrated approach to the design task was
not given. The "engineering train" rolled from department to department with little or no
cooperation and communication between the departments and with the customer. The "voice
o f the customer" was not consistently and effectively captured. Customer wants and needs
were perceived as "the customer rolling boulders on" MILSYS. Downstream issues were
not considered upfront. The horizontal breakage of work resulted in a throw it over the wall
behavior and uncooperative departmentalisation. Mistakes got handed over from department
to department and "fix-it" loops (presented as a "vicious circle'") were required as a result.
Somebody else was always to blame for project failures and mistakes.
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Source: CE Introductory Training, Pictorial Representation of MILS Y$'
Traditional Product Development Process
Figure 19:

Illustrations of Departmentalisation in MILSYS (3), 1996
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According to a Project Manager (2) "upstreampeople don't really have an understanding o f
what happens downstream. And downstream people don't have a real desire to know what
upstream people d o .... They see themselves as alienated, as the total victim o f what happens
upstream, and all they can do is complain rather than take part in the solution". Moreover,
there was a resistance to information and knowledge-sharing, and a resistance to exchange
problem-solving strategies and solutions. An example was provided by the CE Project
Leader: "Take Material Planning and Control, they have this system fo r ordering parts ...,
but they don't really explain what it means to anybody else". The CE Project Leader noted
that in 1993 when he joined the company "there was very little discussion at all between the
groups, not ju st between up- and downstream groups, also little discussion between the
various design groups". The experiences gained in projects/by project teams were neither
recorded nor passed on. The individual and team knowledge accumulated at both great
personal and company cost often simply dissipated. As the result of this conventional
approach to projects, downstream issues were not sufficiently considered during the early
project phases and time-consuming "fix-it" loops were often required due to the handed over
mistakes. This invariably led to over-run of project schedules and budget blowouts in all
projects. Also, customer focus was progressively lost as specialist departments concentrated
on their individual work packages. According to the Director of Quality Assurance "the
customer focus is high at [the upper] two levelsf^ because they are the ones who have most
to deal with the customer. Down here is mainly ignorance. They are ju st not aware what is
happening with our customer".
According to the findings from the "As is" (1996), Cost-Benefit (1996) and earlier analyses
(1995), MILSYS did not address all the customer's requirements, and appropriate functions
and people were not involved in important phases of the project. The "As is" analysis report46

46 With the upper two levels the interviewee referred to the senior and middle management level
including the Projects Executive and the Project Leader.
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summarises it as "poor specification and contract writing", a "poor selection and control o f
subcontractors" and a "poor requirements analysis". The "As is" analysis also found that the
development process suffered from "poor planning and scheduling", "poor estimates" and a
"poor estimating method", with the latter not reflecting risk and learning curve sufficiently.
One reason for these problems was seen in the lack of a standardised Work Breakdown
Structure (WBS) and the absence of any analysed historical data how long it takes to
perform certain tasks, which could have provided more accurate estimates. The functional
WBS was also unable to accurately determine the overall effort it would take to produce a
new product. MILSYS also had a deficiency of Systems Engineering. According to an
Internal Document, (C6, 1995), MILSYS had:

"significant deficiencies in the current tools available for complete system
engineering. ... We have no requirements analysis/tracking tools, and there is
disparate support for the stages prior to detailed design. ... Detailed design
(both hardware and software) is well supported with tools, but there is next to
no

integration between tools;

let alone any integrated configuration

management of the data they produce."

Other problems were seen in the lack of personnel, a lack of training and awareness in
MILSYS'

practices,

inappropriate

company

procedures

and

insufficient

design

documentation to support downstream functions.
As a consequence of the matrix organisation with strong functional emphasis, Project
Managers played only a "lightweight" role (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992b). They had to
constantly negotiate with more powerful functional managers over budgets, timeframe, and
staffing to achieve project objectives. Despite the formal authority and importance of
projects for the company, functions were not limited to a support role, but dominated over
projects. According to a Project Manager (2) "in this company ... the direction is given by
the functional managers, b u t... should be given by the Project Managers".
Project Managers had only a marginal authority and limited responsibilities for the people in
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their projects. A Project Manager (3) claimed that "there [was] a fairly significant
limitation placed on what a Project Manager can do in terms o f setting reward structures,
terms and conditions. And you don't equally have 'carte blanche' [unlimited authority] in
terms o f setting ... hours o f work, ... and you don't always have complete freedom to set up
the environment the way you might like to". Project Managers expressed frustration about
the limitations placed on them to reward 'star performers' on their team, otherwise motivate
the team, or discipline poor performers. They criticised the inflexibility and limited nature
of existing HR policies and practices, but also that those policies and practices did not
support teamwork and the development of team behaviour.
While functional managers were looking after many project-related HRM issues, Project
Managers did not utilise the full range of opportunities and tools available to them. This was
particularly apparent with regard to people management. HRM was considered of little
importance to most Project Managers in early 1996. They underestimated the importance of
HRM and did not see themselves as being widely responsible for people management issues,
or for broader HR issues encroaching on the project team operation.
Project Managers largely accepted the decisions of functional managers without trying to
make them part of their own responsibility or to at least negotiate with them. "Project
Managers aren't filling their apparent authority, their eligible authority" claimed the CE
Project Leader. He continued: "It always surprises me that Project Managers let functional
managers get away with their announcements". The inferior position of Project Managers
relatively to functional managers was also reflected in the fact that there was no Project
Manager as a member of the Executive Committee.
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Despite the emergence o f new approaches in other defence contracting companies47, the
development process in MILSYS remained largely unchanged until the 1990s. Then, with
increasing pressure to reduce lead times and cut the costs of developing new systems,
MILSYS' senior management considered the redesign of the traditional development
process. In early 1995, external business consultants, brought into the company by MCLSYS'
senior management, analysed the design and development process and identified
requirements for a new product development process. They found a high percentage of "no
value" adding processes and a lack of discipline in following existing procedures. An
important issue was the minimisation of post-contractual changes by spending more time in
the early stages of a project. This included the consideration and comparison of alternative
products, processes, and approaches before signing a contract. It also required a thorough
calculation in the requirements identification and planning phases. These activities would
help the development project team (and the customer) to understand how the cost varied for
alternative solutions and would help avoid re-engineering the product at a later stage at
larger cost.
The analysis led to the restructuring of the bidding phase and the appointment of the "ATeam" in October 1996, and the initiation of the CE initiative. How CE was conceptualised
and implemented within MILSYS will be described in chapter eight.
The previous sections have summarised the organisational conditions and peculiarities of
MILSYS, its prevailing culture and the company’s traditional product development process.

47 According to an Internal Document C3, in the early eighties a UK based subsidiary of the parent
company initiated a process, called 'First-Off Build", which strongly drew on principles embodying
what is known today as the CE concept. It included a strong emphasis on cross-functional
integration and communication. A cross-functional team was appointed with clear role identification
and goal setting and a strong team leader. The team was partially collocated. Limitations of this
approach, according to this document, were the lack of fundamental process-re-engineering and the
strong dependency on charismatic leadership. A second approach in the late 1980s in the same
organisation was termed "Concurrent Product Development" and involved the establishment of a
more diverse collocated core team and the testing of 'people ownership' issues encountered under the
first approach. The team was given authority to "establish its own procedures " resulting in "a new
set of procedures which significantly attacked the inefficiencies" of the former way.
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The following section provides an overview of the repeatedly mentioned organisation-wide
change program. The restructuring of the traditional development process was one of its
sub- targets, the development and establishment of an appropriate organisational and
cultural framework for greater team- and innovation-orientation, another.

5.5

THE CHANGE PROGRAM

In 1994, under a corporation-wide efficiency program called TOP {"Time Optimized
Processes") initiated by its parent company, MILSYS was given the opportunity to initiate
its own change program. The TOP program was seen as a major initiative by the parent
company. The objective of the TOP-Program was to significantly reduce corporate costs in
all areas. It aimed to overcome inflexibility and increase competitiveness through cutting
down process and cycle times, reducing the time-to-market for new products, removing
interdepartmental barriers, and changing the way in which core research was funded. The
program also sought to improve customer focus and market orientation and to develop
mechanisms to support continuous process improvement. The program was modified in
1995, two years after its commencement to include a cultural change component in order to
help achieve its goals. All strategic business units were asked by the parent company to
create a "climate o f innovation". They were challenged to "leave well-worn paths" and to
"risk new approaches" by giving "orientation to processes instead o f to functions", by
"trusting] employees to be 'responsible'" "instead o f interfering" and by "keeping] the
customer in the fie ld o f vision instead o f looking inwards and upwards" (Internal Document
C l4, 12/1995). Each subsidiary was given a specific improvement target. According to the
Director of Quality Assurance, the parent company "set very challenging targets fo r every
one o f their businesses around the world". It was the responsibility of the individual firms,
however, to determine how to achieve these goals. The co-ordinators of the individual
company programs were required to report on progress to the parent company.
In addition to the company-specific TOP-Program, MILSYS initiated a range of other
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change projects and initiatives, which complemented the TOP projects, but emphasised
aspects that were not particularly targeted in the TOP-Program.
The overall change program was seen by the executives as an opportunity for employees to
become involved in business improvement processes. They also saw it as an indicator for a
stronger team emphasis in the company. At other levels o f the organisation it was however
criticised that (a) only particular people were working in the individual projects and (b)
initiatives and the project outcomes were limited due to a lack of training in teamwork.
These issues were also raised in the AQA Self-Assessment, as discussed later.
Many managers expected immediate results from the change program and were disappointed
about its slow pace, which they partly attributed to the ignorance and lack o f interest of
employees. They did not understand that it usually takes time to establish new attitudes and
behaviours. A major barrier in the change process was the missing or weak link between the
individual projects. Beyond this, there was still no "appropriate recognition fo r
involvement" in teams, nor enough "formal team processes" as employees and managers in
the AQA Self-Assessment criticised. The aspired attitude change was not realised yet. It
would be hard to achieve as long as the company was still dominated by a culture of blame
and HRM policies and practices that did not clearly reflect the importance of teamwork for
the company.

5.5.1

M IL S Y S ' T O P -P r o g r a m

Towards the end of 1994, and after a business analysis by representatives o f the parent
company, the "very broad mandate to improve [MILSYS’] profitability" led to the initiation
of MILSYS' own TOP-Program. In 1995 an agreement between MILSYS and its parent
company was signed targeting a 50% cycle time reduction and 30% cost reduction by
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199748. In a 3 to 4 months "discovery phase" in early 1995, external business consultants
carried out a detailed analysis of the company's work processes (see above). In addition, an
attitude survey, conducted in May 1995, in which 350 out o f 500 employees participated,
pointed to serious communication problems between management and employees. It was the
first attitude survey carried out in the company's history.
Based on their analysis, the external consultants recommended a number o f areas for
improvement and restructuring. The suggestions were accepted by senior management and
subsequently led to the initiation and "kick-off' o f 6 individual TOP projects: the CE
Project, the Design Documentation and Control Project, the Software Process Improvement
Project, the IT (Information Technology) Strategy Project, the Organisational and Cultural
Change Project and a project called Paperless Documentation System in Manufacturing (see
Table L.
The CE Project (which was the main focus of this investigation) was formally given the task
of developing a concept for the restructuring of the design and development process based
on CE principles. Other projects and initiatives within and outside the TOP-Program,
however, also touched on issues that were important for the introduction of CE, as shown
later. They included the Organisational and Cultural Change Project, the "A-Team" and the
Innovation Project.
MILSYS'

TOP-Program

was

co-ordinated

by

the

Managing

Director

Business

Administration who was appointed by the parent company. One of his main tasks in this
context was to bring together the individual TOP projects and to minimise the conflict
between people's involvement in the TOP-Program and their everyday workload. People
from inside and outside the TOP-Program were not satisfied with the co-ordination effort.

48 At the end of the case study (mid-1997) the Director QA assumed that TOP was not successful in
financial terms as the goal "to half the time of every process obviously was not achievable in every
sense ... Largely because we did not have an enormous amount of wastage to begin with. There was
not a lot to save.". In many other ways, he claimed, TOP was successful as the "potential for savings
in the future is certainly put in place ".
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TOP Project &
Timeframe

Key Features of TOP Projects

Design
Documentation
and Control
Project

Aim was to find a software which facilitates concurrence in design and
development. Looked at the tool side of the design process. Current tools
(software) only supported a serial approach.

Software Process
Improvement
Project

Aimed to improve software programming, software coding, the methodology of the
concept. Software projects lost too much money, and thus were a threat for the
long-term financial reliability of MILSYS.

mid-1995 ongoing by
7/1997

New manuals were written, but the application of manuals was still problematic.
Managing Director Business Administration: "It is now important that it does not
become an academic exercise. ... that those who are doing it apply what is in these
manuals."

The project in its original concept was put on hold as no suitable software package
mid-1995 - on
was found to match MILSYS' requirements. However, potential suppliers were
hold by end of die identified and it was decided to wait until their products were as mature as
case study in
MILSYS required.
7/1997
Leader: Manager Technical Computing

Leader: Manager Process/Software
IT Strategy
Project

Aim was to "overcome the problem o f serial engineering" and bridge "islands o f
excellence" (Managing Director Business Administration). Looked at information
technologies that support communication and information exchange.

mid-1995 ongoing by
7/1997

Approval of ca. A$ 2 million to put in place a new so called "middleware
software", which was found an appropriate tool to foster concurrency of design and
development. Benefits out of this implementation were expected for the year after
the initial implementation.
Leader: Manager Organisation, Info-Processing

Concurrent
Engineering

Aim: Increase the amount of teamwork in planning, design and development, and
provide techniques and resources to properly co-ordinate that team involvement.

end 1995 ongoing by
7/1997

Main improvement areas: project planning, system level design, detailed design,
business planning.
Leader: Manager Systems Engineering
Sponsor: Engineering Director

Paperless
Documentation
System in
Manufacturing
mid-1995 - end
1996
Organisational
and Cultural
Change Project
mid-1995 ongoing by
7/1997

Table L:

Aim: Replace all paper work at the shop-floor.
Leader: Lead Auditor

Aim: Creation and establishment of a company structure and culture most
appropriate to accommodate MILSYS' business reorientation.
Its four main issues: leadership, culture, organisational structure, and people
management.
Leader: Business Administration Manager Engineering Department
Sponsor: Technical Managing Director

TOP Program Projects and Initiatives
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They said that people involved in TOP were overloaded and projects were not properly
linked. Further, and despite the informally recognised interdependency of the various
projects, project leaders and members did not sufficiently co-operate or exchange
information nor did they initiate joint actions.
While the TOP-Program comprised 6 individual projects, only the Organisational and
Cultural Change Project is outlined here in greater detail, as it was of particular relevance to
the CE implementation process.

5.5.1.1

The Organisational and Cultural Change Proj ect

The Organisational and Cultural Change (OCC) Project sought to create a company
structure and culture most appropriate to accommodate MILSYS' new business
reorientation. The OCC Project was co-ordinated and led by the Business Administration
Manager of the Engineering Department and sponsored by the Technical Managing
Director. It had no actual project team. The OCC Project Leader undertook most tasks
himself and rarely consulted or worked together with other staff. His expertise regarding HR
and related issues was based on his own experiences and understanding of HRM rather than
on knowledge gained through training or education. With the emphasis on teamwork and the
design and implementation of innovation-oriented HRM policies and practices, the
Organisational and Cultural Change Project was a potential partner for the CE Project. Co
operation between the two projects, however, did not occur.
A few months into the project, in Marchl996, the OCC Project Leader submitted a first
strategy paper to senior management. It identified four main project objectives: culture,
organisational structure, leadership, and HRM. It summarised the main ideas and thoughts
concerning these topics and outlines the activities and suggested changes in each of the four
areas.
The OCC Project Leader saw creating an open and productive atmosphere as an important
condition for a successful cultural change. He emphasised that it was necessary to create an
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environment where complaints were possible and treated confidentially. Culture, in the
context of the TOP, was determined by the OCC Project Leader as a "very open definition"
as "a living thing within the organisation, ...a certain way, a kind o f agreement, how to do
things". Within the culture category, an initial task for the project was to pick up the issue of
communication raised by the first attitude survey. The results of the first attitude survey, as
mentioned earlier, showed severe problems in MILSYS' communication processes. Many
employees were dissatisfied with the communication process in the organisation, felt poorly
informed about the change program and not involved in the ongoing changes. According to
the Director of Quality Assurance, MILSYS':

"communication is going well from the top to middle management, perhaps
even to lower level management. At that level information is being edited and it
is almost as so, saying those people don't need to know this, ... they wouldn't
understand anyway ... But information is coming down. But it is stopping at a
point and not going further."

Based on recommendations of the external business consultants and the OCC Project
Leader, senior management immediately acted to overcome these communication problems.
In May 1995 a first company-wide presentation to all employees by the Technical Managing
Director was organised. According to the OCC Project Leader "all employees o f the
company were invited to hear about the business direction, competitors, products,
productivity and targets". A general problem that occurred in this context was the amount of
information provided. "Some employees wanted more information, while others got
confused by the quantity that was offered", he continued. The OCC Project picked up this
issue and initiated a number of different actions.
One of the actions involved the publication of an internal newsletter that was published on a
monthly basis from June 1995, in an attempt to keep employees informed about the main
changes going on within MILSYS. The information provided about the various change
projects and initiatives, though, was not comprehensive. The CE Project Team later decided

152

to publish its own newsletter.
The OCC Project also suggested regular presentations or meetings at the departmental level.
The idea was that the manager of the department, in addition to the discussion of workrelated issues, keeps all departmental staff informed about the ongoing change and discusses
with them the implications for the department. These activities were seen as a way to
improve the information and communication flow, to improve co-operation among people
within departments and to raise awareness of the various projects run by the respective
department. Initially, in mid-1995, a number of departments followed this suggestion. In
mid-1996 only the Engineering Department was still holding such meetings (weekly to
fortnightly, up to one hour) on a regular basis. These meeting followed a routine with a short
presentation by the Engineering Director (which gave the meeting a high importance),
followed by a discussion about various work-related topics (e.g. the acquisition of new
contracts and from it resulting work packages for the department; the delegation of
departmental staff onto projects).
Good organisational communication was seen by both Managing Directors as a major
requirement to ensure employee involvement in organisational processes. It was seen as a
means to strengthen commitment by building up a common vision and understanding across
the company. Strong commitment embodied in proactive behaviour in turn was seen as of
primary importance to create a "truly knowledge-based company" (Technical Managing
Director). "What is better communication? ... It is knowledge sharing" summarised the
Managing Director Business Administration.
While the OCC Project initiated the above-described activities, other initiatives also aimed
to improve organisational communication. One such initiative was the implementation of an
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INTRANET49, which was stimulated and supported by the CE Project, another the
Australian Quality Award Self-Assessment (see section 5.5.2.2).
All these activities contributed to better communication within the organisation by the end
of the case study in mid-1997, and the impact of the numerous change efforts started to take
form. According to an interviewee from staff level in 1997 ''communication is better than it
was before. We are generally told what is going on". The results from the AQA Self
Assessment also reflected an improved communication and information process. According
to the Director of Quality Assurance:

"people are basically saying now that since then [start o f the change program
at the end o f 1994] communication has improved dramatically. It doesn't mean
it is as good as it could be, but we have improved. "

Despite first visible improvements, more deficiencies had to be overcome. The "top down"
communication was sufficient, supported by a powerful e-mail and INTRANET system, but,
according to the AQA Self-Assessment report, middle managers criticised that a formal
"bottom up" communication other than project reporting was still missing. At the staff level
people criticised that information was often only accessible over the computer (INTRANET,
e-mail). Employees who did not work on a computer or did not know how to use it (e.g.
many shop-floor workers) were largely excluded from the information and communication
process. The Manufacturing Director criticised that:

"Involvement o f staff hasn't filtered down to all levels yet. Lower levels are
often not given the opportunity to be involved in change projects. "

49 The INTRANET was described as a "system based on the architecture of the well-publicised
INTERNET, except that it is totally contained to [MILSYS]" (Internal Document A10). It used a
common web browser to navigate the web (information) pages of MILSYS and a search engine to
search information. Information was accessible from any platform, and e-mail was integrated in the
system. The INTRANET was given high importance by the Technical Managing Director and seen
as a "prerequisite" in the improvement of organisational communication. He explained: "Though the
e-mail is not all that bad, it is too cumbersome. The INTRANET is more conducive fo r the
occasional asking questions. The INTRANET will be less form al”.
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As a result of the broad change process, employees at the staff level and managers built up a
higher expectation regarding involvement in change processes that was difficult to fulfil by
senior management. Senior management assumed that they have created the framework and
provided the "prerequisites" for the change, and now people need to change their attitude to
make it work, as the following quote by the Director of Quality Assurance indicates:

"The executives say, we have already put this and this in place. Why haven't
you seen it yet? The staff on the other hand says, but you have not implemented
it yet."

The disparity between senior management and staff showed that this was only the beginning
of the transformation into a knowledge-based company.

Another task suggested by the OCC Project Leader (within the culture category) was the
establishment of a measurable basis for employee satisfaction. In the second half of 1996
MILSYS intended to update its first attitude survey from May 1995, and cany out such a
survey each year. The results were meant to serve as a basis to measure the progress of the
change program, adjust strategies and derive further improvement initiatives. For this
purpose, the OCC Project Leader suggested that the survey be customised to take into
account the specific nature of the organisation. But the survey was not repeated as initially
planned. Instead, MILSYS cancelled this initiative in favour of an AQA (Australian Quality
Award) Self-Assessment project, and this was to become the basis for a new attitude survey.
Company representatives, for example, the Director for Quality Assurance and the OCC
Project Leader saw the Self-Assessment as a better tool to obtain a comprehensive and
profound picture of the organisation. The aim and results of the AQA Self-Assessment are
discussed later.

Besides improvements in MILSYS communication process, the OCC Project proposed a
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number of alterations to the organisational structure, personnel policies and practices as well
as the leadership style that were meant to strengthen teamwork, customer focus and
innovation orientation.
The two most visible alterations to the company's organisational structure, suggested by the
OCC Project, were the merger of previously nine Engineering Departments into five in May
1996 (see Figure 20) and the establishment of a permanent bidding team. The Systems
Engineering Department, which did not exist beforehand, was one of the five engineering
sub-departments. The permanent bidding team, the so-called "A-Team" was set up as a
separate department within Sales and Projects Department in October 1996. While its
establishment influenced the nature of the development process with the determination of
the pre-contractual phase, the CE Project Team was not consulted regarding the structure
and scope of the bidding team.

Figure 20:

New Structure of the Engineering Department, June 1996

With the restructuring of the Engineering Department in early 1996, a distinction was made
between technology management and people management. People management was given
formal recognition, as the following quote by the Business Administration Manager of the
Engineering Department shows:

"We have taken away the technical focus offunctional managers to make them
more people managers rather than technical managers. And we have within
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those groups individual technologists. We tried to distinguish between ... the
people that do the people management, and the people that do the technology
management.”

According to the Business Administration Manager of the Engineering Department, he and
the Engineering Director were jointly responsible for HRM. Jointly they ensured that the
function had the "the right people, that they have the right skills, the right succession plans,
and that they are getting the right training".
The five functional managers below were "responsible fo r their function, the people, and the
resources within those different groups" (Business Administration Manager of the
Engineering Department). They were responsible for performance reviews, the counselling,
and the mentoring of the people within their area.
The Business Administration Manager of the Engineering Department called the staff within
each of these 5 areas the "technologists". They were the experts in a particular field (for
example radio-communications) and "responsible fo r the day to day management o f the
technology and tools o f that particular discipline to satisfy the projects".
Though the OCC Project proposed these alterations to the company structure, it made no
attempt to shift the emphasis within the matrix structure from functions to projects. The
matrix structure with strong functional emphasis, which led to the "lightweight" role of
Project Managers, remained untouched. The OCC Project Leader made no suggestions to
devolve authority and responsibility from functional areas towards project teams, or to
empower project teams more broadly than before.

Leadership was the third main focus of the OCC Project. In this area the OCC Project aimed
to define criteria for good leadership in a situation of ongoing change and a stronger
emphasis on teamwork. It was planned to determine the knowledge, skills, and personal
attributes required for an appropriate team leader, and also for all other managers.
Communication was found to be an important aspect of leadership. In this context the OCC
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Project Leader formulated a number of questions, for which an answer was sought in the
course of the OCC Project: "Are communication problems based on individuals?”, "What
has to be done i f a leader himself has communication problems?", "What are the
requirements fo r a good leader?", "Are these requirements the same at different levels?".
These questions were meant to guide further actions by the OCC Project Leader.
One activity in the context of leadership was the initiation of an intensive, 6 day customised
management training course. An external training provider conducted it in May 1996 outside
the company premises. 65 people from middle management up to senior management,
including the two Managing Directors, participated. The broad objective of the course was
to "improve and enhance our management skills" as the OCC Project Leader summarised it.
According to the Managing Director Business Administration, it also served as to build up a
"common understanding" of the target of the change process. It was also meant "to prepare
people fo r change" as they do "not necessarily enjoy change". The course covered aspects
of conflict management, team development, people management and communication. It
addressed issues such as the implementation of and adaptation to change. Emphasis was
given to topics like the effective management and motivation of staff, the conduction of
effective meetings, employee development. A number of training participants, however,
argued that what they had learned during the training was too hard to implement. The OCC
Project Leader was aware that it was difficult to measure whether the training course had
indeed triggered changes in the approach to management and in the leadership style or not.
There were, however, developments he attributed to the training course:

"Some o f the things that I can certainly see, people seem to do a bit more
planning fo r meetings, people seem to do a bit more planning in their work
space. Some people are spending more time with their staff. Some people have
given their staff more responsibility. I f you ask the staff they may say they have
got extra work."
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The participants and the OCC Project Leader saw the training alike as a means of raising
managers' awareness for people management, teamwork, and cultural change issues, and to
prepare them for the management o f change. It was seen as the foundation for more specific
training and further actions like project management assessment.
The training was also used by the OCC Project Leader to determine a new company vision
and mission with the help of the training participants. The OCC Project Leader saw the
formulation of a new vision statement as an important cornerstone for the establishment of a
new leadership style as the following quote reflects:

"A proper vision, mission and value [statement] that the Managing Director
can present to people, have people thinking about, have people following, is
some indication o f future leadership."

A vision-mission statement had been formulated shortly after the take-over by the German
parent. The OCC Project Leader's intention was it "to get rid o f [this] and to come up with
something... more focused, something that people can relate to".
The growing importance of communication and HRM in the context of leadership became
also visible in the introduction of the "360-degree feedback" in 1996, which is discussed in
the next section.

Another target of the OCC Project was the inappropriateness of a number of personnel
policies and practices, which needed to be modified so as to accommodate MTT.SVS' new
business reorientation. This led to the proposal for changes in the HRM area. The aim here
was to establish HRM policies and practices that reflected the company's greater emphasis
on teamwork and innovation, and which would strongly support the leverage of knowledge.
The OCC Project also stressed the importance of a strategically-oriented HRM specialist
function. While such a function would link HRM and business strategy, it would also act as
an internal consultancy to senior and line managers regarding all HRM and related issues.
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The OCC Project Leader recognised that such a transformation required new skills and
experiences on the part of the HR Manager and the staff in the HR Department. No actions
were however agreed upon or carried out to pursue these identified changes.
Changes were proposed and partly realised in a number of other personnel policies and
practices, however. One was the introduction of the "360-degree feedback” r e v i e w 5 ^ . In
1996 the OCC Project Leader, with input from the HR Department, worked out a 12 criteria
catalogue5^ for such an assessment. At the end of 1995 the assessment was pilot tested on
the assessment of the Technical Managing Director. It was planned to conduct the
assessment on a yearly basis, and at the end of 1996 a second assessment was carried out.
The comparison between the two assessments showed an improvement in certain areas, as
the OCC Project Leader reported. An extension of the "360-degree feedback" to functional
managers (with feedback from superior, customers, peers, subordinates) was considered.
The responsibility for the broader application was given to the HR Department, which
intended to consider it by mid-1997. By mid-1997, however, no further activities had taken
place in this area.
Another issue that was addressed by the OCC Project under the HRM topic was the linkage
between performance and rewards. MILSYS did not have a formalised bonus scheme.
Bonuses were awarded in an ad hoc manner for outstanding performance (mainly to
managers or R&D people) in the form of additional payments measured by the percentage of
cost reduction or increased profit achieved. According to the OCC Project Leader bonuses
were not awarded for "constantly good performance that did not achieve outstanding results
but form ed the basis fo r efficiency and good co-operation". The OCC Project addressed the
need for a greater variety of bonuses and different criteria for different performances. But by501

50 For more detail on the origins and method of the "360-degree feedback" process see for example:
Hedge and Borman (1995); Edwards and Ewen (1996); Rands (1998).
51 The 12 criteria catalogue included criteria such as: establishing clear objectives, delegating
responsibility, participation in decision making, discussion of performance, information exchange,
promotion of new tasks, frankness in assessment, salary related to performance, training
opportunities.
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mid-1997 no specific changes had been proposed.
The OCC Project also looked for an appropriate incentive scheme to address the needs of
teams. A concept was examined that linked rewards to team performance and measured it
against certain criteria, such as project completion on time or within budget. In the end,
however, the OCC Project Leader dismissed this concept as being too expensive for
MILSYS. As no other satisfying solution could be found, this part of the project was put on
hold, with the option to take it up again at a later point in time.
The OCC Project Leader also recommended improvements in the performance management
area. He suggested consciously linking performance appraisal with training and
development as well as career management and succession planning. Although the
company's budget for training was "three times higher than the demanded training levy"
(OCC Project Leader), training was conducted randomly and often with little co-ordination
to career plans and departmental needs. Many managers were also hesitant to openly
introduce and discuss succession plans. Based on these circumstances, the OCC Project
Leader proposed and triggered some departmental efforts. One was the development of a
training register and training needs database by the Engineering Department, the Quality
Assurance Department with support from the HR Department.

The OCC-project tackled a broad number of issues of strategic importance. It proposed
several changes affecting most if not all people in the company. The OCC Project Leader
realised that organisational and cultural change was a comprehensive and an ongoing matter
and would require many years. The activities in the four areas described above and the
results that were achieved, he explained "only ju st scraped the surface, there is a lot more
work on those to do in the future".
In comparison to the CE Project, neither the work nor the results of the OCC Project were
broadly communicated. Although one of the project goals was to improve the
communication process, no means were activated (for example a company-internal brochure
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about the project, an INTRANET web-side or the company newsletter) to achieve this. It
was a conscious decision on the part o f the OCC Project Leader not to inform people widely
about the organisational and cultural change process. He explained that he did not have the
time and people and did not want "to drown people with all these ideas" that otherwise were
doomed to "fail".
Thus, it is not surprising that the majority of people interviewed were not aware of the
significance of the project. Many employees, including those involved in other TOP
projects, had only a vague idea of the scope of the OCC-project. They were not familiar with
the proposed changes and other outcomes of the project and related the OCC Project largely
to the comprehensive management training. They assumed that with the completion of the
training, the OCC-project had completed its task. Moreover, even though the OCC Project
dealt with issues that were crucial for CE and important to other proposed changes, co
operation between the different change projects and initiatives did not take place. Neither
was their co-operation demanded by the TOP co-ordinator, the Managing Director Business
Administration, or the sponsor of the OCC Project, the Technical Managing Director.

5 .5.2

P r o jec t s

and

I n it ia t iv e s C o m p l e m e n t in g

the

T O P -P r o g r a m

Complementing the TOP-Program, a number o f additional projects and initiatives were
brought into being. In line with the TOP projects they aimed to increase MTT.SYS' efficiency
and innovation potential. They included the Australian Quality Award (AQA) Self
Assessment, the establishment of a so-called "A-Team", the Project Management
Assessment, and the Innovation Project (see Table M). In 1995/6 "lots o f people started
projects. ...In some ways there were lots o f activities, in some ways there was not much at
all" claimed the CE Project Leader. The efforts from the various change initiatives and
projects including those of the TOP projects were not bundled. The projects were running
largely independently from each other, though they partly dealt with overlapping issues. The
Managing Director Business Administration was the co-ordinator of the TOP projects.
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Change Projects
& Initiatives
Complementing
TOP &
Timeframe

Key Features of Change Projects & Initiatives Complementing TOP

Suggestion
Scheme Project

Aim: Develop and implement a formal process for getting ideas regarding work
and workplace improvements

end 1995 ongoing by
7/1997

Leader: Manufacturing Director

AQA Self
Assessment

Aim: 1) Provide a measurement on how competitive and successful MIT .SYS was
in comparison to other businesses within the corporation as well as other
companies
in Australia. 2) Identify and measure improvements in management and
end 1995 - (Self
other
overall
organisational processes brought about by the change program that
Assessment: 89/1996) - ongoing were intangible and difficult to quantify. 3) Address areas that were not yet covered
by the already existing TOP projects or other initiatives.
by 7/1997
Leader: Manager Strategy and Planning
Sponsor: Director of Quality Assurance
Remuneration
Project

Aim: Introduction of more flexibility into remuneration arrangements at the shopfloor.

end 1995 - put on
hold by end 1996

Scope broadened to include other areas. As no appropriate solution was found,
project was put on hold.
Leader: Manufacturing Director

A-Team

Aim: Set up of a team, which manages the entire project planning in the pre
contractual phase to ensure bids and projects were documented in a consistent
manner and as customer oriented as possible.

setup in 10/1996
- ongoing by
7/1997

Placed within die Sales and Marketing Department

Project
Management
Assessment

Skill assessment of all Project Managers, Business Administration Managers,
project scheduling- and, project systems management services people in 9 key
areas of project management expertise

6/1996

Conductor: AGSEI (Australian Graduate School of Engineering Innovation)
Sponsor: Projects Executive

Innovation Project Emphasised "innovativeness". Aim: Increase the company's innovation potential
9/1996 - ongoing and find ways to react faster and better to customer requirements.
by 7/1997
Leader: former Engineering Director
Sponsor: Technical Managing Director
Systems
Engineering

Aim: Process optimisation and best possible positioning of the new established
function.

Project

Leader: Systems Engineer

end 1995 ongoing by
7/1997

Sponsor: Systems Engineering Manager

Table M:

Change Projects and Initiatives Complementing TOP

There was no co-ordinator for the projects complementing the TOP-Program. The TOP co
ordinator provided little co-ordination and sponsorship, also for projects covered by TOP.
Apart from few inter-project meetings, co-operation and communication between the
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individual projects did not take place or remained informal and dependent on informal
liaisons between the individual Project Managers.
Out of the projects and initiatives complementing the TOP-Program, the Innovation Project,
the Australian Quality Award Self-Assessment and the Project Management Assessment
will be outlined in more detail in the following section.

5.5.2.1

The Innovation Project

The Innovation Project was brought into being at a relatively late stage o f the overall change
process. The first meeting of its project team took place in September 1996. The project was
initiated by the Technical Managing Director. Its project leader was the former Engineering
Director, who resigned in 1995 but joined MILSYS again in 1996 specifically for this task.
The project was given high priority, and the Technical Managing Director himself
functioned as project sponsor. It was provided with large resources in terms of people, time
and finances. The Business Administration Manager of the Engineering Department selected
the nine team members, after discussions with the Technical Managing Director. They were
the "front runners" as the Technical Managing Director called them, the best people in the
company, predominantly young engineers. Their selection was part of the Technical
Managing Director's so called "strategy alignment". In some cases the selection took place
at the cost of other projects (e.g. the CE Project). Team members were taken from other
projects and were not always replaced. Some more experienced volunteers like the
Engineering Director supplemented the Innovation Project team.
The Innovation Project team was tasked to find ways of increasing the company's innovation
potential and ways to react faster and better to customer requirements. These issues were
seen as a key to future competitiveness. According to the Technical Managing Director "the
power o f imagination, vision, and thinking laterally about how to do business differently to
meet customer needs ... will differentiate between [MILSYS] and our competitors". As the
project aimed at improving innovativeness in the company, and not at product or process
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innovation, the name of the project was misleading. One of the first proposals the team came
up with was a plan to provide people with sufficient time to be innovative and to follow up
their own ideas. The Technical Managing Director approved "thousands o f hours in the
budget" for this purpose.
The innovation team effectively used the newly implemented INTRANET to provide other
employees with information about the Innovation Project. But again the team did not co
operate with other change projects. By early 1997 the innovation team had not achieved any
major results.

5.5.2.2

The Australian Quality Award Self-Assessment

The Australian Quality Award (AQA) Self-Assessment5253was indirectly suggested by the
parent company, which took part in a comparable quality initiative in Europe5-*. The project
was brought into being in November 1995. The Director of Quality Assurance became the
sponsor of the project, the Manager Strategy and Planning the project leader. The project
pursued three major goals. Firstly to provide a measurement on how competitive and
successful the company was, not only in comparison with other subsidiaries in the
corporation but also with other companies in Australia. In addition, MTT.SYS "wanted

52 The Australian Quality Award (AQA) Self-Assessment is a comprehensive, systematic and
repeatable review of an organisation's activities, where the results are referenced against a model of
business excellence. The business model concept originated coincidentally in Australia and the USA
in 1988, Europe following in 1992. It was derived from extensive reviews of successful companies.
There are seven criteria (1 Leadership: 140 points; 2 Strategy, Policy and Planning: 80 p .; 3
Information and Analysis: 80p.; 4 People: 200p.; 5 Customer Focus: 180p.; 6 Quality of Process,
Product, Service: 200p.; 7 Organisational Performance: 120p.), which break out into 21 sub-criteria.
The points available from the criteria add up to 1.000. The organisation is seen as an integrated
system with all components required to function together. The model describes the relationship
between the assessment criteria and categorises elements of the system as drivers (1,5), enablers,
which mobilise the full potential of the organisation to achieve its objectives (2,3,4), key processes,
which are focused on how business and operational results are achieved (6), and outcome (7). The
process allows an organisation to discern clearly its strengths and areas in which improvements can
be made and culminates in planned improvement actions which are then monitored for progress. On
the basis of its self-assessment a company may decide results to enter the Award program and
submit itself for an external assessment. A score of >450 is required to be considered for an external
award. Source: Australian Quality Council (AQC).
53 The European Quality Award (EQA) was established in 1992. The model is very similar to the
Australian model.

165

something ... which would cope with the fa c t that the company's business was changing ...
from a product oriented company... to a more system-integration company" and thus had a
"changing baseline in the balance sheet" explained the Director o f Quality Assurance.
Secondly the project set out to identify and measure improvements in management and other
overall organisational processes (e.g. training) brought about by the change program that
were intangible and difficult to quantify. Finally the project wanted to address areas that
were not yet covered by the already existing TOP projects or other initiatives.
The Director of Quality Assurance chose a guided self-assessment54 for a number of
reasons. Firstly, it was chosen for its low cost, secondly its fast execution. A third reason
was the high level of understanding of the AQA process the self-assessment generates would
enable MILSYS to eventually do its own assessments. A fourth reason was the high
involvement of the executive management, other managers and staff to ensure the ownership
of the process and the outcomes. The guided self-assessment, facilitated by a representative
of the Australian Quality Council, involved 12 senior executives, 43 managers and 90
employees in a series of workshops and focus groups.
MILSYS was assessed on seven main criteria: Leadership; Strategy, Policy and Planning;
Information and Analysis; People; Customer Focus; Quality of Process, Product, Service;
and Organisational Performance. The overall score they achieved "was 415 out o f a possible
score o f 1000", which put MILSYS "in the moderately high range compared to other
organisations imdergoing this type o f assessment. ... The 'Process' category was the leading
scorer followed by 'Measures o f Performance' and 'Customer Focus'. The 'People' and
'Planning' categories were the lowest rated. " (Internal Document C8).
The results of the self-assessment were translated into "strengths" and "opportunities fo r
further improvement". In addition, according to the Director of Quality Assurance, "afirm

54 Other assessment options evaluated were: independent assessment; internal assessment; survey;
matrix; awards simulation; management workshop.
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commitment [was made] to the people" to inform everybody who contributed to this
process about the results of the AQA Self-Assessment. All executive and middle managers
received a copy of the self-assessment report and a summary report was given to every
employee. The report was also put on the INTRANET and made accessible for everybody
with computer access.
On the basis of the assessment results the AQA Project leader recommended a number of
key actions. Most of them were approved by senior management. They included the
definition of performance indicators (both individual, department and project) across all
levels of the organisation. Another approved action was the establishment of a project
launch protocol that included the increase of staff awareness of company goals, project
goals, objectives and practices and the contract requirements. Another assessment was
proposed for the end of 1997.
The results from the self-assessment, particularly relating to HRM issues influenced the
work of the CE Project Team and contributed to their later emphasis on HRM. Further, the
AQA Project sponsor discussed the results in more detail with the CE Project Team and
supported the CE training activities.

5.5.2.3

The Project Management Assessment

During the management training in May 1996 it was argued by the participants that Project
Managers needed more training in order to be better prepared for the ongoing and upcoming
changes. In the result, the OCC Project Leader recommended a Project Management
Assessment. He saw the assessment as a further step towards becoming an innovation- and
team-oriented company. Senior management accepted the proposal and the Projects
Executive organised the assessment.
The appraisal process was conducted in June 1996 in co-operation with the Australian
Graduate School of Engineering Innovation (AGSEI). All Project Managers, Business
Administration Project Managers, project scheduling people, people from project systems
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management services were assessed in relation to the standard set by the Australian Institute
of Project Management55. The assessment process consisted of interviews and a PMC
(Project Management Competence) Self-Assessment. The assessment results showed
weaknesses particularly in risk management and HRM. "We are good in managing the
numbers, but not the people, and this is reflected in the assessment report", explained a
Project Manager (2). Based on the results, MILSYS intended to tailor further training and
staff development actions to the needs of these people to help them to overcome the
observed weaknesses and fortify the identified strengths.

5.6

SUMMARY

MILSYS was a profitable enterprise in the sense that it performed well in its market and
kept winning bids. However, the profit margin had decreased over time. As this section
showed, MILSYS' conventional product development process was no longer tenable,
particular regarding the changing industry MILSYS was operating in, with less funding
available and increasingly international competition for projects in a formerly protected
market. An opportunity to restructure arose under an efficiency-improvement program
initiated by the company's multi-national parent. As part of the analysis conducted by
external consultants under this program, it was suggested that CE offered considerable
promise for the company. This was accepted by the company’s Executives, and a CE Project
Team, lead by the Systems Engineering Manager, was appointed.
The change program, of which the CE Project was one part, provided a good basis for the
implementation for CE. It focused not only on technological changes. It also looked at
organisational changes in the form of team-oriented HRM policies and practices and the

55 The assessment was based on the competency standards published by the Australian Institute of
Project Management (AIPM) in 9 key areas of project management expertise: Project Integration;
Scope Management; Time Management; Cost Management; Quality Management; Human Resource
Management; Communications Management; Risk Management; Procurement Management. The
standards specify what individual project managers and project team members can be expected to do
in their work.
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establishment of an innovation- and team-oriented organisational culture.
Despite the close relation of various projects, co-operation or communication between them
took hardly place, as outlined earlier. The different projects were not integrated and instead
run on parallel paths. Although some inter-project meetings took place, co-operation and
communication remained informal and dependent on ongoing relationships between
individual managers.
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6

H R M IN M ILSY S

The aim of this chapter is to analyse MILSYS' approach to HRM and to provide a more
detailed picture of HRM as a specialist function and HRM as an organisation-wide activity
within the company. This is of great importance for the discussion o f the HRM role in the
conceptualisation and implementation process of CE in MILSYS and the significance HR
issues were given in the CE concept. At first a brief historical outline of the development of
HRM in the company is provided. This is followed by an analysis o f the HRM Department
regarding meeting the requirements of a HRM specialist function. The third part of this
chapter

examines

HRM

as

generic

organisation-wide

activity.

It

analyses

the

"internalisation o f the importance o f human resources on the part o f line managers" (Legge,
1995b, xv) in MILSYS.

6.1

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF HRM IN MILSYS

Looking at HRM in MILSYS from a historical perspective (see Figure 21), the appointment
of a new HR Manager in 1990 had a strong impact on HRM as a specialist function. The
appointment occurred in connection with the take-over by the German parent company. The
former HR Manager met the criteria of a "contract-manager", partly even those of an
"architect"56. The new one fitted more those of a "clerk o f works" (Tyson and Fell, 1986) as
discussed later. The former HR Manager, university educated, was member of the Executive
Committee. He acted as advisor to middle and senior management, and was actively
involved in organisational processes, as long-serving senior managers reported. With the
take-over, he took the opportunity to retire.
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HRM Development in MILSYS

The appointment of the new HR Manager was meant to serve as a stopgap until an
appropriate new candidate was found, in order to maintain the day-to-day operation of the
HR Department. The current HR Manager was suitable for this task, as he knew the
company and its administrative operation well. However, no efforts were made later to
replace him with a manager meeting the criteria of an "architect” (Tyson and Fell,. 1986).
The appointment of the current HR Manager - termed a "historical accident" by a member
of the Executive Committee - led to a permanent restriction of the department's scope and56

56 HRM strategists or "architects" are often identified in the literature (e.g. Tyson and Fell, 1986;
Boxall and Dowling, 1990: Sisson, 1995; Marks et al., 1996; Wittingslow, 1997) as a small but high
influential group of HRM professionals, who focus on HRM strategy formulation and adjustment
mid closely cooperate with the top management. They are enabled to proactively influence business
and change strategies and are involved with their formulation, and thus have a significant impact on
the survival and success of a company and its organisational performance. HRM strategists are
separated from most operational HRM responsibilities. For more detail on roles in personnel see
chapter four.
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influence on organisational processes. It was a step back in the positioning and importance
of HRM within the MILSYS. It was in the Technical Managing Director's power to change
this situation, but he did not enforce any action. With the appointment of the then new HR
Manager, more strategic aspects of HRM (like the development o f an HRM strategy, the
initiation of changes in HR policies and practices, HRM planning) became the responsibility
of the Technical Managing Director. With the initiation of the TOP-Program, however, a
move towards greater emphasis of teamwork and an emphasis on employees as a valuable
resource did become visible. This could be seen in the establishment of the OCC Project,
which focused on teamwork and the improvement of the communication process within the
organisation.
Two other developments in the HRM field in the mid-to late 1980s and early 1990s were the
changes in the composition of the workforce and the establishment of an enterprise
agreement in 1992 under what was the new industrial relations legislation57. In the early
1980s, the company had experienced major layoffs particularly in manufacturing. Union
representatives were also affected by the layoffs. What had been a strong trade union
influence diminished, and from 1985, trade unions were no longer formally involved in the
company. In the 1990s "there [was] no union influence in this place at all" (Director of
Quality Assurance). With MILSYS' shift of strategic focus from manufacturing to systems
electronics the composition of the workforce continued to change. The number of shop-floor
and shop-floor related employees was further reduced while the number of engineers
increased. In 1996 MILSYS had about 360 permanent employees. Only about 35% of these
were shop-floor people (compared to 70% in the mid-1980s), and about one third were
professional engineers.
While MILSYS' shop-floor organisation was not involved in unions, the company "still

57 For more information on Enterprise Bargaining see for example: Callus (1997), Hawke and
Wooden (1998), Department of Industrial Relations (DIR) (1996).

172

needed some sort o f arrangement between that group o f workers and the company so that
you have stability" explained the Director of Quality Assurance. The first Enterprise
Agreement was established at a time when the organisation was "transiting between a union
based environment with a closed shop, where HR had to tell people applying fo r a job here
'unless you are prepared to join union you couldn't work here', into a new era". The idea of
an Enterprise Agreement was raised by the HR Manager in 1991, then discussed and
approved by the Executive Committee. The HR manager "was told to organise fo r the shopfloor people to establish a committee". Shop-floor people elected about 6 representatives
from various areas onto the committee. The committee met regularly with the HR Manager
and jointly they established certain goals and agreements. The Executive Committee
authorised the Agreement in 1992. The Agreement covered payroll and working conditions
(such as hours of work, a rostered day off approach, evening shift conditions, conditions for
exercise activity and background music). The Agreement was seen by company
representatives as "a step forward from having something which was externally set to having
a company award which was an agreement between the company and the employees". The
Enterprise Agreement covered shop-floor people only. It did not involve clerks,
administration, or engineering employees, who were covered by individual employment
contracts. Towards the end of the case study, in mid-1997, the company was about to
embark on another enterprise agreement.
With the initiation of the TOP-Program MELSYS' strategy towards employee relations
moved from "traditional" towards a more "sophisticated human relations" approach58
(Purcell and Gray, 1986). Employees were increasingly represented as the company's most
valuable resource. Though MILSYS offered an "only average" pay (Project Manager 2), it
emphasised internal recruitment ("weprefer to make internal appointments", HR Manager)

58 See Purcell and Gray (1986) and Purcell (1987) for a typology of management style/strategy in
employee relations.
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and maintained an internal grievance procedure which operated without the involvement of
trade unions. According to the HR Manager, the company "addressed issues with people
within the company rather than have them relying on the need o f a trade union to represent
them". The Director of Quality Assurance explained that "the idea [was] to allow our
people to fully involve themselves in the organisation because they are part o f it. Not that it
is them and us, but we are all in it together". As mentioned earlier, high levels of funding
were provided for training and development. In 1995, MILSYS initiated what were to be
regular attitude surveys and focused on the improvement of the communication processes
with employees, as outlined earlier. The set up of the OCC Project, sponsored by the
Technical Managing Director, indicated that HRM issues were given a high profile by senior
management in their general deliberations on business strategy.
At the end of the case study in mid-1997, MILSYS had introduced a number o f changes to
existing HR policies and practices. The individual areas of HRM and HRM practices,
however, were not interrelated and did not form a systematic holistic approach to HRM.
Attitudes and behaviours towards HRM (also those of senior and middle managers) had not
substantially changed despite the rhetoric59, and the time and effort it takes to implement
organisational and cultural changes was still being underestimated.

6.2

6.2.1

THE HRM DEPARTMENT - A HRM SPECIALIST FUNCTION?

T h e HR D e p a r t m e n t - S t r u c t u r e

and

C o m p o s it io n

This section describes the structure and composition of MILSYS' HR Department and

59 This was reflected in the management of the CE Pilot Project and some incidents during the CE
training sessions, see chapter nine.

174

analyses whether or not it was meeting the criteria of a specialist function60.
The HR Department in MILSYS had a low status. In MELSYS' organisation structure the
box for the HR Department was arranged below the boxes for the five main functions
(Engineering, Material Planning and Control, Quality Assurance, Manufacturing, Sales and
Projects). The HR Manager was not a Director or member of the Executive Committee. The
HR Department was largely occupied with providing routine administrative services to line
management and welfare provision to employees. It had a short-term planning horizon, a
low level of discretion and was subservient to line management. It was not represented in
the Executive Committee. The HR Department was made up of 8-9 staff including the HR
Manager. It was subdivided into four areas of responsibility: Recruitment and
Administration (four staff), Recruitment and Training (one staff), Occupational Health and
Safety (one staff), and Site Security (two staff) as pictured in Figure 22. In mid-1996 a new
appointee was given responsibility for recruitment and training. In accordance with the
internal recruitment, he was hired from inside the company.
Non of the HR staff members had a bachelor or masters degree in personnel or HRM. Some
of them had acquired TAFE diploma. Hofstede's (1994) argument that the qualification of
the HR Manager tends to give an indication of the department's priorities seemed to be
endorsed in MILSYS. The background of the HR Manager was an administrative one. His
position was best described as "clerk o f works" (Tyson and Fell, 1986), administering basic

60 Based on Tyson and Fell (1986), Storey (1992) and Dunphy and Stace (1994), HRM as a specialist
function (respectively HRM specialists) was defined in chapter four as a function (or person)
concerned with the development and implementation of a HRM strategy linked to the company's
business strategy, the elaboration and establishment of appropriate employment policies and
practices that support the achievement of the organisational goals in conjunction with and through
line managers and employees. According to Mansfield (1997), the specialist function does not
necessarily fall together with the HR Department, but can be taken up by other external or internal
representatives. As further established in chapter four, the differentiation between HRM as a generic
organisation-wide activity and HRM as a specialist function is accompanied by a redefinition of
HRM roles with at least three distinct HRM areas or functions and respective stakeholder groups
with specific expertise: HRM strategy (with HRM strategists, change consultants and the top
management as stakeholders), HRM line accountability (with line managers, team leaders and
increasingly teams) and HR systems (with HR systems administrators).
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Figure 22:

Organisational Structure of the HR Department

routines and providing welfare and routine administrative services. As suggested by Legge
(1995b, p. 46), these included the recording of information required under relevant
legislation and the maintenance of systems in order to provide staff establishment and
payroll data. The HR Manager was not a member of a professional HRM organisation like
AHRI (Australian Human Resource Institute), nor were any of his other staff members. As
suggested in Tyson and Fell's (1986) definition of the "clerk o f works", MILSYS' HR
Manager moved into this role on promotion from a clerical position. His experience was
based on a long administrative career within the company (about 20 years of service) as an
accountant and salary administrator. The limited experience of the HR Manager was seen by
many managers as a main cause for his limited ability to apply a strategic focus to HRM.
The development of employee commitment and the management of cultural change are
usually seen as two major concerns of HRM (in contrast to a Personnel function- Guest,
1987). MILSYS' HR Manager and the other HR staff members, however, showed no
aspiration to move towards this change-maker role. Neither did they emphasise a strategic
pursuit in personnel matters. The lack of aspiration may have been due to a number of
reasons such as the nature of their routine workload and operating style

(routine

recruitment, administering basic routines), the financial orientation of the system (provide
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head count, payroll, performance against budget data), their education and work experience
(clerical career, mostly junior level of staff) (Legge, 1995b, p.45-47; Tyson and Fell, 1986,
p. 24), the level of resources, but also the Technical Managing Director's approach to HRM,
as discussed in chapter nine. The HR personnel were neither equipped nor encouraged to
take on a change-maker role, they slotted in to clearly -defined roles and procedures.
The nature of the HR Department's routine workload and operating style becomes apparent
in the next quote. During 1996 and early 1997 the HR Department was largely occupied
with the retrenchment of manufacturing staff and the recruitment of engineers in response to
the company's business reorientation to a systems house. The HR Manager explained his
role as follows:

"We [MILSYS] have ju st been through some changes in manufacturing. We had
to seek some volunteers fo r retrenchment.... I was involved in communicating
this information to the people and seeking the volunteers and providing
information to people as towards what their benefits were, ... doing their pay
calculations fo r their entitlements,... andfinal letters and certificates o f service
and this sort o f things. ... On the other hand [I am] now looking fo r a number
o f engineers in other areas to work on other projects. From my point o f view,
our approach to things is more traditional. That may be based on my own
experiences over the time I've been on the site here, what is now about 20
years."

The new staff member employed in 1996 did not bring any new expertise and strength for
the HR Department. He was an older, long-serving employee with experience in
administration and training in manufacturing. Similar to the other staff in the function, he
had no formal tertiary education in HRM nor did he belong to any relevant professional
organisation. He seemed satisfied with his move and glad to have escaped the layoffs in
manufacturing. He showed little interest in taking over a more proactive role in MILSYS'
change process. The Department's resources remained too limited to adequately engage
within change initiatives.
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The HR Manager and other staff in the HR Department were recruited and organised to play
a particular "clerical" role (Legge, 1995b). The Technical Managing Director consciously
limited the HR Department to operational duties and welfare provision and saw "HRATs role
... more in the soft factors, to look after them [employees]".
The HR Department was not part o f senior management team and thus, excluded and
sidelined from MELSYS' change program. Those tasks resided with senior management and
selected line managers. The HR Department provided only limited support to the individual
change projects. This consisted mainly of administrative support for training (e.g. as in the
case of the CE Project), or advising on the legal aspects o f personnel management and
providing information about legal frameworks (e.g. as in the case of the Remuneration
Project).
The HR Department did not even meet limited expectations of change project leaders and
managers regarding its contribution to certain HRM issues within the change program.
Middle managers had expected the HR Department to be more involved in the change
process, as the AQA Self-Assessment indicated, and were disappointed with the
Department's insignificant contributions to individual projects. The OCC Project Leader for
example complained that regarding the restructuring of the remuneration package "they
came up with something. But fo r the average man or woman in the company, it will not
mean much. ... Not very much has progressed on that [the remuneration package]”. The CE
Project Leader saw the jobs of the HR people as "very bounded. It is hiring and firing. They
don't have the background really to be able to help". Other managers shared this attitude
towards the HR Department. As a result, line managers themselves became initiators of
changes to HRM policies and practices.

6.2.2

H RM AS A SPECIALIST FUNCTION

As suggested by Mansfield (1997) and discussed in chapter four, HRM as a specialist
function does not have to fall together with the HR Department. This was the case in
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MILSYS. The HR Department was not a specialist function in the sense that it was
concerned with the development and implementation of a HRM strategy linked to the
company's business strategy or the elaboration and establishment of appropriate employment
policies and practices. The Business Administration Manager o f the Engineering
Department in his role as leader o f the OCC Project largely took up these issues. The
Technical Managing Director’s vision of creating "a truly knowledge-based company" was
the driving force behind several initiatives and activities within the change program in
general and the OCC Project in particular. He dominated and drove the company's
knowledge management concept and the way the company went about it, as his next quote
reflects:

"You leverage the knowledge o f professionals by finding a system that a
person, a younger engineer, who is still way behind an experienced one, can
tap into, learn quickly and catch up with the better one by not having to bother
him. ... I f you are truly a knowledge-based company, you should go straight
into the INTRANET or e-mail and [find] somebody in this company or sister
company ... who has done this [problem] before ... I f three or four people do
this, chances are that the person who asked this, will have in no time 80% o f
what he requires. So he will put in a much more superior submission to the
customer, in a much shorter period o f time and can go on with the job or with
the next job elsewhere. That is what leverage knowledge means. You live on
each others experiences and brains and knowledge and everything else. And
that is starting now."

In early 1997, the transition towards a knowledge company was still "at the beginning and
not as fa r advanced" as the Technical Managing Director had anticipated. "If we had an
honest knowledge-based company" he claimed "people would volunteer [to leverage
knowledge]". The limited achievements may have been due to the protractedness of such
complex change, but also to the limited time and resources made available for the OCC
Project and a lack of specialist HRM knowledge and expertise. Though a number of
scattered efforts had been made by the OCC Project Leader (e.g. several changes to existing
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personnel policies and practices, mostly in the area of performance appraisal, training and
development), in early 1997 they were not fully implemented nor had they been widely
discussed. Many people knew about the aspired transition into a knowledge-based company,
but knew little about the details of the planned changes. The changes did not make up a
holistic, organisation-wide approach, they did strongly enforce the attitudinal and
behavioural changes required to realise a knowledge based company and CE.

6.3

HRM AS AN GENERIC ORGANISATION-WIDE ACTIVITY

With the initiation of MILS YS' change program in 1994, HRM was increasingly viewed by
the management team as a shared responsibility of senior management, line managers,
employees and teams. These were all seen as playing a role in planning and implementing
HR policies and practices that would enable the effective utilisation and development of the
company's key resource and the establishment of a "truly knowledge-based" organisation.
From 1994/95 on MILSYS also devolved more HRM accountability to line management^.
This section shows what HR responsibilities were devolved to line management. It discusses
how functional managers coped with their HRM accountability and in what areas line
managers evolved as initiator of changes to existing HRM policies and practices.
Traditionally functional managers looked after some aspects of HRM for their subordinates
(e.g. performance appraisal, training and development, selection of staff for projects). With
the initiation of the change program in 1994/5, Project Leaders, Business Administration
Managers and teams also started to take responsibility and ownership of certain operational
HRM aspects. Line management dealt with more and more HRM issues. Legge (1995b, p.
xv) calls this phenomenon the "internalization o f the importance o f human resources on the
part o f line managers". At the beginning of the change process, HRM activities were still of
low importance to many line managers. They had not recognised the value of HRM nor their61

61 If not otherwise specified line management comprises functional managers, business administration
managers and project managers.
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own responsibility for it. They had little or no training or qualification in HRM.
Nevertheless they felt confident to deal with HR issues and considered their efforts in this
respect as sufficient, as interviews and informal talks indicated. The AQA Self-Assessment
and Project Management Assessment results identified HRM as one of the weakest
managerial areas and showed that most managers in MELSYS largely underestimated HRM
in its complexity and difficulty.
Consequently, the company provided various training sessions on HRM and related issues,
and stimulated a continuous discussion of various HR topics. In early 1997, the awareness of
line managers for HRM processes was raised. Line managers were more actively involved
with the initiation and management of the organisational and cultural change process. They
also became aware of the complexity of HRM and their often limited ability and expertise in
this area. Though functional managers were still spending a larger proportion of time on
personnel matters than Project Managers, Project Managers started to consciously take up
HRM responsibilities. They co-operated with functional managers in assessing project
members. They recommended training, stimulated communication processes and recognised
team members for their project achievements.
A step towards the greater devolution of HRM accountability to line management was the
restructuring of the Engineering Department in 1996, as described earlier. This included a
redefinition of the tasks and responsibilities of the various managers in this area and a clear
distinction between people and technology management took place, as outlined earlier.
According to the Business Administration Manager of the Engineering Department,
MILSYS also made efforts to depart from the traditional practice of promotion by seniority
and aimed to establish a dual career ladder62.

62 A proposal for a dual career ladder was made by the former Engineering Director in late 1994 and
its main ideas summarised in the paper 'Engineering Career Structure and Competency Standards".
The system was based on a multi-level scheme. After passing three basic levels (and gaining
respective experiences, skills and competencies) an orientation towards a more technical or
managerial career was intended/possible. Both paths were subdivided into three, respectively four
levels, with each level requiring particular skills and competencies.
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"We are trying to get away from promotion by seniority. That we don't say, you
are the oldest, the next most senior, therefore you are the person that heads up
a group o f people, whereas he headed up a technology before."

Prior to 1994/5 (and typical of engineering-dominated organisations) it was a common
practice that long-serving technical specialists were appointed to managerial positions even
though they had neither managerial experience nor good people management skills. In 1996,
a number of management positions were still filled with technical experts rather than
management experts. "Our managers are probably stronger on the technical side o f things.
That is a legacy that we have within the company", claimed the Business Administration
Manager of the Engineering Department. It was more likely to be promoted into a senior
management position from a functional position than those of a Project Manager. "When you
are working in a really project oriented rather than a functional oriented organisation, than
the leaders o f the organisation are chosen from among the ranks o f the Project Managers
rather than from the functional department managers. This is not happening here yet",
explained a Project Manager (3). In addition, most functional managers hesitated to engage
in succession planning. They felt uncomfortable in identifying a possible successor for a
particular position. According to the Business Administration Manager of the Engineering
Department succession they saw planning as a source of disturbances within the department
which often lead to unnecessary resignations in cases where people felt deprived of thenprospects of promotion.
Another activity that showed line management's involvement in the change process, was the
design of the earlier mentioned training register and training needs database in early 1996. It
was a joint undertaking of the Quality Assurance-, the Engineering and the HR Department.
The aim was to establish a systematic approach to training and development. On one hand
the database looked at the provision and quality of training courses, on the other hand at the
training and skills needed for certain positions or jobs. Prior to 1996, MTT.SYS mainly
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focused on technical training. According to the Director of Quality Assurance "a lot o f
training [was] initiated by the arrival o f a glossy brochure in someone's mail, rather than ...
planning it, structuring it and ensuring that everyone, who is doing a similar sort o f job, has
the same level o f training". Managers typically approved training as long as an employee
was able to prove its relevance to work tasks. According to a Project Manager (2) the
decision to approve training was not a matter of whether the company was able to "afford it"
or not: "It is purely a question o f whether it is justified. I f it is justified then we can afford
it". But internal skill development, where people gathered experiences in other than the
home department, was not a common practice. It was occasionally practised at the
instigation of an interested employee. Managers admitted that a number of people, who had
worked in a different department, were as a rule better team players and co-operated and
communicated more effectively across functional boundaries.
With the training register, the company aimed to streamline the provision of training and to
improve the quality of the training offered. First successes included the identification of
more appropriate and high quality computer courses. MILSYS standardised on certain
courses, e.g. in document writing and procedure writing. With the initiation of the change
program many training initiatives were also approved that aimed at changing attitudes and
behaviours. Technical skill training, however, remained an important category.
In the development of the training needs database, the representatives of the three
departments determined the competency standards for every generic position within their
departments. Every person in that position was then assessed to see what competencies and
skills were missing. This gap analysis was meant to serve as the basis for a training budget
review and more focused expenditure. Until early 1997 however, the data were not used for
these purposes.
Managers of the Quality Assurance and Engineering Department considered the training
register and training needs databases a helpful tool in staff development matters and the
selection of appropriate project staff. It fell into disuse, however, because its maintenance
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required a lot of time. According to the Director of Quality Assurance they "gathered a lot
o f data in it, but never went any further with it". The initiative had no champion to enforce
its continuous application, or as the Director of Quality Assurance put it there was "no one
in the driver's seat fo r it".
Line managers also initiated changes in the area of performance appraisal. Prior to 1995
performance appraisals were carried out by functional managers even when an employee
was assigned full-time to a project. The appraisal process was carried out annually. It was
used to identify training needs and discuss individual staff development actions. Employees
and managers, however, criticised the appraisal process saying it was too sporadic and
needed "more regular application" and that agreed actions were often not followed up. In
many cases it depended on the persistence of the individual employee whether any further
steps were taken and the agreed training and development activities realised. According to
the Director of Quality Assurance, the performance appraisal was "rarely looked at
progressively throughout the year. It tend[ed] to be something where many managers pull
the things [records] out o f their drawers after the year got by, asking, how well did you
perform against that, rather than being a progressive measure ".
In 1995, with the company's stronger emphasis on teamwork, some functional managers
started to involve Project Managers in the assessment process. The Technical Managing
Director explained the new approach as follows:

"The appraisal is predominantly done by the functional heads, because they
understand it better. ... The Project Manager knows whether [a person]
performs well in the project or not. But whether [this person] is a first class
engineer is very important fo r us too. So the chief engineer [functional
manager] appraises those people with the Project Manager."

The Technical Managing Director took the view that functional managers have not only the
freedom but also the obligation to customise the performance appraisal process to their
departmental needs, as the next quote indicates:
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"If some people don't like the current appraisal forms and systems, it is up to
them, what they make with it. ... I expect totally different answers from a
marketing manager compared to an accountant." Technical Managing Director

The Engineering Director and Business Administration Manager of the Engineering
Department followed this request and modernised the performance appraisal for the
Engineering Department. A set of performance objectives63 was formulated on the basis of
so-called "SMART" criteria64 and was applied in the appraisal process of managers of the
Engineering Department. It was expected that these managers would apply this process with
their subordinates. It was also expected that the managers would co-operate with Project
Managers when their staff members worked on projects. The new performance objectives in
the Engineering Department were still not particularly team orientated, but some of the
objectives promoted teamwork.
MILSYS did not have a formal reward scheme65. Rewards were determined in an informal
and subjective matter by the Technical Managing Director and other senior managers, as the
next two quotes reflect:

"If there has been a considerable good performance in particular areas, fo r
example a very dedicated team o f engineering and marketing staff developed a
product, we give them a spontaneous bonus. ...I t could be something like an
additional month's salary. ... There is no procediere that says, this is the way it
works." Business Administration Manager of the Engineering Department

"There is no formal [reward] structure. But we [MILSYS] recognise
immediately. We have special bonuses. ... I call them in here, both sometimes

63 Performance objectives for engineering managers: job knowledge, training and preparation,
problem solving ability, creativity, leadership of staff, development of staff, responsibility,
reliability, ability to get results, profit cost awareness, exchange of knowledge, relationship and
contribution to the management team.
64 SMART stands for Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Realistic, and Time-constrained objectives.
65 It is referred here to rewards and bonuses over and above the remuneration system.
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individuals and sometimes teams, depending on the task. ... I f you have a team
that beat the world ..., I know the people who contributed. I live in this
company, so I call them in here. Then I give them the bonus and that is it. We
don't pu t it on the wall or say that person got 7000, this person got 10000
Dollars." Technical Managing Director

Individuals as well as project teams were able to quality for a reward within the "quiet
bonus scheme" as the Technical Managing Director referred to it. However, it was the
prevailing practice to reward individuals. Only in rare circumstances teams were rewarded.
Rewards, both for teams and individuals, were usually financial bonuses. Non-monetary
forms of reward and recognition (such as mentioning a person's name in the company's
newsletter or a notice at the home department's notice-board) were not widely used.
Managers rarely gave credit for good performance or a good idea or the participation in an
initiative. This was reflected in the discussions of numerous CE training sessions as well as
the attitude survey and the AQA Self-Assessment. These revealed that employees, including
managers, felt inadequately valued for their contributions, particularly those accomplished
in teams. According to the CE Project Leader, MTLSYS had "no tradition or policy here to
recognise people". Another employee noted that MILSYS is "not a company fo r giving pats
on the back" (CE Pilot Project member). The distribution of rewards in MILSYS
inadequately reflected the importance of teams and the growing value of teamwork. The
position of some executive managers, for example the Managing Director Business
Administration, may have contributed to this practice:

"I would not necessarily see a reason fo r rewarding people working in a team,
because, team work is either successful and enjoyable by those who are
participating, or not. You can not substitute the fun people are having in their
work

by paying

them

extra

money." (Managing

Director

Business

Administration)

He did not see the necessity for team rewards. He perceived the opportunity to work in a
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team as a reward in itself.

6.4

SUMMARY

This chapter showed that with the initiation of the change program in late 1994, MILSYS
started to focus on people as a means to achieve productivity gains and to safeguard its
business reorientation. People's knowledge was increasingly realised the key to the
company's competitive advantage, and a team-oriented HRM the way to manage and extend
this potential. The Technical Managing Director claimed HRM to be of highest importance
to the company and saw himself as a main stakeholder of HRM, though he did not always
act as such.
The chapter also showed that MILSYS' HR Department was limited to the provision of
welfare and administrative services. It had only limited resources in terms of time, funds and
relatively low status staff, and was not involved with the initiation and management of
organisational and cultural changes. The initiation and management of organisational and
cultural changes resided largely with senior managers and selected line managers and was
formally assigned to the leader of the OCC Project. Beyond it, the chapter revealed that the
existing HRM policies and practices did not promote the new emphasis on teamwork and
innovation. It also showed that, by early 1997, many line managers had not fully grasped the
importance of HRM for the success of the company nor their own responsibility and
accountability for HRM. Although some changes to the existing HRM policies and practices
were proposed and realised since the initiation of the change program in 1994, they
remained fragmented and limited in effect. By mid-1997, an integrated HRM concept had
still not been developed. It was however, realised that the implementation of teamwork does
not only require a restructuring of the technical division of labour, but "has to be
underpinned by normative and behavioural changes" (Marks et al., 1996, p.17).
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7

TH E CE PR O JEC T

7.1

INTRODUCTION

While the last two chapters outlined the context, both environmental and organisational, in
which the CE Project emerged, this chapter outlines the actual CE Project.
The CE Project was brought into being by the end of 1995. According to the Business
Administration Manager of the Engineering Department, senior management classified the
CE Project as a "first priority", in comparison to the OCC Project, which was rated a
"second priority". In the course of the project it appeared, however, (and is another example
of rhetoric vs. reality) that the CE Project was not treated as a "first priority" project in
terms of senior management commitment.
The CE Project encompassed both the design of a company-specific CE concept and the
implementation of that selected "solution set". The proposed "solution set" and the course of
the project are presented below. First the nature of the CE Project Team is discussed,
followed by an outline of the course of the CE Project and a discussion of the main events
and decisions during the design of the company-specific CE concept and its beginning
implementation. The chapter finishes with an analysis of the prospects for a full success of
CE in MILSYS and its organisation-wide implications.

7.2

THE CE PROJECT TEAM

The product development process is often seen as the domain of engineers and other
technical personnel for companies66. Thus, it is common to appoint engineers to develop
concepts for restructuring this process (Bailey, 1993). In MILSYS a similar situation was
observable. The CE Project Team was largely made up of people with a technical
background, and the proposed CE concept, as discussed later, clearly reflected the team's
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strong focus on technical solutions to realise integration and concurrence. The CE Project
Leader was an engineer and, as shown below, reinforced the team's technical emphasis.

7.2.1

T h e CE P r o j e c t L e a d e r

The CE Project Team was headed by the Systems Engineering Manager, whose department
(Systems Engineering) and position had been created in the course o f the change program.
He was recruited from outside in late 1993, and had both defence force and industrial
experience. By 1996, his department was not well established. Systems Engineering was an
upstream service and support department. His appointment as leader of the CE Project did
not reflect the high priority the CE Project was formally given by senior management. One
CE Project Team member assumed that "somebody from a performing department would
have been good [as Project Leader],... somebody from manufacturing or the design stream,
... having a true appreciation o f the process. He would be very familiar with the process and
would also have some responsibility fo r the costs and the costs overruns”. He thought that
such a person would have been probably more suited for this task.
The Systems Engineering Manager was enthusiastic about CE and had volunteered to head
the project. He saw CE as "an opportunity to try something new. I'd always had a lot o f
ideas [regarding] the way we managed projects. I saw the CE initiative as a chance to test
some o f those. ...It was a chance to tackle some o f the problems, which worried me fo r some
years". He concentrated on tools, techniques and procedures6667. Little emphasis

66 For a more Marketing-oriented approach to new product development see e.g. Cooper, 1988;
Crawford, 1997.
67 See chapter three: different research streams (engineering, managerial, organisation) tend to give a
different emphasis to the three elements of the CE model (people, processes and tools) and the
relationships between them. A similar phenomenon occurs in practice. Engineers and people with
comparable technical background (engineering perspective) are predominantly concerned with the
engineering activities that play part in the design and development process. They seek to identify
ways, mostly in the form of technical (e.g. CAD/CAM, CIM), and procedural (e.g. systems
approach, design rules, standards) solutions to support and integrate these various activities (Smith
et al., 1995), not so much with organisational means (e.g. matrix structures, different cross
functional arrangements).
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was given to the organisational and HRM implications o f CE, though other team members
repeatedly raised such issues. He gave little consideration to people issues such as common
goal setting, open discussions, good communication and information processes, or
recognition. This was also reflected in his (authoritarian) leadership style, which lacked
team orientation. He treated team members as subordinates and did not develop his team
members appropriately. He dominated the team and did not easily delegate responsibility.
He sidelined people who held a different view from him, both within the team and with
project partners like those from the University. "He made it fairly clear, it is his project. We
don't even get a mention anywhere. We don't get introduced nor do people get introduced to
us ... It is symptomatic o f the way he thinks", described an External Consultant this practice.
From observations and interviews with CE Project Team members it appeared that issues
raised by the project participants were often not put on the agenda, were set aside and then
forgotten or simply not discussed. Further, in the initial stages of the project the discussions
and decisions of the team meetings were not captured. The team did not have any written
agendas or minutes.

7 .2 .2

Th e Team M em bers

The initial project team comprised five, later six members including the team leader (see
Table N). The team members represented only a few downstream and upstream functions
and all members had a technical background. They were mostly junior employees or
contractors. They were "not high profile people, ju st people the company thought it could
spare" described a member the CE Project Team. The team members worked part-time on
the project and were not collocated. At later stages, a representative from Test Engineering
and a representative from Marketing complemented the team. On the other hand it was
weakened through the withdrawal of one of its more proactive members in October 1996. In
February 1997 the project had to face the withdrawal of its project leader and one member,
who both left the company. Though a new CE Project Leader was appointed soon after, he
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was, similar to the initial one, new to the company and Manager of the Systems Engineering
Department.

Position in
CE
Project
Team

M ember
ship
Period

Home
Departm ent/
Unit

Position

Disciplinary'
Background

Project
Leader

11/19952/1997

Systems Engineering

Manager

Systems
Engineer

75%

Member

2/1996 10/1996

Systems Engineering

Engineer
(with 5 or less
years work
experience)

Systems Design
Engineer

50%
(4-7/96)
then
20%

Member

2/1996 ongoing
by 7/1997

Software Engineering

Contractor

Software
Engineer

50%
(4-7/96)
then
20%

Member

2/1996 ongoing by
7/1997

Quality Assurance

Engineer

QA Engineer

Member

3/1996 2/1997

Manufacturing/
Industrial Engineering

Engineer
(with 5 or less
years work
experience)

Industrial
Engineer

50%
(4-7/96)
then
20%
50%
(4-7/96)
then
20%

Member

7/1996 ongoing by
7/1997

Sales and Projects,/
Projects

Project
Manager
(joined
company in
6/1996)

Electronics
Engineer

20%

Member

9/1996 ongoing by
7/1997

Engineering/
Test Engineering

Engineer

Engineer

Member

11/1996 ongoing

Sales and Projects/
Sales and Marketing

Engineer

Engineer

not defined
(called in when
required)
not defined
(called in when
required)

New
Project
Leader

3/1997 ongoing by
7/1997

Systems Engineering

Manager

Systems Design
Engineer

Table N:

Time
Dedication
(planned)

not defined

Composition of the CE Proj ect Tearn

The work on the project was not widely viewed as rewarding by its team members. It
involved additional work but the team had little authority to enforce changes and there was
little management support. At times the project work led to conflicts between the team
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members and their home functions regarding the time commitment. Neither the team nor
individual team members received much recognition or reward for their efforts.
No initial team building training was offered to the team nor requested by the CE Project
Leader (e.g. in order to avoid problems of different departmental cultures and languages, to
sufficiently clarify the role and responsibilities of the team and the individual team members
and to determine a common goal and the scope of the project). Meetings, though they took
place on a regular basis (initially once a week, later twice a week, and then again once a
week), were not used to fully resolve the conflicting understandings of CE between the CE
Project Leader and the team members.
Strategic alliances with other stakeholders were rarely established and if they were, they
were mostly mediated by the CE Project Leader. CE got "the most support from the least
powerful people in the Executive Committee" claimed a CE Project Team member. The
Manufacturing Director for example openly welcomed the implementation of CE and was
willing to introduce a number of CE training sessions. He strongly emphasised the
importance CE at these and other occasions. Other senior managers were less supportive of
CE. In some cases support was denied. The Director of Material Planning and Control, for
example, did not participate in any CE training events, nor did she send a representative of
her department onto the team.

7.3

THE COURSE OF THE CE PROJECT

This section discusses the course of the CE Project (see Figure 23) with its main decisions,
activities and outcomes. The project was triggered by an organisational diagnosis in early
1995, as outlined earlier. The results of the analysis culminated in a decision to restructure
the traditional design and development process. Concurrent Engineering was recommended
as a promising concept and a CE Project set up accordingly.
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The CE Im plem entation Process
Business Analysis
(1-4/95

Collaboration with University of Wollongong (2/9 6-7/97)

C E Implementation plan - project
proposal (10,11/95)

Q FD/CE/DFA
W orkshop with U C W
(5/96)

Set up of C E strategy
team (12/95-2/96)

CE W orkshop with
U O W (2/96)

Workshop with Departments to
develop common understanding
of N PD P (7/96)

Sponsor resigned,
12/95

INTRANET (6/96-2/97)

Analysis of M ILSYS' design, development &
production activities (2,3,4/96)

Assessment of Boothroyd/
Dewhorst DFA tool (10/96- 797)

Case study of success
ful project 6-7/96

New Sponsor,
1/1996

CORE - assessm ent impiementation 10/96 - 3/97)

Strategic framework for CE (sub
project planned in 6/96, ...aborted)

Design & Development
Process Manual - 2nd

CE Cost Benefit
survey (3/96)

modified edition (5/97)
Development of team structure for future
projects, 7-8/96

C OSA T workshop

PM & Product U fe-cyde
rocess handbook

W orkshop to review

(3/96)

;j

Preparation training
sessions, 9-10/96

Focus-Groups
(2/96)

existing results of
CE(2/97)

(proposal: 7/97)
Team leader

Info-session to
_

functions (4/96)

resigns (2/97)

Training: Introduci d>n
to C E (10,11/96)

Appd>intment new
team leader (2/97)

Train the trainer for
Training: Project

C E Team (8/96)
.

Management in CE
(11/96)

Presentation of CE
implementation plan

CE Training for Hardi-

by new leader (4/97)

ware design (10/96)
Training Systems
Engineering (10/96)
PM of Pilot
resigns (5/97)

procedures (5-11/96)

I

PM representative on
team nominated new

Metrics System (8-10/96)

PM for Pilot (6/97)
Pilot project (CE team involvement from 10/96 onwards)
TeamBuüdng Training
(proposal: 7/96 - only pianneri)
CE best-practice
brochure (7/96)
CE information

CE newsletter,

paper, 2/96

4/96

7/96

1. CE presen-

2. CE presentation (3/96)

tation (11/95)

Nov

Dec

CE newsletter,
11/96

CE newsletter,

Jan

Feb

March

Apr

3. C E presentation (9/96)

May

June

Main data e je c tio n period

July

Aug

1996

CE newsletter,
1/97

Team recognition
lunch, 11/96

Sept

Oct

4. CE presentation (2/97)

Nov

Dec

Jan
j

Feb
----------- ■

March

Apr

May

June

July

Aug

19g7

Extended data collection period

Figure 23:

CE Project Internal Activities and Events Determining the CE Implementation
Process

The newly appointed Systems Engineering Manager was nominated the leader of the CE
Project and was tasked to develop a project proposal with an initial CE implementation plan
and identifications of required resources. In late November 1995, after two months of
intensive work, he presented the project proposal to the Executive Committee, which agreed
to the proposed milestones and the requested resources. The project proposal contained a
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vision and mission statement68, the goals of the CE Project69, and main project tasks70. The
goals and initial activities were identified by the CE Project Leader in co-operation with the
external business consultants. The Engineering Director was appointed the sponsor of the
CE Project. He saw CE as a great advantage for the company and also fostered University
linkages to help to develop the project.
Under the approved project proposal, the first project task was the initial planning and
preparation of the project, which was solely carried out by the CE Project Leader. The task
comprised the establishment of the project budget, the identification of areas that required
consultancy support and the preparation of a 'CE text and reading' file. It also involved
negotiations with functional managers to release personnel to the CE Project Team.
In December 1995, the project's original sponsor resigned from the company. In January
1996 the newly appointed Engineering Director was assigned as sponsor of the CE Project.
In contrast to the initial sponsor, the new sponsor showed much less interest in the CE
Project, its course and results. "He was not proactive at all. He did not show any interest,
did not turn up to any meeting, did not comment any report except fo r spelling mistakes"
claimed the CE Project Leader.
In February 1996 the CE Project Team was appointed and the project officially launched.
The CE Project Leader communicated the launch to MILSYS' employees through the first

68 Mission of CE Project: "To develop concurrent design, production and management processes to
deliver systems solutions faster, at a lower life cycle cost, and in a predictable manner. " (Internal
Document A l).
69 General goals of the CE Project: "get products to market in a shorter time; raise predictability (of
design); reduce rework in manufacture; produce more new products more often; incorporate more
features at less cost; standardise design practices; increase team effort; reduce current levels of
production support, product testing and; improve overall downstream process performance"
(Internal Document A l).
70 Tasks of the CE Project: "Initial planning and preparation; Form team and detailed planning;
Determine current situation; Determine CE 'best practices'; Determine provisional 'preferred' CE
process; Establish procedures and set up tools to support pilot project and; future tasks" (Internal
Document A l).
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CE Newsletter71. The CE Project Leader introduced the four initial team members to the
project's vision, mission and goal and the project schedule. They commenced their work by
refining the project tasks and schedule for the next part of the project. They also reviewed
some of the available literature on CE selected by the CE Project Leader (e.g. Grady, 1994;
Salomone, 1995, which reflected a strong Systems Engineering focus).
Also at this stage, an agreement with the University of Wollongong was finalised providing
support for the CE implementation process. One of the first activities resulting from this co
operation was a workshop on CE in 2/1996. It was run by the University partners for the CE
Project Team, and strongly emphasised the organisational dimension of the CE concept.
In February 1996, the team set up focus groups within MILSYS in order to determine how
departments interact over the entire product development process. It also wanted to identify
the main problems experienced by the various groups and departments72. Twenty-three
focus group meetings were held. Each group involved between three and ten staff members
from the various departments associated with the product design and development process.
In addition, the CE Project Leader reviewed several of MILSYS' recent product design and
development projects and analysed their actual time and budget requirements. Without any
consultation he designed a questionnaire for a CE cost-benefit survey to be employed in a
so-called "Delphi-Study". The survey was carried out by the CE Project Team in mid-March
1996. Over 40 project personnel completed the questionnaires. The survey results were
summarised in a CE requirement and feasibility study and presented to senior management
in the second CE Project presentation by the end of March 1996.
The feasibility study first of all provided an assessment of the design and development

71 The CE Newsletter briefly explained why CE was adopted by MILSYS and its basic concept,
introduced the CE Project Team, the general aims of the project and initial tasks (such as the focus
group meetings to identify main deficiencies in MILSYS' product development process).
72 More than 200 problems were identified by the Focus Groups, which were grouped into 40 problem
categories and then ranked following certain criteria (such as frequency of the problem; relative
value of the phase in which problem was experienced; elapsed time between the process that the
problem is experienced and when it is caused) (Internal Document A6); see also section 5.4.4.
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process at the time ("as is" analysis)73. Secondly, it discussed the need for a sub-project on
strategic planning aspects under a CE approach74756. Thirdly, it introduced a model that
expressed] the current duration o f the design-to-delivery cycle in a way that allow[ed]
extrapolation to future projects" (Internal Document A6) and attempted to quantify the costs
and benefits of the implementation of CE73. It finally proposed four initiatives (in the area
of project planning, systems level design, detailed design, business planning) to overcome
the main problems identified in these areas7(\ In order to measure their effect, the study
recommended the institutionalisation of quantitative measures in the form of key
performance indicators (i.e. cycle time, number of design changes, customer and
downstream department satisfaction).
In retrospect, some team members and the project partners from the University judged that
the diagnosis was not appropriate. A team member claimed "We never got really good
information out o f th a t... We did not get into the heart and soul o f the main processes. I
think, we could have actually gone and observed what's going on, rather than simply ask
them [functional representatives in focus groups] questions".
The feasibility study aimed to convince senior management to fully support and commit to
an accelerated and full implementation of CE. The team also wanted to ensure the support

73 Some of the 15 most important problems and issues identified were: lack of communication, poor
planning and scheduling; lack of personnel; poor estimates; lack of training and awareness in
MILSYS' practices and procedures; poor requirements analysis, poor specification and poor contract
writing; difficult data share between software packages).
74 The aim of the sub-project "Strategic Framework for CE" was the development of a model to
predict the number of projects MILSYS can handle simultaneously with a given staffing level, which
would then support organisational and strategy recommendations.
75 The study predicted that CE would significantly reduce MILSYS' manpower costs (up to 55,000
man/hours savings across many functions over 18 months - by the end of 1997/8).
76 Aim of Initiative 1 - Project Planning: More realistic plans, schedules and estimates. Initiative 2 System level design: Reduce delays in acceptance due to unfeasible specifications and delays in
development where designers fail to reflect the contract specifications. Initiative 3 - Detailed design:
Reduce delays in development caused by rework of the design during later development, and delays
due to insufficient design data to support purchasing, manufacturing, and ILS development.
Initiative 4 - Business Planning: Reduce the problem of lack of staff for projects.
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from all departments involved in product development. In April 1996 the results were
presented to, and discussed with, the participating departments. With the involvement of
many people in the survey and in the focus groups as well as the broad communication of
the results, the CE Project Team tried to raise awareness for CE and signal changes in the
design and development process.
In March 1996 a workshop took place where the CE Project Team was familiarised with
COSAT (Cross Organizational Step Adoption Tool), a management tool and guide for
introducing CE, which focuses on the organisational side of the implementation process.
Another event at this stage was the QFD (Quality Function Deployment), DFA (Design For
Assembly), CE workshop in May 1996, which was organised and carried out by the
University partners. It again emphasised the organisational dimension o f CE, but provided
also an overview of QFD and DFA under consideration of their organisational requirements.
At a later stage the team investigated the QFD and DFA methods in more detail and
evaluated a particular software for DFA.
From April/May 1996 on the CE Project Team worked on the four initiatives proposed in
the feasibility study. In Project Planning they aimed to develop a checklist of relevant
functions to be involved in various planning activities. They aimed to revise the procedures
for scheduling, estimating, and managing risk in order to reflect a more systematic team
approach. Finally, they intended to train facilitators familiar with the revised procedures to
assist Project Managers. In System Level Design they wanted to assess and possibly
introduce QFD (Quality Function Deployment) as a means of identifying and managing
customer needs. They also aimed to improve the application of Systems Engineering as a
means of ensuring customer requirements were fully met through procedures, training and
tools. For Detailed Design they intended to engage in four activities. One was the
development of a checklist of relevant functions to become involved in the various design
activities. The second one was the introduction of more comprehensive DFMA (Design For
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Manufacturing77 and Assembly) and DFT (Design For Test) procedures to reduce
development time. The third activity comprised the revision o f the reviews and procedures
for design planning to allow a more systematic team approach. The fourth task was the
development of facilitators familiar with the revised procedures to assist Project
Engineering Managers. Finally, in Business Planning they wanted to develop a model for
optimising the staffing for different types of projects.
While the completion of the fourth initiative was planned for 1997, the CE Project Team
aimed to have the new procedures drafted by July 1996, and to start a suitable Pilot Project
soon after. Due to the complexity of the task and other work commitments of the CE Project
Team members, the CE Project Team was unable to keep to their plan. Most of the work
until August 1996 concentrated on the writing and re-writing of the company's design and
development manuals and procedures to reflect the requirements for CE.
In June/July 1996 the CE Project Leader analysed one of MILSYS' recent and very
successful product development projects to identify its success factors. The findings were
summarised in an internal case study report. They showed a strong effort on the part of the
Project Leader to apply teamwork principles and to integrate downstream function from an
early point in the development process. For the CE Project Team this corroborated the
approach they had chosen. The CE Project Team used the findings to identify MILSYS'
"bestpractices". They formalised and extended them in a statement of CE "bestpractices"
to allow their application in a Pilot Project and later on all product development projects. In
this context, the CE Project Team discussed the possibility of visits to other project-based
companies for benchmark purposes.
In June 1996 one CE Project Team member started to investigate the requirements for an
INTRANET implementation, which the CE Project Team had suggested as an additional

77 DFMA - a method of design with the goal of understanding the product’s future manufacturing and
assembly processes during the design stages (Internal Document A 17).
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communication source within the company.
The efforts of the CE Project Team also aimed to overcome the deficiencies in the current
tools available to support systems engineering. They identified a need for appropriate
requirements analysis and tracking tools, which would offer support across all stages. Such
tools were needed to allow integration between the various tools and an integrated
configuration management of the data they produce78. In October 1996 one CE Project
Team member therefore started to investigate the Boothroyd and Dewhurst software for
DFMA79 (which was purchased for trial in December 1996). Another team member began
to analyse CORE, a database, which can be used to record systems and product specification
as well as test and verification information (which was implemented by early 1997).
The sub-project "Strategic framework fo r CE", which was meant to look at the criteria for
an ideal project mix for the company, was aborted in June 1996. The CE Project Team did
not have access to appropriate people for the task. The necessity of the project was also
questioned because it was recognised that the company was not in a situation to freely
choose its projects, but had to take the projects that came up.
With the intensified negotiations between senior management and the CE Project Leader for
a CE Pilot Project from June 1996 on, the CE Project Team paid more attention to aspects
such as team formation, team building training, the definition of team objectives and goals
and the design of a team charter. The CE Project Team proposed a new project team
organisation. It was based on Grady's (1994) model of project teams in a Systems
Engineering environment. Under this, a development team was seen in relation to the size of
a project, which determined the team structure and the formation of its components such as
core-and sub-teams. Figure 24 shows the CE Project Team proposed for small projects,

78 Two types of software were considered here: 1) software to support Systems Engineering (customer
requirements analysis and specification management), and 2) software to support Design and
Development activities (notably DFA).
79 Boothroyd and Dewhurst DFMA: A computer based technique to support DFMA analysis and to
provide early cost estimates for manufacture; techniques can also be applied manually; software
consists of various separate modules (e.g. design for manual assembly, PCB assembly, etc.).
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Team Structure for Small Projects
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Source: Internal Document A l 1
Figure 24:

Team Structure for Small Projects

Team Structure for Large Projects
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Team Structure for Large Projects
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Figure 25 the proposed structure for large projects.
The new project team organisation was introduced in August 1996 in the form of a
specification to be included in the company's new and revised design and development
manuals and procedures. While the CE Project Team defined the responsibilities and
composition of each individual team, it did not define all individual team roles and
responsibilities (see Appendix J). For a number of team member positions it was also left
open whether they would be involved in the project full- or part-time. It was not clarified
whether they would be on the project team from concept design to the end or only at a
particular stage. Integration issues between up- and downstream groups and with customer
representatives or key suppliers were not adequately addressed either.
Also in July, the CE Project Team came up with a draft for a team building event for cross
functional teams in new design and development projects in general and the CE Pilot Project
team in particular (planned as a two-day off the company premises event run with the
support of the University partners). However, for the CE Pilot Project team senior
management, as discussed later, did not approve such an event.
Another major event in July 1996 was a workshop held by the CE Project Team with
representatives of all functions involved in the product design and development process,
explaining the CE Project Team ideas regarding CE to the functions. The main upcoming
changes in MILSYS' design and development process were also summarised in a brochure
(the CE Project Team had designed) and circulated to all departments at this occasion. The
brochure summarised the need for changes, it addressed the areas of change (under the
headings: better teamwork, better techniques, better tools, and better product planning) and
introduced the recommended CE "bestpractices" for each area (see Appendix K). It also
briefly outlined the "way ahead" including an overview of the scheduled training courses
and contained a reference to the relevant contact people. The workshop was also used to
develop a common understanding of the process of designing, developing and producing
systems to enable all functions to work together more effectively to deliver systems faster.
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Based on their already developed ideas, the CE Project Team and the functional
representatives jointly developed a scheme of the new design and development process. In
contrast to the traditional process, this scheme reflected greater concurrence and team focus.
The scheme was further refined by the CE Project Team and later integrated in the new and
revised design and development manuals and procedures.
In July 1996 the third CE Newsletter was issued. Under the heading "[MILSYS] to launch
CE in September", it reported that the new and revised manuals and procedures "will be
used on all design and development projects commencing in September 1996" (Internal
Document A3, 7/1996). The July newsletter also provided for the first time a more specific
goal of CE: "The Concurrent Engineering changes aim to reduce the cost o f design changes
in production by 20% by July 1997”. The newsletter also talked about the CE Project Team's
effort to establish a set of company specific CE "best practices", and how the changes
would be implemented.
The main events and activities up to this point are summarised in Table O.

Topics Discussed By
CE Project TEAM

CE Project Activities,
Events

Outcomes

Relevant
Events
Outside CE
Project

1995

Required project
budget and personnel;

- Appointment of CE Project
Leader
- Elaboration of CE Project
proposal
- Elaboration of CE Project
proposal
- 1. CE presentation to
Executive Committee
- Appointment of Project
Sponsor
Resignation of initial project
sponsor;

Initial project tasks and
milestones

Initial planning and
preparation of CE Project

0
ct

N
0
v

D
ec

Ja
n

Benefit of CE for
MILSYS; Resources
for CE Project;
Milestones

What is CE - general
concept?
Required project
budget and personnel;
Initial project tasks and
milestones

1996
New sponsor assigned;
Initial planning and
preparation of CE Project
(e.g. negotiations with
functional managers for CE
Team members)

Project Proposal

'CE text and
reading' file

Start of
AQA
process
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F
e
b

What is CE - general
concept?

Establishment of CE Project
Team;

CE Project Team;
CE Project Launch;

How to apply CE in
MILSYS?

Refining die project tasks and
schedule;

1. CE Newsletter;

Deficiencies of
MILSYS' design and
development process.

Analysis o f current
development process in focus
groups;
Review of CE literature;
CE Workshop with UOW

M
a
r
c
h
A
Pr
il

M
ay

Ju
ne

How to improve NPD
process with CE?
Need of procedures as
cornerstone for process
improvements.
How to optimise
project mix?

CE cost-benefit survey;
Comparison of development
projects;
Preparation of CE status
report;
2. CE presentation;
COSAT workshop;

How to raise
organisation-wide
awareness of CE?
How integrate
downstream functions?

Presentation of'CE
Requirement and Feasibility
Study1to departments;
Engage in four initiatives:
Project Planning, System
Level Design, Detailed Design
and Business Planning;

Functional Integration.
Criteria for Pilot
Project.
Benefits of CORE,
QFD, DFMA.
Facilitator Training
Training Preparation;
Indicators of successful
team-work;
Benefits of
INTRANET;

Agreement with
University Partner
(UOW);
"Problemcatalogue" (from
focus groups)
Paper: Results of
Cost- benefit
analysis;
'CE Requirement
and Feasibility
Study1

CE Newsletter

CE, DFM, QFD Workshop
with UOW;

TOP forum
(all TOP
projects
present
except for
OCC)

Engage in four initiatives:
Project Planning, System
Level Design, Detailed Design
and Business Planning;
Writing and re-writing of
design and development
manuals and procedures
Internal case study of
successful development
project;

OCC
strategy
paper
submitted

Case Study Report;
Sub-project
"Strategic
framework for CE"
aborted;

Start investigation of
INTRANET;
Ju
1
V

Benchmarking v»ith
other companies;
Team building;
Conditions for CE roll
out;
Communication of CE
effort;

Representative from Project
Management joins team;
Work on manuals and
procedure continued;
Workshop with departments;
Negotiations for Pilot Project;
Work on structure for future
development project teams

CE Newsletter;
Paper: "CE and
Communication" (+
INTRANET
proposal);

Project Mgt.
Assessment
(Competenc
y Survey)

Outline: "Team
building
workshop";
CE "Best Practice"
Brochure;

Table O:

Summary of Main CE Project Events and Activities (October 1995 - July
1996)
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As outlined above, the actual CE Project started with the formalisation of a project
agreement with senior management and the determination of the staff resources for the CE
Project. The CE Project Team then identified the resources for the planned activities and
worked on the completion of (and mostly completed within schedule) its first phase goals.
These goals comprised the determination of 1) the current situation in MILSYS' product
development process, 2) CE "bestpractices", and 3) a provisional "preferred" CE process.
A fourth goal was the establishment of procedures and the identification of tools to support
the CE Pilot Project. Until mid-1996 the CE Project Team, dominated by its leader,
however, largely ignored HR issues in the context of CE. The CE Project Team did not co
operate with the OCC Project, which was looking at organisational and HRM issues of
change. The input by the University partners with their strong organisational focus was
largely neglected. According to an external consultant "early on the attitude was, we need to
do some training. We need to improve procedures. We need to buy a couple o f tools. That
was seen as the solution to the problems they had identified". For about six weeks in May
and June 1996 the CE Project was jointly managed by its team members during the absence
of the Project Leader, who had to meet other business obligations. One of the first meetings
during this time was used to analyse the project progress up to this stage. The CE Project
Team concluded that the success so far was limited and the direction of the project needed
to be adjusted. The members agreed, that up to that point the CE Project Team had not
developed a set of CE "best practices" and had neglected organisational and HR issues. A
possible Pilot Project had not been identified, and organisation-wide awareness for CE had
not been achieved. The next four meetings were used for intensive brainstorming on how to
change this situation. In the course of these meetings they came up with ideas for the
implementation of CE that were of a more organisational nature. According to an external
consultant "they [the CE Project Team] made a quantum leap. ... Suddenly there is the
design team, there is the emphasis on up-front planning". For the first time since the project
started, the CE Project Team also produced and circulated written minutes of the CE Project
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Team meetings. With the absence of the Project Leader, the CE Project Team took the
opportunity to give more consideration to organisational issues. Two of the five CE Project
team members in particular were active in this regard. The CE Project Team presented these
conclusions to the Project Leader on his return, and thus (in conjunction with input from the
University partners) contributed to an attitude change on his part from then on. The focus of
the CE Project shifted towards a greater awareness of the organisational dimension of the
CE concept. The growing awareness of the organisational dimension o f CE till the end of
the case study is discussed below.

For three months in August to October 1996 the CE Project Team representative from the
Quality Assurance Department was involved with the development of a performance metrics
system. The metrics system was meant to enable the company to measure and evaluate
project performance under CE. In the CE concept an organisation is viewed as a system of
interdependent resources. Its strategies, actions and performance measurement systems must
be linked to each other and its performance measures must be aligned to the company's
business goals. The system the CE Project Team representative from the Quality Assurance
Department came up with - influenced by recent developments within Systems Engineering
(INCOSE Technical Board, 1995) - did not satisfy these requirements. It did not sufficiently
define detailed measures for project performance under CE. Thus, it did not enable to collect
and analyse appropriate data in order to track performance over time and support continuous
improvement. Neither did it address behavioural aspects of performance measurement and
management under CE. The proposed performance metrics system found no consensus
among the CE Project Team. Due to time constraints and lack of expert knowledge its
further development was aborted.
Another activity in August 1996 was the "Train the Trainer" seminar conducted by a
representative from the HR Department for the CE Project Team members. It aimed to
advise and prepare the CE Project Team members in the design of a training plan and course
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material and in leading a CE training session.
In September 1996 the CE Project Team informed the various departments about the
preliminary completion of the new and revised manuals and procedures80 and how they
were accessible. They also informed them about their intention to introduce the manuals and
procedures in a series of training sessions. The departments were asked to determine an
appropriate time for the training and put together a list of training participants. The
departments were also asked to comment on the proposed changes and recommend further
improvements. But only few functional staff members took this opportunity.
The next two significant events were the introduction of the training concept at the third CE
presentation to senior management in September 1996 and the nomination of the CE Pilot
Project in October 1996. During the period September to November 1996, the CE Project
Team spent preparing and delivering CE training. This consisted of a half-day CE overview
course, a five-day Systems Engineering training, a two-day project management course, and
a one-day hardware design course (focusing on DFMA principles).
The CE overview course "Introduction to CE” was carried out first (twelve sessions, each
with up to 20 participants). The participants came from all departments and levels of the
company. But not all employees participated. While some avoided attending the course,
others, like many shop-floor workers, were not given the opportunity. According to their
manager, this course was not relevant for them, as they were not involved in the design and
development process. The CE introduction course had at least three objectives. One was to
familiarise the participants with the CE principles. A second one was to make them
understand the benefits of CE for MILSYS. The third objective was to show them how
MELSYS would practise CE and discuss how their work practices would change under CE.

80 Draft: Design and Development Process Manual, Systems Engineering Handbook, DFT/DFM
Handbook, Manufacturing Logistics Planning Work Instruction.
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The course contained two participatory elements, a group drawing exercise and a group
design exercise. The first one was used to encourage participants to critically reflect on
MELSYS' existing design and development process. The results led to a discussion of the
strengths and weaknesses of the process and the benefits of CE for MILSYS. The purpose of
the group design exercise was to foster recognition of the characteristics o f a successful
cross-functional team. The participants were expected to identify the behaviours that assist
or hinder cross-functional teamwork, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the cross
functional design and development team.
In the three specialised training courses only people from relevant departments or positions
participated. The objective of the "Project Management fo r CE" course was to reinforce the
aims of CE in MILSYS with particular emphasis on the project management aspects of CE.
The course also sought to provide the participants with the knowledge and skills to manage
projects in accordance with the proposed design and development process. It introduced the
new project team structure, the integrated project planning process, the work definition,
scoping and authorisation process, planning and performance measurement, and risk
management.
The aim of the Systems Engineering training course was to familiarise the participants with
the new rigorous project execution and reviewing process with a particular focus on
integration and concurrency. A target was to enable the participants to integrate the product
components and the process components into a system solution by ensuring that hardware,
software, and human systems components interact effectively. This integration effort was
seen as a critical condition in order to achieve the system purpose and satisfy the customer's
need.
The "CE fo r Hardware Design" course had two main objectives. One objective was to
provide insight into issues and general approaches to the application of the DFM/DFA
methodology. Its second target was to introduce some common DFM/A techniques,
guidelines, and checklists (including the Boothroyd and Dewhurst DFMA technique).
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Beyond it, the course introduced the proposed team structure and explained in detail the
tasks of the IDT (Integrated Development Team) and the SET (Speciality Engineering
Team).
The numerous training courses and seminars brought about a lot of action, but were limited
in their success. A number of questions remained unanswered and not all doubts about the
feasibility of the new approach were addressed. One reason for the limited success was seen
in the time factor. The training was conducted at a stage when a Pilot Project had not yet
been nominated. The CE Project Team had not tested its proposed CE concept and therefore
had no experience with its actual application. In addition, senior management and the CE
Project Team were still struggling to build up a coherent vision of CE, a common
understanding about what CE meant for MIL SYS. The CE Project Leader viewed CE as a
concept, which enabled the company to reduce the lead-time for product development by
streamlining the individual design and development processes. For the Technical Managing
Director CE was "not a process [but] an attitude, a culture". Accordingly he saw the scope
of the project mainly as a matter of changing attitudes.
The CE Project Leader had initially planned the training for a later stage in the CE Project.
The delivery of the training at this point in time "was probably the biggest mistake o f the
project", he later believed:

"We did not intend to roll out before we had done a Pilot Project. But the
[Technical] Managing Director insisted that we do it. Fd wished, I worked
harder to talk him out o f it. I think, if we had done the training after the Pilot
Project, and after we had demonstrated in practical terms to people the
benefits o f what we were talking about, then it would have been a bit more
concrete in peoples' minds and therefore easier to get CE going."

Also, the message of the training was not clear enough in terms of how individual
employees were affected by CE, and how the overall organisation was about to change.
Many organisational and HR related issues were raised in the training such as the future role
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of functional managers, but remained unanswered. "We are ju st starting to think about a
project team organisation. We haven't really addressed the issue, what the functional
department managers are going to do in the future" explained a team member and
continued: "I think, their role is very much guidance and policy". While some organisational
aspects (such as team formation and a team charter) had been discussed before the training,
a coherent organisational approach to the implementation of CE could not be presented to
the training participants. The training, however, contributed to the growing awareness for
CE and the new emphasis on teamwork.
After the completion of the training period in November 1996, the CE Project Leader
invited the CE Project Team members to a team recognition lunch. It was the first event of
its kind. It was greatly appreciated by the participants, as it was the official recognition of
their efforts in the CE Project by the organisation.

In early November 1996, after a year of activity and extensive consultation within the
company (and after giving the departments the opportunity to comment on the proposed
changes and recommend further improvements), the CE Project Team announced the launch
of the new and revised design and development manuals and procedures. These formalised,
refined and complemented the "bestpractices" exhibited by MELSYS' successful projects to
allow their application on all projects. According to the CE Newsletter, the major changes
were: (1) a "design and 'downstream' process which will be developed in parallel as a
matter o f course"81, (2) a flexible design process82, (3) a comprehensive specification where
downstream process goals will be quantified and placed in the technical specification so that
all project goals are captured in one document, and (4) the conduct of audits rather than
reviews to ensure that the recording of analysis in support of design decisions will be more

81 For example, a review of an R&D project will consider both technical performance and production
concept.
82 It means the design process will not follow the classical 'waterfall' model, but mix high level and
detailed design in each phase.
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formalised. Consequent changes were announced for the way projects are staffed and
organised ("Teamwork"), in the design and planning methods ("Techniques'"), in the
software packages used ("Tools"), and the business planning process ("Business Planning").
The changes would be implemented through a combination of new and revised manuals, in
house training, the provision of CE mentors to new design and development projects and
process audits of projects by the Quality Assurance Department.

An outline of the proposed new design and development process is summarised in Figure
26. The figure shows the nine phases of a system's life cycle encompassed in MILSYS'
Design and Development Process. They were split into two groups of phases: the
Decomposition and Development Phases, and the Production and Use Phases. The second
group was outside the scope of the Design and Development Process Manual and thus,
neglected by the CE Project Team.

Source: Internal Document A 11, A13
Figure 26:

Scheme of the Proposed New Design and Development Process - Overview
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The new process indicated a stronger focus on up-front planning, rigorous Systems
Engineering, and functional integration through cross-functional teamwork and the early
involvement of "downstream" functions in the project team.
The design and processes (i.e. the processes of development, production, integration,
operation, and support) of a system were seen as intimately linked and needed to be
developed in parallel. The key methods of ensuring parallel development of design and
process were seen in (1) requirements specification that include both technical design and
process requirements, (2) a formal process description, and (3) an integrated project
planning method that acknowledges the importance of design and process development in
the WBS and project management plan. How the parallel development of design and process
was supposed to be managed in the new approach is exemplified in the following four
figures. The new development process scheme illustrates the activities in each of the four
main phases of the design and development process. The activities were assigned to seven
particular areas: Marketing and Selling; Team Activity; Requirements Analysis and System
Design; Module Design and Development; Project Management; Systems Integration,
Verification and Validation; Downstream Planning. This formal structure gave all in the
development process involved people and functions a clear idea what was expected of them
and what they could expect from the other participants at any particular point in the
development process.
Figure 27 portrays the concept design and planning phase, which is the starting point for the
cross-functional project team. In this phase the cross-functional team is formed and
undergoes a 2-3 day team building training, which is also used to pass a project charter and
to define its first phase goals. The CE Project Team saw clear meaningful goals as an
important feature of successful cross-functional teamwork. A phase goal was defined as a
set of objectives that the product development team must satisfy to progress to the next
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phase of development, and consisted of "SPARC,/83 sub-goals. This goal had to be agreed by
senior management and the product development team at the start of each phase and to be
recorded in the project charter. The specification of the phase goal was seen as one of the
main team activities. Other team activities were to include joint planning meetings, joint
design meetings, progress meetings as well as end-of-phase and other reviews, as shown in
Figure 28, Figure 29, and Figure 30. The end-of-phase-review was proposed to be an
internal review conducted by senior management to ensure that the product development
team has achieved the respective phase goals.
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Source: Internal Document A 11, A13
Figure 27:

The Proposed Concept Design and Planning Phase83

83 The acronym SPARC used for five sub-goals in each phase goal: Schedule. Performance,
Attractiveness (what benefits will be delivered to customer and MILSYS), Risk, Cost.
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C usto m ised Design and Planning
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Figure 28:

The Proposed Customised Design and Planning Phase
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The Proposed Subsystem and M odule Design Phase
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Detailed Design and Development

Description:
C o m m en c es with:

T e a m activity

R eq. analyses &
systems design
M odule design
& developm ent
Project
m a na g em e n t
SI, verification &
validation
D ow nstream
Planning

Output

This is where the software is designed and coded, and the hardware is designed sufficient to allow production. Training & user documentation are
developed. Site design is conducted. Systems Integration and testing occur in this phase.
This phase commences with the establishment of agreed subsytems and module designs and specifications
jjjjj^|j

- develop phase goal, - joint design meetings, - joint planning meetings, - progress meetings, - phase and other reviews

revise design and specifications as a consequence of extra knowledge from detailed design and development activities
completed design and development of all modules
develop phase goal, - revise project management plans, incl. project schedule and SEMP, - manage project team
- verify that module designs satisfy their specifications
- develop detailed test specs for systems, sub-systems & modules
- verify performance of prototyp system, sub-systems and modules
- complete materials requirem. planning
- complete production routing
- complete deployment plan__________________- complete ILS production plan
The phase completes with the issue of a Design Release Certificate for the entire system or product., indicating the production package satisfies all
technical, ILS and operations specifications
Output: Hardware production drawings, Hardware production special-to-type tooling, jigs and fixtures, Hardware production special-to- type-test
programs and equipment, Hardware production plans, Executable SW and source code listings, Site installation design drawings, System, subsystem
and module test specifications, A prototype system, ystem, subsystem and module test results, ILS solution
Approved
schematic

Detailed
design

CDR #1

Development &
prototype testing

Approved
production
design
Another
review

Product and support baseline: determine manufacturing drawings and support package

Source: Internal Document A 11, A13
Figure 30:

The Proposed Detailed Design and Development Phase

The scheme of the proposed new design and development process clearly laid out the highly
complex multi-layered product development process and formalised functional involvement
with the formation of the project team. The early involvement of downstream functions was
meant to enforce the earliest consideration of downstream issues such as testability,
manufacturability, assembly, and the early development of a detailed operational
requirement document. The integration of function and design was expected to result in
better planning and scheduling, better estimates and more cost-effective and innovative
designs. It was also hoped that it would result in better control and a significant reduction of
the number of design changes, and consequently reductions in risks during production.

The CE Project Team intended to test the draft procedures in a CE Pilot Project. From as
early as May 1996 the CE Project Team had been negotiating for a suitable project with
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which they could pilot test the new procedures and systems. The CE Project Leader
considered a project initiated in September 1996 appropriate, but senior management
refused to approve this. The project was said to be too important and under too much time
pressure to serve as a trial for CE. Senior management was not fully convinced about the
predicted time savings with CE. They believed project lead-time would increase because
Project Manager and project personnel would have to deal with new, unfamiliar conditions
(new team organisation, new manuals, procedures, etc.). It was not until October 1996 that a
Pilot Project was nominated. This resulted from a request of the Project Engineering
Manager of a particular project to use his project as trial for CE.
The Project Engineering Manager (new in MILSYS, but project experienced) of the
nominated CE Pilot Project perceived CE as a promising concept. He was keen to enforce a
greater team emphasis in his project and to achieve a greater integration of up- and
downstream functions. The project, however, was not an ideal case to trial the CE concept.
The project was already at a stage where the conceptual design was mostly completed. Thus,
the "CE solution set" could not be frilly applied, particularly in terms of initial team
building, common goal setting or formulating a team charter. Senior management did not
approve a team building event for the project. It was seen as inappropriate because the
project had been underway for some time. The CE Pilot Project was a smaller project with
minor importance to company. It suffered from management problems. The Project Manager
had been nominated after the appointment of the Project Engineering Manager, who led the
project in its initial phases. In contrast to the Project Engineering Manager, the Project
Manager was not eager to run the project differently to the traditional way and her
leadership style was not conducive for team work principles (egocentric, blame mentality).
From November 1996 on, a representative of the CE Project Team participated in the main
meetings of the CE Pilot Project. His task was to discuss the application of CE "best
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practices" in the CE Pilot Project84 and to review their progress. The Project Engineering
Manager and Project Manager o f the CE Pilot Project occasionally participated in CE
Project meetings. In December 1996, the CE Project Team recommended a new project
team organisation for the CE Pilot Project85 (based on their proposed team composition for
larger projects), that was accepted by senior management, the Project and Project
Engineering Manager.
The January 1997 CE Newsletter concentrated on reporting the "CE lessons learned to date
on the [Pilot] Project". It reported that the weekly meetings were used for "lots o f inter
team communication". The Project Integration Team (PIT) had continued the use of the
database CORE (supported by the CE Project Team) to record the systems and product
specification and begun to incorporate test and verification information. The Project
Management Group (PMG) was now properly staffed. The Newsletter also noted that
progress had not been made in all areas. Despite the CE Project Team's effort in identifying
"downstream" departments to include in the CE Pilot Project Team, the need to include a
particular department was overlooked and caused a delay in the development process. Also,
the project schedule was not revised during 1996 due to a lack of project management
personnel.
The Project Engineering Manager put a big effort into the integration of "up- and down
stream" functions in the project team. Despite the formal project team organisation and joint
team meetings, he was unable to significantly change their pattern of work and

84 Some of die discussed CE best practices' for the pilot project in the area of Project Management
included risk management, team effectiveness, and scheduling; in Product and Business Planning: an
as early as possible draft of the product schedule; in Industrial Engineering and MP&C: a standard
parts library, the development of trade-off models, the trial of Boothroyd and Dewhurst DFA
software; in CM Management, Systems Engineering and Technical Management: the support of
CORE, the development of the product specifications in a preferred format and its distribution
afterwards.
85 PMG, PIT, DPT, SET, 5 IDTs with 2 to 4 members. In PMG: Project Manager, Project BA, Project
Analyst, Quality Assurance; In PIT: Project Engineering Manager, Systems Analyst, Verification
Testing, CM; In DPT: Project Engineering Manager, MP&C, Production, Customer Service; In
SET: Industrial Engineering, Drawing Office, Logistics, Engineering, Test Engineering.
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communication86. Only to a limited extent was he able to stimulate greater proactiveness on
the part of downstream functions and more co-operative behaviour on the part of up-stream
functions (such as the early release of preliminary, incomplete information).
This was not surprising, as changes in the communication and co-operation pattern require
behavioural and attitudinal changes. They commonly take a longer time to establish and
require to be supported by organisational changes and changes to conventional HRM
policies and practices. The team members of the Pilot Project (in November 1996, about 30
people from various departments) were only part-time dedicated and dispersed around the
company. Team meetings were not used to resolve conflicts or to improve the team climate
by overcoming taboos, a culture of blame, and the low proactiveness. A problem was also
that the Project Manager played only a lightweight role. She had little authority over project
personnel and resources. Moreover, the functional representatives on the CE Pilot Project
Team were not always given the necessary authority to make decisions that were project
critical. This was illustrated, for example, when a decision made by the MP&C
representative was overridden by his department manager and this led to delays in the
project schedule.
The CE Pilot Project was a compromise to a new "clean sheet" development project, which
because of business reasons did not eventuate at this point in time. Due to the described
difficulties, it was difficult to assess the effectiveness of CE approach and the proposed new
"solution set".

Parallel to the involvement with the CE Pilot Project the CE Project Team further evaluated
and prepared the implementation of the INTRANET (which was approved and implemented
in Februaiy 1997). It also continued the assessment of the Boothroyd and Dewhurst software
for DFMA (Design For Manufacturing and Assembly) and CORE (which was approved and

86 See Clark and Wheelwright 1992.
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implemented in the first quarter of 1997). For the DFA/DFM software a decision had not
been finalised by mid-1997. Moreover, with the withdrawal of the manufacturing
representative from the CE Project Team, a promoter for this aspect was lost and difficult to
replace.
In February 1997 the CE Project Team convened a workshop in order to review its
achievements in which also representative from the CE Pilot Project participated. It wanted
to analyse what went well and what did not and why, and to co-ordinate the CE progress
report to the TOP-Program in March 1997. Another important issue on the agenda was to
resolve the CE Project's way ahead. The CE Project Team needed to decide what initiatives
and activities were necessary in the next 6 months and what was the best way to implement
them. The CE Project Team concluded that the outcome of the CE Project was rather
modest, as the proposed "solution set" had not been broadly applied within the company.
Reasons for the limited success were widely seen to be insufficient senior management
support, inappropriate project leadership and the neglect of a broad range of organisational
and HRM issues. Though the CE Project Team was given the resources to design an
implementation CE strategy and to conduct CE training, senior management did not actively
sponsor CE. This translated into the lower status of the project. The CE Project Leader in
particular was sceptical regarding the institutionalisation of CE. He assumed that unless
senior management showed a stronger commitment to the project, CE would not be
successful. These issues were taken into consideration in the development of the "CE
Implementation Plan fo r the period March - September 1997". This plan was presented to
and discussed with senior management at the formal presentation to the Executive
Committee in February 1997.
The "CE Implementation Plan" described the organisation and management processes
required for the institutionalisation of CE. Four issues in particular were addressed, that
were crucial for the CE Project in order to be more effective than in previous phases. It was
necessary (1) to "increase the amount o f explicit support fo r CE by senior management", (2)
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to increase the understanding and skills of the "project leadership pool" with the proposed
"solution set" and to convince them of the benefits and priority o f the CE "best practices",
(3) to ensure the CE [Project Team] had sufficient labour resources", and (4) to "improve
the expertise o f the CE [Project Team] on change management" (Internal Document A23).
With regard to the first point, the CE Project Team suggested regular consultation and
effective communication with the Executive Committee. They also recommended the
preparation of a program of actions by the Executive Committee to illustrate its support for
the changes to the rest of the company. Thirdly they suggested the preparation of detailed
instructions to allow the Executive to conduct effective "End-of-Phase Reviews" of projects.
Concerning the second issue, the CE Project Team proposed to prepare a detailed guide to
allow more effective selection and establishment of project leadership and to offer improved
training of the project leaders. It was also proposed to conduct a trial of the 360-degree
feedback system for project managers to provide them insight into their leadership style.
Another recommendation was to complete the Generic WBS (Work Breakdown Structure)87
and instructions sufficient to allow its application on new projects, and to continue
harmonising functional processes within the overall design and development process by
establishing an action committee of process co-ordinators from each division. With regard to
the labour resources for the CE Project Team, the project sponsor was asked to identify
long-term dedicated staff for the CE Project Team as soon as possible. With respect to the
CE Project Team's expertise on change management the CE Project Team wanted to acquire
the expert assistance they require by April/May 1997.

In early-1997 (at the end of the main data collection), due to the long-term nature of
organisational change processes, it was still difficult to predict the prospects of full success

87 According to Internal Document A 23, MILSYS "had already completed some elements of such
system, namely: the Software generic WBS, and the ACCESS estimating database. However, poor
estimating and WBS preparation on recent projects ... illustrate there is much room for
improvement."
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for CE (i.e. the institutionalisation of the CE concept within the company, in contrast to a
partial success with only some elements of the CE concept adopted) and the adoption of a
strategic HRM approach in the context of CE. On the one hand, those prospects did not look
good in the foreseeable future. The CE Project experienced high pressure of other business
in a highly competitive industry (work tasks of the CE Project Team members in home
functions often took priority) and suffered from the turnover in key managerial staff. At the
end of February 1997, the CE Project had to cope with the loss of its Project Leader and a
further team member (both left the company). Most development projects were still
managed following a more traditional approach. Even in the CE Pilot Project little change
was visible in the pattern of work and communication between the up- and the downstream
group. And although Project Managers were increasingly involved in the appraisal of the
product development team members and decisions about their training and development,
their overall status and authority had not largely changed.
On the other hand, senior management had made a big effort in early 1997 (after a period of
low commitment during 1996) to keep the CE Project running. The job advertisement for the
new Systems Engineering Manager indicated that the successful applicant would have the
responsibility for improving CE in the company. In March 1997, a new Systems Engineering
Manager was appointed, and was made the new leader of the CE Project. Though the second
Project Leader was new to the company, he was more broadly experienced than his
predecessor and familiar with the basic concept of CE. Approval was given by senior
management to the new CE Project Leader to continue the remaining CE Project Team's
activities. From the initial six team members only three were still on the CE Project Team in
Februaiy 1997. By mid-1997 the core CE Project Team was made up of five members
including its leader. They came from Systems Engineering, Software Engineering, Project
Management, Quality Assurance, and Industrial Engineering. The new CE Project Leader
reviewed what the CE Project had achieved. He consulted with the remaining team members
as well as various departments and Project Managers. He found that, although most
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development projects still followed a more traditional approach, the new and modified
manuals and procedures and the CE "best practice " concept were increasingly being used as
guidelines by the product development teams. He also found that Project Managers paid
more attention to their ratification, and downstream functions became earlier involved in the
design and development process than previously.
The new CE Project Leader worked out a continuation plan for the CE Project, which was to
be presented to senior management by April 1997. One aspect of the plan was the closer co
operation with relevant initiatives such as the OCC Project. Another aspect was the
reorientation of the CE Project Team from a focus on design and implementation to a focus
on CE support. The remaining team members had already taken up the support task by
assisting and advising the still running CE Pilot Project. For the future it was planned to
extend the support to all development project start-ups. The CE Project Team saw its role as
providing support during the initial phases of each project. They aimed to assist with the set
up of the cross-functional team, the team building training, the determination of a common
goal, and the integration of downstream functions. Senior management formally approved
the timeframe and budget for team training at the start o f each new product development
project. In May 1997, the new CE Project Leader introduced a modified edition of the new
design and development process manual. It placed a stronger emphasis on the design and
development process with regards to risk management, generic WBS and product life cycle
issues. In July 1997 the CE Project Leader submitted a proposal for a Project Management
and Product life-cycle process handbook in order to address a broader approach to design
and development. Also in May 1997, the Project Leader of the CE Pilot Project resigned. In
June 1997 senior management appointed the Project Management representative on the CE
Project Team the new leader of the CE Pilot Project.
In July 1997 (at the end of the case study), it looked likely that the CE Project would
survive. With a new CE Project Leader and a new focus for the CE Project Team (from a
design to a support team), the CE Project Team was more empowered to actually implement
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and enforce its proposed changes. Senior management made a clear commitment to establish
new projects following a CE approach. The changes to the various manuals and procedures
were accepted and said to be applicable to all projects. The new tools were applied in the
Pilot Project and said to be used in other projects soon after. Complemented by the
achievements of the change program and the OCC Project (its emphasis on creating an
appropriate organisational and cultural environment to accommodate the ongoing changes
and the establishment of a knowledge-based company), there was likelihood for a successful
CE institutionalisation. The company-wide application of CE on all development project
start-ups and the establishment of an organisational structure (e.g. heavyweight project
managers) and HRM policies and practices that support cross-functional teamwork,
communication and co-operation (and enforce required behaviours) would decide about the
ultimate success or failure of CE in MILSYS.

The main events and activities from August 1996 till end of July 1997 are summarised in
Table P.

Topics Discussed By
CE Project TEAM

A
u
g

Risk management;
Selection criteria for
Pilot Project;
Performance
Measurement in CE

CE Project Activities,
Events
Identification of appropriate
performance metrics for CE;
Negotiations for Pilot
Project;

Outcomes

Proposal: Team
Organisation

"Train the trainer" seminar

Relevant
Events
Outside CE
Project
Intensive
Mgt.training
(initiated by
OCC
Project)

3. CE Presentation;
S
e
P

Appropriate
requirements analysis
and tracking tools.

Negotiating a Pilot Project;
Developing performance
measurement system;

Minutes of team
meetings;

Training preparation and
execution

Preparation and conduct of
information sessions to
departments (about new and
revised manuals and
procedures and upcoming
training);

Preliminary
completion of new
and revised
manuals and
procedures
(departments have
opportunity to
suggest changes);

How to measure success
of training

Start investigating CORE;
Start investigation Boothroyd
and Dewhurst - software

Innovation
project
initiated
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0

Training execution;

c

Support for Pilot;

t

N
0
V

D
ec

How to support CE Pilot
Project;
DFMA;
CORE;

How to support CE Pilot
Project
-> team agreed to send a
representative to all CE
Pilot Project meetings.
How to measure success
of CE implementation.

F
e
b

CORE;

r

c
h

Supporting the CE Pilot
Project in applying CE 'best
practices'

Support CE Pilot
Project;
DFA;
Survival of CE Project;

Workshop to discuss
achievements and way ahead;
4. CE presentation;
DFA assessment session;
Further team member and the
project leader resign;

Future implementation
steps;

How to institutionalise
CE? How to ensure
senior management
support/commitment?
How to train project
management pool?

4

7

support offered by team;
optimisation of pro
cesses; broader approach
to design & development

Table P:

Draft: Performance
metrics system;

New and revised
manuals and
procedures;
Paper: CE Pilot
Project Team
organisation;

A-Team
appointed

Visit of
parent
company
represen
tatives

Purchase
Boothroyd and
Dewhurst software;
CE Pilot Project
Best Practice
Paper;

CE Newsletter

INTRANET
implemented;
CE implementation
plan for 3-9/1997;

Former
Engineering
Director
nominated
leader of
Innovation
Project
TOP
Program
Progress
Meeting

New CE Project Leader
appointed;
Refining actions agreed to in
the updated implementation
plan;
Project Manager of CE Pilot
Project resigns

Design and
Development
Process Manual
(2nd edition)

PM representative on CE
Project Team nominated new
PM for CE Pilot Project

Proposal: Project
Management and
Product Life-cycle
process handbook;

5
6

Nomination CE
Pilot Project;

CE Pilot Project
progress reports
(fortnightly);

Participation on CE Pilot
Project meetings, support CE
Pilot Project;

Project Performance
Measurement

M
a

CE Project Team
representative attends CE
Pilot Project meetings;
Representative from
marketing joined CE
meetings;
CE Pilot Project applies new
team organisation;
Team recognition lunch;

1997
Preparation of DFA
assessment;

DFA;
Ja
n

Preparation and conduct of
CE training sessions; Team
member withdrawn from
team; Negotiations for Pilot
Project;

Summary of Main CE Project Events and Activities (August 1996 - July 1997)
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In summary, it appeared that the CE Project Team was able to significantly increase the
organisation-wide awareness for CE since August 1996 (due to the numerous training
sessions, the broad communication o f its efforts and results) and was given broad support by
the CE Pilot Project Team. The CE Project Team also survived initial staff turnover. But
probably the most important result was the establishment of a company-specific "best
practice solution set" integrated in the new and revised development manuals and
procedures (although it reflected a more technical bias). It focused on both technical and
organisational issues and recognised communication and co-operation as important factors
for achieving integration. The technical side, however, remained the dominant one and
emphasis was given to procedures, systems and tools (such as CORE, software for DFMA,
the INTRANET). In August 1996, the CE Project Team still largely neglected HRM issues
in relation to CE. Organisational changes and changes to HRM policies and practices were
seen as outside the scope of the CE Project. The CE Project did not specify organisational
requirements (such as the shift from a functional to a more project-oriented matrix
structure). Although the new development process assumed a more "heavyweight" Project
Manager than the conventional process, it only implicitly addressed the restriction of
functional departments to support functions for projects. The months from January to March
1997, however, were used to discuss a larger range of organisational and HR issues (e.g. a
stronger empowerment of Project Leaders). A deeper understanding of the organisational
dimension of CE evolved, and the CE Project Team realised the importance of a stronger
HRM-CE alignment for the success of CE.

7.4

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This chapter discussed the actual CE Project. It introduced the CE Project Team, its leader
and team members and found that the CE Project Team was inadequately resourced and
insufficiently prepared. Furthermore, it outlined the course of the CE Project, starting with
an organisational diagnosis, in the result of which senior management decided to restructure
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MILSYS' conventional product design and development process. The chapter discussed the
main activities and decisions that lead to die proposal of a new design and development
process based on CE. It summarised the CE Pilot Project that was used to trial run the
company-specific CE concept. Finally the chapter discussed planned activities for
implementing CE and the prospects for full success of CE in MILSYS at the end o f the case
study.

Drawing on the above findings, it could be concluded that the CE Project was not fully
successful. At the end of the investigation in mid-1997, it had not achieved the anticipated
high-level of integration of departmental functions and product design. A number of factors
contributed to this outcome.
One factor can be seen in the composition and preparation of the CE Project Team. As
outlined earlier, the CE Project Team was made up of few, mostly junior employees with
limited experience. They were all engineers. They only represented a limited number of
relevant functions. Moreover, the CE Pilot Project Team had not been sufficiently prepared.
It was not provided with any team-building training nor was it appropriately empowered.
A second factor can be seen in the insufficient attention the CE Project Team paid to HRM,
organisational and cultural change issues. HRM issues were largely seen as outside the
purview of the CE Project. Although the CE Project Team started to grasp the relevance of
HRM for CE towards the end of the main data collection (February 1997), it made no
attempts to align HRM and CE (e.g. in the form of new and modified HRM policies and
practices that would support cross-functional teamwork) as part of the CE concept.
Inadequate senior management support and commitment was a further obstacle for the
success of the CE Project. Despite the resources given to the CE Project in the form of time
and people, senior management was not committed to CE. Its second rate treatment by the
executives was implicitly recognisable throughout the organisation. The CE Project did not
have a powerful champion. Members of the Executive Committee did not 'walk the talk'.
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Organisational change issues were not addressed by them or simply avoided and the project
was not linked to other change project and initiatives (such as the OCC Project). The
nomination of a Pilot Project was delayed and no appropriate project made available for this
purpose.
It is a central argument of this thesis that CE is not simply amenable to a technical fix (e.g.
in the form of CORE, DFA/M, INTRANET). Its successful introduction involves
organisational and cultural changes, which are most often difficult to realise. MILSYS' CE
"solution set", however, was largely superimposed on the traditional organisational structure
and culture. Traditional personnel policies and practices were not widely altered or replaced
to accommodate the proposed changes and to enforce the desired behaviour and attitudes.
The CE Project Team did not address CE as a complex organisational issue in the sense that
its successful implementation required an appropriate organisational structure and culture,
and appropriate HRM policies and practices.
The nature of the CE concept as a management "fad", notably its interpretative flexibility
(Abrahamson, 1996), may have further contributed to the limited success of CE in MILSYS.
In interviews at the end of the investigation, it appeared that different groups and individuals
still had diverse understandings of CE. They ranged from the view that CE merely requires
an attitude change to a perspective which saw CE as largely identical to Systems
Engineering. Even differences in the understanding of CE between the Technical Managing
Director and the CE Project team remained unresolved during the course of the project.
Furthermore, insufficient attention was paid to organisational politics. Support for the
proposed changes was not effectively mobilised, nor was any opposition neutralised by
either the CE Project Team or the project sponsor. The CE Project Team did not adopt a
comprehensive implementation strategy or plan to address these sorts of issues and thereby
missed to ensure that the required actions were taken.
Although the success of the CE Project was limited and CE had not been fully applied at the
end of the investigation (mid-1997), the concept of CE within MILSYS had gained
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momentum. The proposed concept conveyed a vision o f the future development process that
corresponded with MELSYS* business reorientation, an orientation towards teamwork and
innovation.

227

8

O R G A N ISA TIO N A L PO W ER A N D PO LITIC S IN THE
IM PLE M E N T A T IO N OF CE IN MDLSYS

8.1

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the role of organisational power and politics in shaping and
implementing CE. It is now widely acknowledged that organisational change is an
essentially political process,

involving conflict, struggles, negotiation, bargaining,

compromise, and the "play o f pow er" (Buchanan and Boddy, 1992). The introduction of CE,
which requires substantial organisational change, is no exception. Yet, the CE and the
management literature generally do not adequately explore the shaping role of political
behaviour in organisational change (Buchanan and Badham, 1998). Sankar (1991) assumes
that the more complex an organisational change the more difficult it is to successfully
institutionalise the change due to the political difficulties inherent in major change
initiatives. Simple changes, introduced slowly and incrementally, do not typically cause high
degrees of conflict (Badham et al., 1997). In contrast, a complex change like the
implementation of CE - which requires rapid and radical changes in the behaviour of people
and threatens vested interests and privileges of individuals and groups - is highly vulnerable
to political disruption, and thus more likely to fail.
Jones and Stevens (1998) argue that not only external political influences such as
government policies and the leverage of "special interest groups " influence the new product
development process. They assume that micro-politics or internal politics (such as political
struggles for access resources or to improve career prospects) have a strong impact on the
innovation process. Successfully implementing CE involves developing high levels of
collaboration across departmental and disciplinary boundaries, usually via the medium of
the cross-functional project team (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992, 1995). Accompanying this
formation of more autonomous project-focused units within the organisation, is the
establishment of a team-oriented environment including appropriate HRM policies and
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practices. Along with these changes there should be devolution of authority and
accountability (e.g. over budgets, schedules, the management of risk, and resources) from
functional managers to the project teams (Gerwin and Susman, 1996; Haddad, 1996b). Such
changes will inevitably involve power struggles between different groups and individuals,
some of whom will be seen as "losers" and others as "winners" from change (Schubert and
Couchman, 1998). Such changes also cause "tension between old and new" that the whole
organisation must be capable of balancing in order to be innovative (Dougherty, 1997). A
major challenge for companies implementing CE therefore is their ability to design and
clearly spell out perspectives for the "losers" of such changes (i.e. groups and individuals
who are required to give up their traditional responsibilities and authorities). By providing
such perspectives, management is more likely to avoid rejection, refusal or an undermining
of the change process.
Change processes involve a "plurality o f actors or players", who act as a so-called "change
agency" (Buchanan and Storey, 1997) with distinctive roles and behavioural repertoires88.
Change agents can play more than one role at the same time (Hartley, Benington, and Binns,
1997). A decisive role in the change process is played by the company's CEO or managing
director (Bums and Stalker, 1961). The top manager, through his or her organisational
authority and decision-making capability, can determine the direction, intensity and degree
of success of change (Bums and Stalker, 1961).
Change drivers89 have a significant shaping and steering role in the organisational change
process (Thomas, 1994). This is also the case in the implementation o f CE. A clear vision of
what they want to achieve sets the direction of the change process. Broken down into
manageable steps and actions, such a vision not only provides orientation and facilitates co

88 For analytic purposes, Buchanan and Storey's (1997) identify a number of potentially distinct roles
within the 'change agency': initiator, sponsor, driver, subversive, passenger, spectator, victim,
paramedic.
89 Following Buchanan and Storey (1997), change drivers (which are only one of the change agency
roles) are seen here as organisational players who promote, implement and deliver change
initiatives, and are often the process or 'project manager* of these change initiatives.
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ordination, it also stimulates motivation and helps to narrow down uncertainty and to win
stakeholders' support. Buchanan and Badham, (1998, p, 4) claim that change drivers "who
have the ability to reduce uncertainty can gain significant reputations and positions o f
considerable influence". However, the success of change drivers in complex change projects
- such as the implementation of CE - is not only dependent on a combination of personal and
local factors (such as the adequate knowledge and skill in the organisation, "people skills" of
change agent, level of resistance by particular individuals and groups, senior management
commitment). It strongly depends on the change driver's political skills (Hartley et al.,
1997).) Buchanan and Badham (1998) claim that change drivers have to be politically
sensitive rather than politically neutral or "apolitical" (see e.g. McDonough and Griffin,
1997) because complex organisational changes rely on the contribution, compliance and co
operation of a range of groups and departments with different values, perceptions and goals.
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All these considerations suggest that the play o f organisational power and politics is indeed
a determinant of the outcomes of the CE implementation process and the role that particular
groups (including HRM) play in die conceptualisation and implementation of CE. It appears
essential to incorporate the play of organisational power and politics into any framework,
which claims to give a realistic account of the introduction of CE. Consequently the author
modified her initial conceptual framework (which is summarised in chapter four) to take
into account this perspective. The modified conceptual framework is pictured in Figure 31.

Before discussing how organisational power and politics influenced die conceptualisation
and implementation of CE in MILSYS, the following section provides an outline of the
theoretical concepts of power the analysis is based on.

8.2

CONCEPTS OF ORGANISATIONAL POWER

The literature on organisational power and politics is diverse and different views exist of
what constitutes power. One view is to look at power as a resource or a property an
individual or group possesses. A distinction is made between individual and structural
sources of power (Pfeifer, 1992b). A related concept views power as a property of the
relationship between a person and others. It identifies up to eight different power bases, in
the sense of tools available to influence others: reward, coercive, expert, authority, referent,
information, affiliation, group power (French and Raven, 1958; Benfari, Wilkinson and
Orth, 1986). These concepts are not entirely sufficient for the purpose of this study, as they
do not reflect the complexity and embeddedness of power and politics within an
organisation (Buchanan and Badham, 1998).
Concepts that view power as an embedded property of the structures, relationships, norms
and regulations of an organisation, can be distinguished into three sub-concepts. Lukes
(1974) talks about one-, two-, and three-dimensional views of power with regard to their
different emphasis on the outcome and players of decision-making processes, and the
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occurrence of conflict. Representatives of the one-dimensional view focus on specific
outcomes of decision-making processes (e.g. reaching consensus on critical business issues).
Their findings are based on concrete, observable behaviour, often with the underlying
assumption of the existence of observable conflict of interests. The two-dimensional power
concept expands the one-dimensional view by including non-decision making in its
reflection. A decision is basically seen as "a choice among alternative modes o f action"
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, in Lukes, 1974, p. 39). Non-decision is described as "a
decision that results in suppression or thwarting o f latent or manifest challenge to the
values or interests o f the decision-maker" (Lukes, 1974, p. 44). Non-decision-making is seen
as "a means by which demands fo r change ... can be suffocated before they are even voiced;
or kept covert, or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or,
fa iling all these things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementation stage o f the
policy process (Lukes, 1974, p. 44). For proponents of the two-dimensional view, the
"control over the agenda o f politics and o f the ways in which potential issues are kept out o f
the political process" is the critical issue of power. They assume that the conscious or
unconscious (due to a bias of favour) creation of barriers is used to suppress certain conflicts
and decisions while others are exploited (Lukes, 1974). The one- and two-dimensional
views are based on behavioural theory and thus, fail to include social forces in thenexplanation. They fall short in conceptualising organisational power and politics in thencomplexity and embeddedness within an organisation, and their dependence on structures,
cultures, norms, expectations and the historical context (Buchanan and Badham, 1998;
Thomas, 1994).
By contrast, the three-dimensional view of power goes beyond the reductionism inherent in
the behavioural {"too individualistic" Lukes, 1974) accounts and focus of the one- and two
dimensional views of power. As reflected in Table Q, the three-dimensional view offers a
sociological perspective for investigating decision- and non-decision-making power and the
various, often complex and subtle, ways of suppressing latent conflicts within a particular
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social context. It includes individuals as well as collectives (e.g. in the form of social forces
or institutional practices) in explanations about decision-making and control over the
political agenda. The three-dimensional view thus offers a model to explain how political
systems prevent demands from becoming political issues or from being raised. Decision
making and control over the political agenda (not necessarily through decisions) can take
place in the form of observable (overt or covert) and latent conflict of subjective and real
interests (Lukes, 1974). This makes it possible to focus on the processual component of the
"play o f power" or as Buchanan and Badham (1998, p. 50) call it "the substantive,
unavoidable and necessary shaping role ofpower and politics in change".

3-Dimensional View of Power
; '

’

■

Decision-Making

í

.

.

Non-Decision-Making

POWER
Exercised Consciously or Unconsciously through:
Individuals
Individual's Decision

Collectives
- Social Forces
- Institutional Practices
Occurrence In :

Observable

Latent Conflict

(Overt or Covert) Conflict

Source: Lukes, 1974
Table Q:

The 3-Dimensional View of Power

For the purpose of this study Lukes' three-dimensional view of power was employed, as it
has not been fundamentally challenged apart from minor additions (see e.g. Fulop and
Linstead, 1999). It was also chosen for its ability to analyse how individual and collective
forces of the change process determined the conceptualisation of CE, its translation into a
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workable solution and its subsequent implementation. The findings of this analysis are
discussed in the next section.

8.3

POWER AND POLITICS IN MILSYS

The CE implementation process in MILSYS was shaped by the actions and interactions of a
whole "cast o f characters" (Hutton, 1994), i.e. different groups and individuals within the
company (see Figure 32) and outside the company90.

Figure 32:

The Exercise of Organisational Power and Politics in MILSYS in
Implementing CE

90 Different groups and individuals outside MILSYS (e.g. the parent company, the university partners,
external consultants and training providers, Defence) also influenced the implementation process of
CE. However, due to a lack of data these external influences are neglected here, which accounts as a
limitation of this thesis. Future research needs to establish how the power relationships with external
groups and individuals influence the implementation of CE.
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The lines between different groups and individuals are an indication o f the power exercised
in the conscious or unconscious assertion of their individual or collective interests. The lines
also reflect the engagement of different groups and individuals in organisational politics and
power struggles to either defend and retain or amend and improve their position in the
context of implementing CE.
The CE Project Leader, the CE Team members and the Technical Managing Director (the
"man at the top") were some of the "characters" that played a key role in this context. Other
important individuals were the Engineering Director (sponsor of the CE Project), the
Business Administration Manager of the Engineering Department (Leader of OCC-Project)
and the Managing Director Business Administration (Co-ordinator TOP-Program), as shown
below. CE was also shaped by the various groups in the company such as the group of
functional managers, Project Managers, Business Administration Managers, and the HR
Department personnel. The group of engineers and people with comparable technical
background made up another important and numerically large group in MIT.SYS The
actions of the individuals were partly determined by their belonging to the one or other
group.
The following sections seek to explain how professional and occupational values guided the
thinking about what constitutes CE. They also seek to explain how concerns about social
status influenced the position and actions of the various groups and individuals in the CE
implementation process. What, from a micro-level perspective, looks like an individual
making the decision and shifting the process into a certain direction, is also based on the
interests of one or more particular groups with particular sub-cultures, ways of thinking, etc.
(Thomas, 1994; Markham and Holahan, 1996). The following sections show that the
cultures, norms, expectations and interests of the different groups in the organisation as well
as their traditional power position have a strong impact on the CE implementation process.
These aspects basically constitute the third dimension of organisational power and politics.
For the further analysis three individuals were chosen out of the cast of characters, who, in
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the author's view, most significantly influenced the CE implementation process. They were
the CE Project Leader, the OCC Project Leader and the Technical Managing Director. Their
positions and actions are examined along the three dimensions of power. In addition the
author focused on three groups regarding their position towards CE: 1) the CE Project Team
(as the group most directly involved with CE), 2) technical managers (as one of the most
influential groups within MILSYS), and 3) Project Managers (as a group in the process of
gaining power as a result of CE).

83.1

T h e CE P r o j e c t T e a m

The CE Project Leader and the CE Team members were all engineers. As representatives of
the large group of engineers in MILSYS they were subject to the conscious or unconscious
exercise of power through the collective forces and institutional practices of engineers. The
market MILSYS was competing in required engineering excellence. About one third of the
overall staff in MILSYS were professional engineers, and 80% of the project's staff were
typically engineers. Their training and experiences were largely based "on technical and
economic factors, with little i f any recognition o f the human and social implications"
(Bailey 1993, p. 190) and the performance enhancing potential of HRM91. This was clearly
illustrated in the work of the CE Team. For example, the CE Project Team focused on
technical problems (e.g. tracking requirements), and recommended technical solutions to
identified problems (e.g. CORE). It found problems with the design for manufacturability,
and suggests purchasing the Boothroyd and Dewhurst DFM/A Software. That Systems
Engineering was not applied in a systematic and disciplined way, may be changed by writing
new and rewriting existing procedures manual and providing more training. Better
communication was sought to be achieved by implementing an INTRANET. Consequently,
the CE concept (introduced in October 1996) reflected the technical mindset of the CE

91 The low recognition o f HRM by functional and project managers was for example reflected in the
results of the AQA self-assessment and the Project Management Assessment, as discussed earlier.
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Team members. It was giving primary focus to technical and procedural solutions to
problems like communication, co-operation and integration while paying insufficient
attention to HRM, organisational and cultural change, as shown earlier. Faster and more
efficient electronic communication and computer technology and more relevant procedures
were perceived as automatically leading to better communication and higher degrees of
integration.
The technocratic position of the CE Team members (who were all male) was reinforced by
the "feminine" (hence downgraded) image attributed to personnel specialists because of the
welfare origins of their occupation (Legge, 1995b, p. 20). Their service role (in contrast to
other management functions with their central "male" activities such as Production,
Engineering, and Finance) "could be said to mirror the conventional domestic division o f
labour, since the status o f the (male) organisational breadwinner is elevated above the
'improductive' (female) welfare and administrative function" (Collinson, 1991, in Legge,
1995b, p. 22). MILSYS itself could be considered a patriarchal society. It had a
predominantly male workforce^, the Technical Managing Director was not sensitive to
gender issues in the workplace, and MILSYS' personnel specialists were restricted to
administrative and welfare tasks.
Moreover, HRM issues were largely seen by the CE Project Leader as outside the purview
of the CE Project (though this changed at a later stage). An illustration of non-decision
making was the suppression of the CE Project Team members' demands for change (raised
in the form of various HR and organisational issues such as the future scope of functional
managers or team rewards) by the CE Project Leader. These HR issues were not included
into the minutes, agenda, project tasks or the CE Project proposals. The CE Project Leader
discussed the project proposals with senior management. As they only contained issues92

92 29% of MILSYS' overall staff were women. In the Engineering Department they only made up
8.4%, the HR Department had 77.7% women, Manufacturing 65.6%. In Senior Management women
were represented by 2.5%, in Management all together by 8.4%. MILSYS did not have a formal
Affirmative Action Program, but said to encourage females, particularly within engineering.
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accepted by the CE Project Leader, he acted in a gatekeeper's role, and so exercised control
over the agenda, keeping potential issues (e.g. future role o f functional managers) out of the
political process (Lukes, 1974).
In addition, the CE Team members did not fully appreciate the human and social
implications of the implementation of CE (this changed over time especially as a result the
continued input from the University partners and suggested readings such as Wheelwright
and Clark, 1992b). Apart from HRM issues such as team structure, team training, and team
meetings, the CE Team did not consider other HRM issues in depth (until February 1997).
Because of the strong engineering culture they just did not occur. Little or no emphasis was
given to the design and promotion of constructive interpersonal relationships. Issues such as
how to support people through change and ensure their ownership of the new processes
found little attention. The CE team did little to overcome the 'Svait and see" attitude^ of
many employees towards CE. This attitude was based on past experience with change in
their organisation. Many employees had long years of service and had worked in the
company before part of it was taken over by the German corporation. They had witnessed a
number of changes and change initiatives with different results. According to the HR
Manager, most of these changes had been presented as fait accompli with little or no
attempts by the company "to accommodate people in the course o f the changes". Many of
the major changes in the past were accompanied by massive dismissals. But the CE team
failed to clearly spell out and discuss the implications of implementing CE for the individual
employees and the various groups affected (such as functional managers or Project
Managers). CE w ith its strong emphasis on cross-functionality may have been perceived by
the functional management, for example, as an advance against their strong vested rights and93

93 Despite the opportunity and request to comment proposals, to come up with ideas or suggestions,
die CE Project Team received very little feedback. People did not ask for additional information,
showed little interest in CE or offered voluntary work. In informal talks people expressed their hope
that the change process will "soon be over and everything goes back to normal". Similar statements
were found in the AQA self-assessment They also showed that people did not think that their
contribution or initiative can contribute to change.
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power. Various materials produced by the CE Project Team pointed to a reduction in the
influence of the functions in projects and their reorientation tow ards a supporting role in the
development process94. Functional managers repeatedly asked (e.g. in the CE introduction
training, and in meetings of the CE team with functions) about their future roles and
responsibilities. Some functional managers as shown later, refused to support the CE Team
and acted to protect their territories. The CE Team did not seem to be aware (too junior in
status perhaps and without relevant experience) that these individual and collective attitudes
were endangering the successful implementation of CE.
Most of the CE team members, on the other hand, were representatives o f specific functional
departments. They consciously or unconsciously asserted the collective interests of their
home functions. One indication may have been the avoidance of any discussion of the
devolution of authority from the functional to the project management. Due to their
functional bias they may have lacked the vision of howr a strong project organisation
operates. The material produced by the CE Project Team provided few clear statements of
this required shift. The clearest account was produced by the project management
representative on the CE Project Team. In the CE training for Project Managers he
introduced the concurrent responsibility assignment matrix (see Figure 33), winch was not
shown in any of the other training sessions.
This concurrent responsibility assignment matrix indicates devolution of authority' and
accountability from functional managers to project teams and a concurrent approach to
design and development (see Figure 16 for comparison). The Project Leader becomes
responsible for planning, authorising and controlling all aspects of the project (including
project personnel), and the project team creates a top-level specification, which leads to the
identifications of the CIs. This in turn generates the top level WBS for the project, w ith a

94 See for example the comparison between the classical and the concurrent responsibility assignment
matrix (Figures 16 and 31); or the proposed project team structure including the definition of roles
and responsibilities of the individual teams and team members.
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Concurrent Responsibility Assignment Matrix
MILSYS, 1996
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Figure 33 :

Concurrent Responsibility Assignment Matrix

focus on the delivery of the CIs.
This section made an attempt to trace back the CE Project Teams emphasis on technical
solutions to what were essentially organisational problems, and broad neglect of HR issues
to their engineering background, MELSYS' patriarchal society, the dominance of their
Project Leader and their integration in functional departments.
The next section outlined the position of the groups of technical managers and Project
Managers regarding CE and their influence on the conceptualisation and implementation of
CE.
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S 3.2

T he Groups of T echnical and P roject Managers

The technical managers (including the Technical Managing Director and the Directors of the
technical departments) were the probably most powerful group in MILSYS because their
resources and representation on committees and thus their influence on the change process.
They not only had the strategic decision making power through their membership on the
Executive Committee, traditionally they also dominated the decision-making process in
projects. According to Dougherty (1997, p. 428), the power in traditional organisations
"reinforces segmentalism became it is attached to existing boundaries and established
routines. The power o f resources that is embedded in funds, expertise, information, and
credibility is in the hands o f managers who are not part o f the innovative initiative, so it
sm tains current activities". The CE Project Leader claimed that "if you compare functional
directors ... and Project Managers [in MILSYS], Directors certainly have a higher
hierarchical position, more power and influence". Functional managers decided over many
aspects of the projects as outlined in chapter five. Project Managers only acted as
"lightweight" managers, and had to constantly negotiate with more powerful functional
managers to achieve their project objectives, and to get the necessary resources and support.
They were "always begging and pleading" described the Director of Quality Assurance the
position of Project Managers, and continued:

"prior to CE the Project Manager often had to almost go on his hands and
knees to get more resources. He would have situations where the Engineering
Director would like to have this guy [from a project] back to do something else
now. A nd then there is this big hole and nobody is doing his work anymore.
A nd the Project Manager had no means to stop that."

According to the CE Project Leader, the direction in MILSYS was "given by the functional
managers". But he claimed that "the directions should be given by the Project Managers".
He also argued that
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"there is every opportunity fo r the Project Managers to have pow er status.
Unfortunately a lot o f our Project Managers don't seem to take this
opportunity... This is why the functional managers fill the gap. ... There is a
leadership void ... Project Managers aren't fillin g their apparent authority,
their eligible authority. ... It always surprises me that Project Managers let
functional managers get away with their announcements. "

Many Project Managers lacked the knowledge how to strengthen their position. They w ere
inexperienced in the play of organisational power and politics in achieving an organisational
change agenda and not proactive enough to seize power. All Project Managers in MIT SYS
(including the Project Management representative on the CE Project) were qualified
engineers. Many of them were ex-defence forces. Most o f them had been in the company for
more than five years. They operated within the established institutional framework of
MIL SYS. They were neither trained nor rewarded or encouraged to do otherwise. Due to
their cultural integration in MIL SYS and their experience in the defence forces (a strong
hierarchical body with a culture that one is told w hat to do), they may have lacked a vision
of a strong project and team culture. Due to their orientation and experiences they may not
have recognised the significance of the human factor in an integrated product development
effort. The Project Manager (2) assumed that "with a stronger personality Project Managers
might be able to push this process o f getting into a more pow erful position". He continued
"the speed with which we can turn this functional organisation into a project culture based
organisation is dependent on the personality o f the Project Managers involved". This quote
points to the personality' factor of individual Project Managers and their skills and ability as
a group to determine the pow er shift process. But functional managers may have prevented
the recruitment or appointment of strong personalities as Project Managers or becoming a
Project Manager was not perceived as challenging career and thus did not attract high
profile people.
Project Managers were also inferior to technical managers, as they were not directly
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represented on the Executive Committee. According to the Technical Managing Director
"functional managers play an important role to support the way o f thinking here in the
company". The Executive Committee, as outlined in chapter five, was the most important
decision-making panel in the company. It was the forum through which CE issues like the
devolution of authority could have been discussed. No detailed discussion of topics
endangering the " tu r f of functional managers at the meetings o f the Executive Committee
was, however, reported by interviewees or recorded in the minutes. This may not be
surprising as the composition of the Executive Committee clearly showed that it was a
domain of the functional (technical) managers^ (perhaps they may have foreseen
implementation of CE as empowerment for the project organisation and interpreted
themselves as losers of this process).
In different ways, a number of functional managers and Directors consciously and
unconsciously undermined the implementation o f CE and cross-functional and team efforts.
A number of departments did not provide a functional representative for the CE team, even
after the repeated requests by the CE Project Leader (e.g. no representative from MP&C) or
only at a later stage of the project (e.g. Project Management, Sales and Marketing). Some
technical managers and Directors did not participate in important CE meetings or training
sessions nor send a respective substitute (e.g. MP&C, Sales and Marketing). In other cases
functional managers did not enforce the participation of their subordinates on CE training or
did not sufficiently empower the functional representative on the Pilot Project (e.g. MP&C).95

95 Chapter five provides more detail on the Executive Committee. The EC was made up of the two
Managing Directors, the Directors of die Engineering, Manufacturing, Quality Assurance, and
Material Planning and Control and the Finance Department The Sales and Projects Department (and
thus project management) was represented by the Technical Managing Director, a proponent of
strong functions.
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As it is in the vested interest of traditional (Tayloristic) functional departments96 to weaken
cross-functional orientation (in order to stay in control and maintain their power position)
(see e.g. Juergens and Malsch, 1994; Druecke, 1995; Kern and Schuman, 1985), their
protective behaviour was not only directed against project management but also against
other departments. An indication o f this attitude was given by the leader of the CE Pilot
Project in describing the difficulties in building up cross-functional integration in the Pilot
Project. He was wondering how he should possibly "resolve differences between the
departments in this project when at the highest level o f the company [the Directors] are
fighting each other". He drew up a diagram of the functional structure with the functional
directors shooting at each other. The Director MP&C was particularly negative. She did not
see CE as relevant for her department and perceived the CE Project as a purely engineering
project. With the increased use of COTS (Commercials Off The Shelf), the MP&C
Department had gained greater importance. The Director MP&C defended her status and
department by repeatedly directing and redirecting blame for mistakes and failures to other
departments (e.g. for unsuccessful bids or project delays). She also refused to share
information (e.g. about the way a particular order system in MP&C worked, or about terms
of delivery for COTS). She did not sufficiently empower the employee who represented the
function at the CE Pilot Project (e.g. in the form of authority to provide information about
the new order system in MP&C or to decide the order of parts). This caused confusion in the

96 Behaviour and thinking typical for tayloristic design of work: control bureaucracy (rules), hierarchy
(interventions from above); uncooperative departmentalisation; stringent division of planning and
disposition tasks, on one hand, and executing/doing tasks in the development process; authority and
decision making power for project resides in hands of senior functional managers not directly
involved in project; non-transparent project management - functional managers decide of many
aspects of project (including resources, targets) and do not need to justify to project personnel
reason for changes; communication/cooperation mediated through the hierarchy; delegation and
control play most important role in the relationship between subordinates and superior; culture of
blame; big status differences.
Behaviour and thinking typical for cross-functional teamwork in product development: promotion of
constructive interpersonal relationships, which engenders communication, participation, trust,
teamwork, empowerment, personal growth and pride in performance; power in hands of highly
authorisiesed project teams; lateral (between projects) and vertical (with management) coordination
o f resources, targets, priorities; small status differences.
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Pilot Project Team and led to delays in the project course (due to missing information about
lead times for certain orders and the late order of parts). The person was not able to make
any decisions, which impeded the teamwork process and co-operation. The Director of
Quality Assurance presumed that "empowerment is often driven by the comfort factor o f
relevant managers ".
How this applied to the Technical Managing Director is discussed in the next section.

8.3.3

8.3.3.1

Th e M an A t Th e Top

The Power Position o f the Technical Managing Director

The CEO of a company, as mentioned before, has a strong impact on the scope and success
of organisational change through his or her official top position (Bums and Stalker, 1961).
In his reflection on power, Weber (1947) distinguishes between power that is intrinsic to an
individual and power that is intrinsic to the "office" a person holds, derived from its official
post. In the case of the Technical Managing Director of MILSYS, who was the company's
CEO, the two aspects coincided and intensified his powerful position and influence on the
overall change program. The Technical Managing Director not only had the organisational
authority and decision-making capability through the superior position he was holding, but
also through his strong personality and broad experience.
Bom and raised in Germany, his father Russian, his mother German, he proudly described
himself as "a mixture o f the biggest troublemakers o f the 20th century". He started his
career in the 1960s as design engineer in Australia in the company from which MTT.SYS
originated. In order to gain broader experience, he worked in a number of different
companies, businesses and countries. For example, he worked as an application engineer in
the computer and instrumentation division of a renowned international consumer goods
corporation, and in the American finance industry, dealing with mergers, acquisitions and
corporate advice: "I did this to learn more about finance. Now I know more about finance
than my financial people. They ju st never had any o f this exposure I had". However, as his
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ultimate goal was not to become a successful merger banker, he went back to manufacturing
industry and Australia. He worked in a financial role for a major cable manufacturer, then
became its Managing Director. In 1985 he became the Managing Director of the
organisation where his career began. He described his aim in this role as "merging
engineering... with strategic thinking".
The Technical Managing Director was an "entrepreneurial hero" (Buchanan and Badham,
1998, p. 98) in the way he was able to set a vision for the company, mobilise people and
obtain the active contribution of the diverse groups within the organisation. He was widely
accepted as well experienced, knowledgeable, strong-willed and determined. One Project
Manager (3) described him as "very clearly focused on the market, ... he understands very
clearly what our cost drivers are, how the organisation works, what sort o f business the
organisation needs to keep going and what kind o f profit margin we have to make". The
Director of Quality Assurance talked about a certain rule the Technical Managing Director
followed. He claimed "he did not believe that you sit around and wait fo r the future to
happen. You had to actually make the future happen in the way you want it to happen".
Looking back at the time of the initiation of the TOP-Program, the Director of Quality
Assurance recalled that in the way the Technical Managing Director acted he was "almost
like a religious person. He made us all believe in these things [TOP, organisational change,
knowledge management]. It was exciting. Lots o f nights I did not like going home. I ju st
wanted to keep doing what I was doing here. It was so much fun". The Leader of the
Innovation Project claimed that regarding the Innovation Project the Technical Managing
Director "believe[d] in it with religious zeal. He did not conceive the idea but when it came
up to him, he quickly embraced it and pushed it forw ards”. His determination was also
reflected in the decision making process of the future core competencies of the company.
His position was that "the only two profitable things you can do fo r any company, ... are
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marketing and innovation. The rest are all costs'/97. He strongly brought his influence to
bear to determine marketing as one of the company's future core competencies. A number of
activities were immediately initiated and directly promoted by the Technical Managing
Director to stress marketing’s importance. Among these was the development of an
opportunity database" (see chapter five). It was run by the Marketing Department and "will
be run stronger still by me, changing the marketing role" as the Technical Managing
Director emphasised.
He recognised employees as the company's key source of competitive advantage: "Human
resources are the only resources you really have. ... To succeed out there you have to decide
what kind o f company you want to have, ... it really comes down to people". His underlying
attitude, however, was "when you employ people, you employ problem s" (see also Footnote
95). This was revealed in interviews with him and in his occasionally aggressive stance
towards managers and employees when faced with criticism or differing opinions. An
example for the latter is provided in the incident report below.
He occasionally pursued an authoritative decision-making style. A middle manager from the
Engineering Department described him as "dictatorial. ...H e w ill tell you what to do and
you have do it in a particular way". According to the Director of Quality Assurance a
number o f decisions in the Executive Committee were made in an "authoritarian style, with
[the Technical Managing Director] saying I don't care what you are saying. That is what
we are going to do". The Technical Managing Director himself explained that "in the Anglo
Saxon world you want a leader. Somebody ultimately has to run the ship".
He exercised a "strong favouritism ... towards certain people" (External Consultant) and
was condescending towards others. The OCC Project Leader for example "seem[ed] to
make the going". According to an external consultant the OCC Project Leader was one of 97

97 This attitude was an indication that his attitude towards HRM had not substantially changed employees were still seen as a cost than as key source of competitive advantage (disparity of
management rhetoric and practice).
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the "rising stars" in the company benefiting from the strong favouritism by the Technical
Managing Director. The Technical Managing Director adopted a more pejorative position
towards the Managing Director Business Administration. Despite the formal status attached
to this position (as described earlier), the Technical Managing Director stressed that

"while the kaufm an^ would emphasise ... this is a peer group, we are both
equal, it is not so. ... I f he doesn't do well, I fire him, not he me. There is a peer
no. 1 and there is a peer no. 2. ... [But] I don’t have to concentrate now on
everything, ...all the boring s tiff I can give to him. I can concentrate on
marketing, engineering and project management."

He was rather autocratic with regard to his contribution on the success of the company and
often handled HRM matters in an informal and arbitrary way, as the next quotes show. On
the other hand he seemed to be easily offended by criticism about the company (see incident
report).

"We are ahead in the area how we are moving towards becoming a knowledgebased company. Why is this? Predominantly because I am driving it."
"I can talk on these things [organisational change program] forever. I'm
running the show, so I have probably much more to say than you have ever
heard elsewhere."
"I know the people who contributed [in major developments], I live in this
company. ...T o recognise a hero takes a hero."

He might not have been aware of the effect of his capriciousness on managers and other
employees in the organisation. His attitudes and behaviours ran counter his organisational
goal to "build up a truly knowledge-based company" (Technical Managing Director) and
hindered the establishment of an environment required for successful CE. In the case of the98

98 The term "kaufman" was repeatedly used by the CEO when he talked about the Managing Director
Business Administration (used in a pejorative way: the bureaucrat the moneygrubber).
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CE Project Leader it contributed to his resignation from the company (he believed that his
further career development was limited in MILSYS because of the incident described
below).

Incident Report

The incident occurred at one of the several half-day introductory training sessions for CE.
At this particular session about 20 employees and managers of the company participated.
One of them was the Technical Managing Director.
The CE introductory training generally started off with a discussion about the strengths and
weaknesses of MILSYS' traditional product development process. Similar to other introductory
sessions, critical comments were made but also a number of strengths pointed out by the participants in
the training session, in which the Technical Managing Director participated. The training then moved
into the team game stage (LEGO design game). Three teams were formed and each player was given a
particular role. The task was to design a truck as attractive, cheaply and fast as possible following a
number of requirements. The exercise was designed the way that this team would win, which paid
attention not only to the actual design requirements but also aspects such as costs, and involvement of
downstream functions.
The full cost of the truck was calculated as the sum of the costs of the components plus the sum of the
costs of assembly. Only one person, the designated production manager of the team, knew the costs of
assembly. His/er task was to build seaplanes (simulated production line), for which the team also
earned a number of points per seaplane. One aim of the game was to illustrate the need for up-front
involvement of downstream functions, for functional integration. The team was supposed to clarify the
roles of each player and to find out what information each of them got. Most of the teams did not meet
this requirement, among them the team to which the Technical Managing Director belonged.
The Technical Managing Director was designated the role of the truck designer. Right from the
beginning of the game he was desperate to win and showed a real aggressiveness. He constantly
interfered with the job of the Project Manager and pushed the team to come up with a solution. They
quite quickly came up with a design of a prototype.
The CE Project Leader and an external consultant played the role of the customers and assessed the
various solutions. In terms of the mandatory design requirements the Technical Managing Director's
team offered an acceptable solution. But to win the points for 'first to market', they also had to come up
with assembly instructions. The team had the prototype, but they did not have the assembly
instructions. The designated customers thus decided that the Technical Managing Director's team was
not ready to go to the market yet.
The Technical Managing Director started to get agitated and tried to argue with them. But they insisted
on the rules of the game. After the failed attempt to convince the 'customers', he lost interest. The rest
of the team carried on. The designated Project Manager took over his actual role. In the meantime,
however, they were beaten by another team, which came up with both the prototype and the assembly
instruction. The Technical Managing Director's team came second, which he was not impressed with.
The training then moved into its final stage. It was explained what CE is and what benefits it would
bring for MILSYS. The benefits were explained by reflecting on the weaknesses identified in the first
part of the training and the observed behaviour patterns in the team game. The CE Project Leader gave
an assessment of the company's traditional project development process. He summarised the strengths
and pointed out that some of the projects unconsciously already use a number of CE principles. He
then addressed the problems the CE Project Team identified and how they intended to overcome them.
He introduced the team's proposal for a new project team structure, and he talked about the proposed
implementation process: the training, the revised manuals and mentoring. It followed the scheme: that
was the way it works today, here are the proposed changes, building on existing strengths, here is how
we will achieve them. It was an interactive session because people picked up problems, asked
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questions, which the CE Project Leader tried to answer.
At this stage the Technical Managing Director got very agitated and blurted out that die CE leader was
painting too negative a picture of the company and demanded that people, who come up with criticism,
exactly point out what project this applies to. He criticised the whole course for being too negative and
not drawing enough on the positive side, the achievements of the company. The systems were in place,
he insisted, it is just people's attitudes that stop them from working effectively. He obstinate!}7
persisted in his complaints and hindered the CE Project Leader to bring the training session to the
planned close.
~
Right after the session a couple of participants came to the CE leader and made a very7public display
of satisfaction with the training in front of the Technical Managing Director. One guy shook the CE
Project Leader's hand and said, thank you very much and congratulations.
While the other participants went away, the CE Project Leader, the Technical Managing Director and
the external consultant stayed behind. The CE Project Leader was very7 perturbed. He saw7 the
Technical Managing Director’s behaviour basically as sabotaging the training and pulling the rug from
under his feet. He openly' raised the question, whether the Technical Managing Director was really7
supporting the CE Project Team in what it was trying to do. The Technical Managing Director, on the
other hand, was very angry and paced up and down. For the next hour the CE Project Leader
supported by' the external consultant tried to placate the Technical Managing Director. But die
argument went round and round in circles.
But the Technical Managing Director did not seem to criticise the substance of what the CE Project
team was proposing to do. He criticised elements of the training session, which, in his opinion,
portrayed the company in a too negative way (though the criticism came from the training participants
themselves, not from the course content). He used words like: There is nothing wTong with our
systems, its the people.’ 'What is required here is nothing more than an attitude change. There are no
Chinese walls in this company. Those walls only exist in people's minds.' These drawings are all
wrong (see Figures 17-19). The systems and processes are in place.’ They would work if people w ould
allow them to. People don't have die right attitude.'.
Another point he raised was that the CE Project Leader placed too much emphasis on systems and
procedures and not enough on changing the way people think and behave. But because he was
speaking in a very emotional way a lot of his arguments got lost. He said, training is not enough to
change die attitudes and that the team had not paid enough attention to the people side. He also got
very personal and accused the CE Project Leader for sabotaging one of the company's bid attempts
because of a somew hat negative interaction between him and one of the other people involved in the
affair. The argument carried on. They finally disbanded but without any agreement how7to proceed or
solve the conflict.

Other managers (such as the Director MP&C) may have felt encouraged to pursue their
traditional leadership style with little devolution of authority to subordinates, little
orientation towards teamwork and a strong "blame mentality". Similarly, his position
towards the HR Department strongly determined the department's role in MIL SYS'
organisational and cultural change process. It may have also influenced the recognition of
the significance of HRM by line managers and the consideration of HRM issues in
individual change projects, as discussed in the next section.
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8.3.3.2

The Technical Managing Director and HRM

The Technical Managing Director determined the HR Department's reactive position to
change. One such step was the appointment of the new (traditional oriented personnel) HR
Manager in 1990. The Technical Managing Director had the power to change this situation,
but no attempts were undertaken to recruit a broader experienced and more knowledgeable
person. This led to a permanent restriction of the department's scope and influence on
organisational processes, as discussed earlier. More strategic aspects o f HRM (like the
development of an HRM strategy, the initiation of changes to HR policies and practices,
HRM planning) went into the responsibility of the Technical Managing Director. But until
the initiation of the TOP-Program in 1994 he was not active in this regard. One reason may
have been the Technical Managing Director's low recognition of HRM before 1994 in terms
of HRMs contribution to the success of the company (perhaps due to his training and
experiences based on technical and economic factors (Bailey, 1993)).
Only with the initiation of the TOP-Program in 1994, the Technical Managing Director
showed an increased interest in HRM. It was particularly reflected in the establishment of
the OCC Project whose sponsor he became. It is interesting to note that the corporate TOP
Program had been modified in 1995 with the addition of a "cultural change component in
order to help achieve its goals". This may have been a trigger for the initiation of the OCC
Project in MILSYS, and the attention given to it by the Technical Managing Director.
With the initiation of the TOP-Program and the OCC Project a more strategic pursuit in
MILSYS' approach to HRM became apparent as well as a move towards more a
"sophisticatedhuman relations" style (Purcell and Gray, 1986), as discussed in chapter six.
He used the OCC Project to realise his vision of MILSYS becoming knowledge-based
organisation. The Technical Managing Director assumed that if MILSYS was a "knowledge
based company, people would vohmteer [to spread knowledge]". Thus, the OCC Project
was asked to redesign the appraisal system. According to the Technical Managing Director,
starting in 1997 "people w ill be assessed on how they spread knowledge" and will get

251

"rewardedfor spreading knowledge" (but he did not say how this would be assessed).
His engagement with the OCC Project indicated that HRM issues were not only given a high
profile in his general deliberations on business strategy, but also that personnel policy itself
had been taken over by him in order to directly influence the development of employees and
thus the transition towards a knowledge-based company. Yet, and possibly due his technical
mindset and his limited knowledge o f HRM, he seemed to perceive behavioural change as a
simple cause-effect relationship rather than a complex and longitudinal process. He tended
to favour technical solutions to organisational problems, in contrast to, for example, face to
face communication (e.g. quick approval of INTRANET, quick approval to purchase a socalled "middle-ware" software to support communication and information exchange, quick
approval to purchase CORE, but no approval for team building training in the Pilot Project
or the CE Project Team).
Despite the beginning of an organisational and cultural change process in 1994 and a move
towards a more "sophisticated human relations" style, the Technical Managing Director
restricted the HR Departments activities. He justified this situation as follows:

"He [the HR Manager] can’t be the front-runner. He ju st wouldn't know, what
is the sharp end o f our business to succeed in the marketplace. I f he knew that,
he would not be personnel manager, or human resources manager. ... What
kind o f company you want to have really comes down to people. That is the sort
o f thing that has to come from here [points to himself]. You can't leave it to
your kaufman or your HR man or whomever."

He claimed that the HRM Department did not influence or co-ordinate the change
process or was seeking to. He explained that this role largely resided with him:

"What we call the strategy alignment, is done by me. I am the sponsor and [ the
OCC Project Leader] is the manager. To make certain that people know where
the company is going, what our mission is, ... that is what strategy alignment is
.... That is not run by the HR Department. And I don't see that it can be done by
them. Because I don't want him [the HR Manager] to know as much as I do. ...
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To make sure that people go in the right direction and all thinking in a similar
way is my role. It is not HEM ’S role. H RM s role is more on the soft factors, to
look after them [employees]. Strategy alignment - this is my role. ... I f HRM
could do it, I could go home. ... I f they'd do it, w e'd duplicating functions."

He strongly emphasised that he was running the company and that he decided over
MILSYS' employees:

"You think the HR Manager runs the company. No. Wrong. The resources we
have - we are selling brains, we are not selling products. We sell solutions ...
A nd therefore I have to hone the people to become what I want them to become,
to be successful out there. And i f I don't do this, then you give me a reason why
I'm here. Therefore I'm ultimately [responsible fo r] Human resources."

He even claimed that it was his responsibility to create the appropriate HRM policies
and practices to accommodate MILSYS' business reorientation:

"Even sorting out an adequate reward or punishment system is not theirs [HR
Department]. It is my role. I f people have done well in engineering ... Do you
think [the HR Manager] knows what technically that meant. I know what it
means. ... I go to H RM a n d ... say, I want to pay [these people] a bonus o f so
and so much. How does a HR man know, whether this technical product is
world class or ju st made it. What do you want this poor man to be?
Everything? "

With the increasing importance of people and HRM and a growing dependence of
companies on employees' knowledge, a dominant, strategic oriented HRM Manager would
necessarily hold an influential position. The above quotes seem to indicate that such an
influential HRM Manager was perceived by the Technical Managing Director as threat to
his own position {"If H RM could do it, I could go home. ... I f they'd do it, we'd be
duplicating functions"). It could have been the reason why he avoided a more progressive
appointment. He consciously excluded the HR Manager from the organisational and cultural
change process {"Idon't want him [the HR Manager] to know as much as I do") and did not
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demand from him to broaden his knowledge. At the same time he justified this exclusion
with the limited expertise of HR Manager and other HR staff {"He ju s t wouldn't know, what
is the sharp end o f our business to succeed in the marketplace"; "I don't see that it can be
done by them [HR representatives] ").
The OCC Project Leader, on the other hand, may not have been perceived as a threat. He
was the Technical Managing Director's "protégé". Moreover, his position as leader of the
OCC Project was only an additional temporary task to his position as Business
Administration Manager of the Engineering Department, not a formal structural position. He
was seen as an ally, as a person who worked out the transformation of the Technical
Managing Director’s vision into reality {"strategy alignment, is done by me. I'm the sponsor
and [the OCC Project Leader] is the manager").

8.3.3.3

The Technical Managing Director and the Change Program

The Technical Managing Director strongly influenced the overall organisational change
program. He brought his pow er to bear regarding what projects were initiated and supported.
Projects in his immediate interest were sponsored by him personally, like the Innovation
Project and the OCC Project. They were given the best people - the "front-runners" - as well
as the time and financial resources the}' asked for.
The Innovation Project, for example, was given a full-time dedicated, influential project
leader (the re-employed former Director of the Engineering Department). The selection
process of the Innovation Project team members was part of the Technical Managing
Director's "strategy alignment". They were selected by the Business Administration
Manager of the Engineering Department and then personally approved by the Technical
Managing Director. They were "predominantly young engineers ... people who are the front
runners". According to the Technical Managing Director, their main target was to fmd ways
to improve innovativeness in MILSYS. "Who will be innovative? We don't know yet. But the
important thing is, one can teach innovation. And this team is working on these things". The
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nomination of the Innovation Project Team members took place sometimes at the expense of
other projects. The CE Project for example lost a valuable team member to the Innovation
Project without getting a replacement. The Technical Managing Director acted as the
sponsor for the project and ensured that the project had the necessary resources in terms of
people, finances and time.
The Technical Managing Director was less supportive towards other projects, such as the
CE Project, as outlined later. Other projects were staffed with less experienced or qualified
people. They had less powerful project leaders, and were restricted in their time and
financial resources. They were disadvantaged in comparison to the favoured projects.
According to McDonough and Griffin (1997, p. 4) "no amount o f team training or
management support can turn a group o f less capable team members with no resources into
a ... powerhouse". It was therefore not surprising, that a number of the projects and
initiatives outside the Technical Managing Director's interest had to be put on hold or lost
momentum. In contrast, the projects sponsored by the Technical Managing Director were
successfully continued beyond the end of the case study in mid-1997.
In addition, the efficiency of the projects was hampered due to a lack of co-ordination, as
outlined earlier. The Managing Director Business Administration "who was meant to
provide overall co-ordination, showed no interest at all in providing any sort o f ongoing co
ordination. In the course o f the 12 months, I think... I had fo u r meetings with the gentleman.
... [In one o f these meetings] I suggested putting together a TOP-newsletter fo r the company
where we could report things ... [which] is outside the scope o f my responsibility. Again, he
wasn't interested", explained the CE Project Leader. Within the change program a number
of projects and initiatives dealt with overlapping issues. Despite few inter-project meetings,
little synergy was achieved. Co-operation and communication between the individual
projects did not take place or remained informal and dependent on informal liaisons between
the individual managers, and the Technical Managing Director did nothing to counteract.
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83.3.4

The Technical Managing Director and the CE Project

The CE Project was one of the projects outside the immediate interest o f the Technical
Managing Director. External business consultants recommended CE as o f considerable
promise to MILSYS. The Technical Managing Director accepted the recommendation, and a
CE Project was initiated. From its inception and despite the formal high priority, the
Technical Managing Director treated the CE Project, however, as of secondary importance.
This was reflected in the selection of the CE Project Leader and of the CE Project Team
members. The CE Project Team members were mostly junior employees with one more
experienced contractor. They were allotted to the project by their respective functional
managers. Though all main functions were asked to send a representative onto the CE
Project Team, only three main departments responded immediately, as discussed earlier.
The CE Project Leader was fairly new to the company and headed the smallest sub
department within Engineering (with only 7 subordinates). He had no direct influence on
development projects and the product design and development process. He had not yet
established a strong personal and professional reputation. The appointment of a project
leader with a strong reputation, according to Buchanan and Badham (1998, p. 21), carries
"more weight and influence than one held in low regard". This was particularly visible in
comparison between the CE and the OCC Project Leader. The nomination of the Systems
Engineering Manager indicated that the expectations of the Technical Managing Director
were not particularly high in regard to the enforcement of change. A CE Project Team
member claimed that the CE Project Team w as "not in power to make anything happen. It is
a systems group". He believed that if it should have been different, it would have needed
"somebody- like [the Business Administration Manager o f the Engineering Department],
who actually causes consequences to happen. ... I think it was not the mandate o f the group
to push harder ...to get more power to influence processes”.
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The Technical Managing Director did not become the sponsor for the CE Project, and its
senior management sponsor, the Engineering Director, was little interested in the CE
Project The CE Project was given resources in the form of people's time to develop a CE
concept and to conduct training. But (until February 1997) the Technical Managing Director
and other

senior managers

did not actively support the

conceptualisation and

implementation of CE and the more far-reaching changes that were proposed by the CE
Team. The CE Project remained very much an Engineering project (focused on design and
development within projects).
The Technical Managing Director seemed to disagree that MILSYS had problems with the
way it executed development projects. During the CE training sessions and interviews it
appeared that he seemed quite satisfied with MfLSYS' development process and the
procedures in place. For him it was the people who caused problems (see incident report),
because they tended not to follow procedures and were not willing to co-operate closely. In
his perception, the major target of the CE Project should have been to achieve an attitude
change in the people involved in the development process. Thus, he saw little need for
structural change.
Despite his understanding of CE as an "attitude” and "culture’’ change, that ’’continuously
[requires] various exercises, training, teaching", he did not require any co-operation
between the OCC and the CE Project. He did not seem to fully realise that for such an
attitude change to happen, certain organisational conditions had to be fulfilled (such as the
establishment of a culture of trust; HRM policies and practices reinforcing the required
attitudes and behaviours; accountability and decision-making pow er for projects allocated to
Project Managers). His limited experience with strong project matrix organisations may
have caused his bounded vision of CE. He gained his experiences and advanced his career
predominantly in strong functional organisations.
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8 3 .4

8 3.4.1

T he OCC P roject Leader

The Power Position o f the OCC Project Leader

The OCC Project Leader was another important change agent in the company. He had a
strong impact on the implementation process of CE and the role of HRM in the overall
change process. An accountant, he joined the company after the take-over by the German
parent in 1991. In 1992, with the introduction o f the double-head structure he was appointed
the Business Administration Manager o f the Engineering Department. Though this was a
senior management position, he was not a member o f die Executive Committee. But
organisation charts do not always expose the full power structure o f an organisation. "Power
is also embedded in other less visible features" (Buchanan and Badham, 1998, p. 36). The
OCC Project Leader profited from particular circumstances (Hardy and Clegg, 1996) such
as the enforced changes by the parent company (i.e. introduction double-head structure), the
initiation of the TOP-Program as well as the Technical Managing Director's vision of
becoming a truly knowledge-based company. He emerged as w inner o f the various change
processes and was able to steadily increase his sphere of influence. According to the
Business Administration Manager of the Engineering Department, he and the Engineering
Director were:

"jointly responsible fo r the whole function. ...W e clearly run this [department]
together. I ’m very interested in the technologyf... I'm very interested in ensuring
that we have the right people and processes in place to achieve the contract
deliverables. A t the same time I have to construct the financial results fo r the
group. But I don'tju s t say, Ilo o k after the number side o f things and don't give
a damn about when we deliver something or the fa c t that we don't have the
right tools or the right people."

The final decision-making power, however, rested with the Director of the function.
According to the Technical Managing Director there was "one function, one man". The
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OCC Project Leader had "a lot o f ambitious plans" (Director of Quality Assurance). He was
one of the 'rising stars" and one o f the "widely acknowledged movers and shakers" in the
company, and "seem[ed] to make the going" as an external consultant put it. He benefited
from the strong favouritism on the part of the Technical Managing Director. Beyond this, he
was widely respected by the employees and had a high reputation for getting things done
and being proactive. A CE Project Team member described him as

"very efficient and task-oriented. I f he is given a task, he finds all the data he
needs and does not stop until he figures out a way to solve the problem. . . . I f
somebody like him was appointed the team leader or at least member o f the
[CE Project] team, we would have had a much higher reputation."

Though the OCC Project was officially of secondary' importance, his selection attached a
high importance to the project. He possessed great authority and, through his own senior
management position, he had easy access to senior management, to information, and other
resources. In the face of opposition and resistance, such power helps in the pursuit and
achievement of valuable social and organisational objectives (Buchanan and Badham,
1998). The status of the project was even more heightened with the Technical Managing
Director becoming the sponsor of the OCC Project. This underlined once more the OCC
Project Leader’s official warrant for change. It provided the OCC Project Leader with
valuable resources in terms of time and finances, and enabled him to enforce the proposed
changes within the organisation.

83.4.2

Vision and Political Skills

The OCC Project Leader had a comprehensive vision of what he wanted to achieve with the
instigated organisational and cultural change process. His ideas were captured in the OCC
Project concept as outlined in chapter five. Some aspects the OCC Project focused on
coincided with CE (such as teamwork, innovation orientation, and communication). While
the OCC Project Leader was not concerned with the restructuring of the traditional product
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development process, he realised that the new type o f business required a new type of
leader. Teamwork was seen as a way to master innovativeness and flexibility. This all
entailed a new role for HRM as a source o f competitive advantage, which was also
addressed by the OCC Project.
In comparison to the CE Project Leader, the OCC Project Leader was more successful in
pushing his proposed changes through. Reasons may be seen in his organisational position
(senior manager) and the interest of the Technical Managing Director on the OCC Project as
described above. Other reasons may have been his political skills and the change strategy he
applied. He was aware that "organisational change intensifies political issues and
behaviours" and the change agent inevitably encounters resistance to new ideas (Buchanan
and Badham, 1998, p. 26). Consciously and unconsciously he deployed political tactics to
dispel resistance and opposition, formed alliances to advance both, his personal and
organisational change agendas, and tailor his concept to fit into the system.
He engaged in a variety of tactics. One was to make decisions appear less important to
others. Another, slightly related to the first, was to involve only a minimum o f people in
negotiations and decision-making processes. His argument was that "the organisational and
cultural change process is not the most important issue and therefore should not bind many
resources". While other TOP projects were conducted in teams, the OCC Project was run
without a team (although it wfas probably the broadest and most time-consuming change
project). The OCC Project Leader single-handed determined the topics of the cultural
change project. This way he reduced the potential for conflict and disagreement, the level of
challenge and possible dispute. In addition, he did not expose his wider concept to the
majority of employees. Instead, he translated the concept into locally workable solutions,
broken down into manageable steps and actions, which were then communicated to the
organisation. Thereby he maintained "order to otherwise confused situations" (Buchanan
and Badham, 1998, p. 4). Given this approach, it was not surprising that the 6-day
management training for example was equated by many employees w ith the end of the OCC
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Project, while it was rather a starting point.
He was aware that organisational and cultural change requires a lot of time to institutionalise
and assumed that cultural and organisational change ... will go on fo r many, many years".
Consequently, he applied a so-called "philosophy o f little steps". It helped him to minimise
the insecurity employees perceived in view of the radical change. In exposing only the very
next step of his wider plan and providing only selected information, the OCC Project Leader
accommodated the people's desire for security. In doing so he was able to overcome human
and organisational barriers and successfully avoid scepticism and resistance towards his
broader vision. He explained that he was "not going to drown people with all these ideas
because they [the ideas] would fail. We don't have the time and people ... to change
something every single day o f the week". Consciously or unconsciously he may have known
that the degree of complexity or uncertainty of change "will adversely affect its chances fo r
adoption" (Sankar, 1991, p. 318). A complex change like MILSYS' organisational and
cultural change process, which aimed for radical changes in the behaviour of people and
most likely causes changes the balance of power, is highly vulnerable to political disruption
(Buchanan and Badham, 1998, p. 123). Simple changes, introduced slowly and
incrementally, typically do not cause high degrees of conflict. By limiting the information
about the OCC Project to a minimum, he was able to maintain control over his activities
with little interference from others. He minimised the risk of endangering his career or being
sidelined by the one or other stakeholder group or individual in the company (Buchanan and
Badham, 1998, p. 18).
On the other hand he formed strong alliances with critical groups and individuals in the
organisation. He made sure that his plans and proposals were agreed and well supported by
the Technical Managing Director. He was proactive in proposing further steps and actions
which was well liked by the Technical Managing Director, at the same time open to include
his ideas. At times in 1995/6 they met "at least once a week" to discuss ideas and further
actions regarding MILSYS' organisational and cultural change process. The OCC Project
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Leader ensured that all actions were justifiable as step towards a knowledge-based company
(support the "right" causes). This way he met the expectations of the Technical Managing
Director, secured his lasting strong commitment and won him as his probably strongest
allies.
Another strong ally was the Engineering Director. By giving him the opportunity to take part
in the implementation of OCC, and earn a reputation for being proactive and having an
innovative and successful department, the OCC Project Leader was able to pilot-test and
fine-tune his proposed changes in the Engineering Department. By setting up the
comprehensive six-day management training the OCC Project Leader started to create a
broad alliance with managers of all levels. He used the training to inform them about the
intended direction of MIL SYS' organisational and cultural change. He also discussed and
agreed first actions with them (e.g. elaboration of a new vision, mission statement). This
way he made them to supporters of his ideas. By emphasising the imminent alterations and
mobilising "powerful outside experts with credibility and the aura o f objectivity" (Pfeffer,
1992b, p. 254) (e.g. training providers and competency assessors from a Management
Institute), he not only justified his actions, but assured the commitment of the managers or at
least dispelled their resistance.
Another political tactic the OCC Project Leader applied was not to insist on getting his own
way at any cost. He w as able to concede and sacrifice proposals in order to get other more
important causes through and to maintain alliances. The attitude survey was one such
example. Originally the OCC Project Leader had planned to repeat the survey on an annual
basis. With the decision for the AQA self assessment, he relinquished this plan, even though
he lost the "consistency back against the [previous] survey results". But "rather than
[having] another survey, we decided to see how this [the AQA Self-Assessment] goes, what
sort o f feedback we get from this one". This earned him (additional) respect by the Director
of QA, who talked of the OCC Project Leader w ith high regard and actively supported his
proposed changes and actions.
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8.3.4.3

Position on HRM

HRM was a key point of interest to the OCC Project Leader also in his role as Business
Administration Manager of the Engineering Department. He directly influenced the position
of HRM in M3LSYS. At the same time he sidelined potential competitors and rivals, as in
the case of the HR representatives and the CE Project Leader. Within the scope of the OCC
Project he tried to raise the awareness of HRM of functional and business administration
managers and with it to strengthen the status of HRM. He knew about the little interest and
limited knowledge of many functional and Project Managers in HRM matters and their
downgraded image of HRM. Hence, he only confronted them with few but gradual changes
in the HRM area. At the same time he initiated a training program that focused on new
leadership skills and suggested the assessment of project management staff regarding their
HRM competencies. He turned to external forces such as the training provider or assessor of
the competency profile to support his position.
He stressed the need for change from a personnel into a Human Resource Management
function, particularly with the company's development into a knowledge-based organisation.
He criticised the HR Department for "not [being] proactive enough" and for its traditional
personnel focus and lack of expertise to fulfil such strategic role. At the same time he
deprived them of the opportunity to get involved in the OCC Project and to extend thenknowledge. He saw the HR Department's responsibility in hiring, firing, administration and
welfare. He explained: "It is a bit like this: if... I go to the HR function and say, 'where are
the 20 people I demanded? ... I need sta ff to do the p ro jects'... or if I sat down and say 'we
must be a little bit more strategic about our training philosophy ... ', I think this is going to
come second". While a competency assessment was carried out for Project Managers at his
suggestion and served as the basing point for further training, he proposed no such actions
for the HR staff.
Instead, he himself moved into the role of a HR strategist and internal consultant for HRM.
From 1995 to 1997 he proposed and started to implement a number of changes to existing
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personnel policies and practices. But at the end o f the case study in mid-1997 these changes
did not form a holistic, organisation-wide approach. They did not strongly enforce
attitudinal and behavioural changes. According to the OCC Project Leader, he was "selftaught on ... HR issues" and had no formal qualification or education in the HR field. This
may have been a reason why he did not seem to grasp the significance o f a holistic HRM
approach with its interrelated HRM policies and practices, and the proposed changes
remained scattered efforts. It is also conceivable that he fried to strengthen the position of
BA Managers. With Business Administration Managers o f the Departments becoming more
accountable for HRM (and thus the development o f employees - the key source of
company s competitive advantage), they would significantly influence and contribute to the
success of the company.

83.4.4

Position on CE

The OCC Project was a potential partner project for the CE Team due to its emphasis on
organisational structures, culture, and HRM policies and practices and its focus on
teamwork and communication. The OCC Project Leader saw CE as an opportunity to
overcome the

"attitude 7 do what I do, and then I pass it to somebody else to do what they
do’. CE to me ... is getting a right team together at the right time with
everybody- knowing what they- need to do and working together to achieve that
specific goal. ... That is very much - and p u t a brand on it - teamwork, ... CE is
a cultural change."

Despite his recognition of CE as cultural change and its dependence on teamwork, he did
not support the CE Project. This was apparent on a number of occasions. One was the sixday management training (in May 1996). An important aspect of the training was to discuss
and understand the benefits of teamwork. But no link was drawn to CE nor was the CE
Project introduced or mentioned. Furthermore, the OCC Project Leader covertly refused a
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co-operation with the CE Project Team. A CE Team member claimed that the OCC Project
Leader "did not support the [CE] team very m uch There was always a h a lf page summary,
data is not available' 'I can't get anymore'". He assumed that if he would have been on the
CE Project Team or even been the project leader, he would have "pulled out all information
we needed" and worked on the problem until a solution was found. The CE Teams invited
him several times to their meetings in order to gain detailed insight into the OCC Project and
discuss the overlap between the two projects and possible areas for co-operation. But he
never took up the invitation. He saw no need to join the meetings. He had spoken to the CE
Project Leader on a number o f occasions about this organisational change. A nd what came
out o f i t ... was that teamwork and communication, the motivation sort o f thing is very, very
close to CE. A nd I'm very surprised that they haven't picked that up". He basically made the
CE Project Leader responsible for the failure to establish a clear and strong link between CE
and the organisational and cultural change process.
The CE Project Leader on the other hand was neither powerful enough nor broadly
politically skilled to win the OCC Project Leader as an ally for CE, as shown in the next
section.

8.3.5

8.3.5.1

The CE P roject L eader

The Power Position of the CE Proj ect Leader

The CE Project Leader was a key figure in the conceptualisation and implementation of CE.
He was the Manager of the Systems Engineering Department. Despite the importance given
to Systems Engineering, the department was perceived as of minor status by both managers
and employees. The Systems Engineering Manager assumed that "you should not spend
much time here when you are young", as it was not career favourable. The Systems
Engineering Manager was well regarded for his dedication to his specialised field. Systems
Engineering. He was respected for his ability to keep projects on track and ensure the
delivery of stated objectives. According to an external consultant he possessed an
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intellectual rigor in dealing with problems and analysing issues. He was open to new ideas,
also those outside his own field o f expertise. From the beginning he supported the idea of
CE and offered himself as candidate for the leadership o f a respective project.

8.3.5.2

Vision o f CE

The implementation of CE challenged the status quo of established product development
practices and the ways these practices had been justified in the past. Hence, it was crucial
for the CE Project Leader to create a comprehensive vision of CE. A broad vision does not
only inspire and legitimate these changes. It also helps to form a vast troop of allies to
support the implementation of the proposed changes and to effectively overcome
subversion, blockage and ignorance. How the CE Project Leader failed to meet these
requirements is discussed below.
The CE Project Leader perceived CE as "very closely linked to Systems Engineering" and
thus, as "part o f [his] normal jo b ... in as much as most CE applies to the design and
development process". According to him, one of his main tasks regarding CE was to "put
together a very strong set o f best practices, a set o f rules fo r me to oversee projects". On the
other hand he saw CE as "an opportunity to try something new. ... I saw the CE initiative as
a chance to test some o f my ideas, ... the chance to tackle some problems which have
worried me fo r some years". He read several books about CE. And "having read these
books, and fo r the fir st time trying to apply [CE] in a relevant period o f time", was seen by
him as a major "personal challenge". It struck him, however, that many of the case studies
and examples provided in this literature described how extremely bad processes can be
improved. He claimed that M3LSYS "did not have an universally bad process" and was
already applying CE, if only in an unsystematic way. In 1996 he assumed that the potential
for improvement through the introduction of CE in MTLSYS would be rather modest.
Typical for his engineering background, the CE Project Leader focused on technical and
procedural solutions but little on the social and people aspects involved. The (in October
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1996) presented solution set reflected his perception o f CE as little more than the systematic
application o f good engineering practice, as the next quote indicates:

"Our solution set o f CE 'best p ra ctices'... did apply systematic common sense.
It is hard to get too excited about applying systematic common sense. It is not
as sexy as we would have hoped at the outset. But it is really ju st focusing on
the details, having the appreciation o f what goes into the design and
development process. And basically make it more straightforward in many
w ays."

Similar to the engineering-based CE literature, he recognised the cross-functional team as a
key to the success of CE. But he largely neglected the organisational context, in which the
cross-functional product development teams are embedded. He focused on aspects such as
team training, meetings, and team structure and did not recognise these team characteristics
and activities as only a "subset o f the set o f elements required to make teams truly effective"
(McDonough and Griffin, 1997, p. 11). He was not aware that unless teams were placed in
an organisational context that reinforces attitudes and behaviours required for teamwork,
high functional integration was not achievable. He did thus not consider the creation of an
appropriate infrastructure for CE with appropriate HRM policies and practices as within the
scope of the CE Project.
He avoided or just did not realise the need for structural changes and failed to clearly spell
out the perspectives for the various groups and individuals in the company. He may not have
had an answer himself how such structural change would look like. His bounded vision may
have been due to his engineering background" "with little if any recognition o f the human
and social implications" (Bailey, 1993, p. 190). By leaving the question open "What is in fo r
me?", he, however, increased people's uncertainty regarding what happens to their job,
status, reputation, work relationships, workload, personal "comfort zone", (Buchanan and
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Badham, 1998, p. 6). This caused individual and collective, open and covert resistance to
CE. By only vaguely defining the changes in accountability and responsibility, functional
managers, for example, who may have seen themselves as "losers" of this process, were not
given the opportunity to find or adopt a new role or position. Project Managers, on the other
hand, may not have perceived themselves as winners and thus, also remained hesitant.
The implementation of CE primarily required "workable knowledge" in the form of
decisions and solutions that would work in this context, and which were both socially and
practically acceptable (Buchanan and Badham, 1998). The CE Project Leader's limited focus
proved to be not very effective. As he had no comprehensive vision of CE, he was not
capable of delegitimising MELSYS' old approach to product development. He was not able
to show that CE was indeed a concept to enable MILSYS to make the leap from being a
good company to becoming an excellent one. He was unable to kick-off the creation of new
values, beliefs, symbols, and ideologies.

8.3.5.3

Political Skills and Behaviour

The success of the CE Project as a complex change effort was not only dependent on the
technical knowledge and vision of the CE Project Leader. It strongly depended on his
political skills and behaviour, his ability to obtain the compliance, contribution, and co
operation of a broad range of individuals and groups with different values, perceptions and
goals.
The CE Project Leader, however, did not fully realise the highly political nature of CE
implementation. He neglected the fact that it threatened the vested interests and privileges
(as well as the long-accepted ways of doing things) of different individuals and groups.
Moreover, he underestimated the need for powerful alliances for the successful implemen-9

99 Typical for a systems engineering approach is to clearly restrict the focus of the project (to clearly
define what is inside, what is outside the project), which enables them to tackle complex problems
(broken down and tackled in pieces) (see e.g. Grady, 1994; Salomone, 1995).

268

tation of CE despite his "formal warrant fo r change" (Buchanan and Badham, 1998). The
CE Project Leader did not foresee that even groups and individuals, which at first glance
would profit from CE (such as Project Managers) did not proactively support the proposed
changes. Their hesitation may have been due to a number of reasons such as lack of interest,
uncertainty about their personal job, a limited willingness or ability to take over more
responsibility and risk. For Project Managers the implementation of CE for example
involved the need to enhance their "people skills" and to apply a different leadership style in
order to foster a closer co-operation and communication between different departments,
groups and individuals. They would have to deal with more diverse goals, perceptions and
modes of operation than in the past. Not every Project Manager was up to this challenge or
willing to take it. But the CE Project Leader paid little attention to their hesitation and its
reasons.
In addition, he was not very clever and sensitive in winning (strong) allies and obtain broad
senior management commitment. Reasons may be found in his personality and his
leadership style. His leadership style corresponded with his professional experience in
strong functional, and thus compartmentalised organisations with a Tayloristic approach to
work. The Defence industry, with their "militaristic ethic o f a bureaucratic organisation
Cdo your jo b and take your ration')" (Buchanan and Badham, 1998, p. 74), traditionally
expected managers to be authoritative. Hence, it was not surprising that the CE Project
Leader paid little attention to team maintenance issues and did not utilise the CE Project
Team as one of his alliances. Instead of developing strong linkages to the functions via the
representatives at the CE Project Team, he dominated the CE Project Team. He did not
ensure all members felt included nor did he establish an agreed vision. He did not devolve
responsibility and often suppressed ideas of team members in favour of his own views. In
doing so, he steered his team into a direction that emphasised procedures and technical
solutions.
In his relations with others, especially senior managers, his intensity, intellectual rigor, and
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frankness was, according to an external consultant, at times "somewhat daunting". He was
forthright, but at the same time blunt and not very diplomatic. This was also the case in
situations where he needed to win somebody over. A number of subordinates and peers
positively valued his openness, as several interviews and informal talks revealed. Senior
managers did not seem to appreciate it. He was not on good terms with his immediate boss
or the two Managing Directors. His name was not mentioned when senior managers talked
about the "front-runners" of the company. He was not asked to contribute to the Innovation
Project. He had to formally ask for every meeting with the Managing Directors. In the
course of 12 months in 1996/7, according to the CE Project Leader, he only "had four
meetings with the gentleman [the Managing Director Business Administration]" who
showed no interest at all in CE, though he was meant to provide overall co-ordination for
the TOP-Program.
By being open, emphasising support and calling on proactivity and participation100, the CE
Project Leader adopted a more conventional approach to change. He was unaware of the
need to engage in political tactics (which was to a degree political naivety), particular in
winning over senior managers, as the next quote indicates: "If I have invited them [senior
managers] along to deliver a message, ... they were there... In terms o f being proactive like
attending any o f our team meetings or showing any sort o f interest or providing any sort o f
reward, guidance or anything at all, they did not. They were totally reactive". This "lack o f
senior management commitment" as he called it, was "really frustrating" for him, reaching a
climax with the later outlined incident.
According to Lettice (1995) and Bucciarelli (1996), the project sponsor has a critical impact
on the organisational success of a change process. The CE Project did not have a proactive
and supportive sponsor. The Engineering Director was the formal sponsor of the CE Project.
He was also the immediate boss of the CE Project Leader. To the disadvantage of the CE
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Project they had a poor relationship. While the Systems Engineering Manager had an almost
mentor - protégé like relationship with the former Engineering Director and initial sponsor
o f the CE Project, his relationship with the new Engineering Director was less intense and
based on a very formal level. The former Engineering Director was very interested in CE.
He saw CE as o f great advantage for the company and fostered the co-operation with the
University partners. In contrast, the new Engineering Director showed little interest in CE
nor the course and results of the project. When the CE Project Leader "went fo r specific
help, a specific job, he [the sponsor] may or may not have done it". According to the CE
Project Leader "he was not proactive at all. He did not show any interest, did not turn up to
any meeting, did not comment any report except fo r spelling mistakes". As a member of the
Executive Committee the Engineering Director could have championed certain issues for the
CP Project, such as the representation of every function at the CE team or the early and
appropriate allocation of a Pilot Project. But no such attempts were undertaken. This may
have been a conscious or unconscious protection of his turf, both as individual and
representative of the group of functional managers, as discussed earlier. But again, the CE
Project Leader with his limited political skills and possible unawareness of the political
nature of CE was unable to overcome these difficulties and thus, failed to win the project
sponsor as an ally for the CE Project.
The exercise of conversation controls, influence tactics, and impression management
techniques is an exercise of power and thus a form of political behaviour (Buchanan and
Badham, 1998). An opportunity to apply such power was given to the CE Project Leader
with the CE introductoiy training in which several senior managers participated including
the Technical Managing Director. His time was limited and he did not spent half a day on
many things. His participation was thus, a great chance to win his commitment and get him10

100 This was largely his approach within the CE Project Team as well. He made, however, clear that
he is giving the direction and sidelined people who held a different view from him; as discussed
earlier.
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stronger involved. Knowing the Technical Managing Director, his personality and
leadership style, it would have been a sign o f political sensitivity on the part o f the CE
Project Leader to structure and manage the training and game the way it most likely
achieved an outcome that pleased the Technical Managing Director (e.g. Why not let him
and his team win, rather than upset him by losing the game?).
Despite the formal thank you and shaking hands on the part o f a number of training
participants, the incident during one of the introductory training sessions for CE (see section
8.3.3) reinforced the Technical Managing Director's existing impression o f the CE Project
Leader, as CE Project Leader noted:

"When the [Technical] Managing Director tells you at the end o f a nine month
project, you are on the wrong track, ... you start mentally preparing your CV
and making yourself ready to leave the company, because you fe e l like you
have lost, ... attempting to help the company, you severely hurt your own
career.”

After two years of dealing with CE, he concluded somewhat disillusioned "Ife e l a lot wiser.
But 1 certainly don't think we have achieved everything we set out to". He felt "not as
confident anymore as when I set out that I know how to fix the discovered problems". He
handed in his resignation only couple of weeks after the incident. He left the company in
order to take up a full-time MBA study. He hoped to learn more about project management
and the processes involved, but also to increase his knowledge about concepts like CE,
knowledge management and the like. Though the official reason was not related to the
incident, several employees interpreted it as a direct consequence.
In his role as change agent the CE Project Leader had to work with individuals and groups
whose collaboration and compliance was necessary, but over whom he had no formal
organisational authority. Better political skills may have helped him to recruit allies and
form coalitions. An understanding of CE as political process may have helped him to find
ways to accommodate their desires (personal and organisational "agenda fo r change") and
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marginalise their concerns. As he did not have a comprehensive vision and did not gam the
broad commitment o f individuals and groups, he endangered die success o f the CE Project

8.4

SUMMARY

The results o f the longitudinal case study revealed that the exercise o f organisational power
and politics had a significant influence on the course and outcome o f the CE implementation
process and the limited role HRM played in it. The decisions and actions made in this
process were based cm a combination o f understandings, past experiences, and personal
assumptions and values (Scfaon, D„ 1983). Key players were caught between their visions
and traditions, between their practical endeavours and cultural frameworks - particularly
MILSYS strong engineering culture. Along with a strong engineering culture commonly
goes a technical mindset, an orientation towards technical solutions and traditionally little
appreciation o f HRM. The bounded success o f the CE Project and the limitations o f the CE
concept indicated that the

" m a n a g e ria l c h a n g e a g e n ts h a d a c o n c e p tio n o f th e 'o ld * c u ltu re ,

b u t n o c o m p re h e n s iv e v is io n o f a n e w o n e m(Marks

et al.. 1996, p. 19; see also Hartley et al.,

1997).
A whole cast o f characters - individuals and groups - influenced the CE implementation
process. The CE Project Leader, the OCC Project Leader and the Technical Managing
Director were found to be most critical to the success o f CE. The latter two were able to
draw on rich structural and individual sources o f power, which helped them in the pursuit
and achievement o f their organisational and personal change agenda. Due to their personal
and organisational change agenda and limited interest in CE. however, they made no
attempts to strengthen the CE Project and prevented that HRM was realised as within the
scope o f die CE Project. The CE Project Lead»- could not match them. He lacked the
structural power to force through valuable social and organisational objectiv es. In addition,
he had no comprehensive vision (o f what was achievable with CE) and was inexperienced in
dealing with organisational politics. He was unable to win die Technical Managing Director
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and the OCC Project Leader as allies for CE. The implementation of CE required radical
changes in attitudes and behaviours. It threatened the vested interests and privileges of
various groups and individuals in the organisation. At the same time it called on their
contribution, compliance and co-operation. This made it an extremely difficult political
undertaking and highly vulnerable to political disruption. The CE Project Leader did not
understand CE as a political process. The OCC and the CE Project Leader adopted different
change strategies. From the results of the case study it appeared, that the one applied by the
OCC Project Leader (based on incremental changes), was more successful in changing
established structures and processes, as he was able to tailor his concept to fit into system
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9

C O N C LU SIO N

9.1

RESEARCH SUMMARY

The central focus of this thesis was the role of HRM in the process of defining and
implementing CE. This was investigated in a longitudinal processual case study of a
company attempt to improve the product development process by using a CE approach. The
case study company was an Australian manufacturer o f defence electronics. The
investigation showed that the conventional organisational structure with its strong
departmentalisation and functional managers as focal point for decision-making power and
authority over budgets run counter the CE concept and its aim of high cross-functional
integration. In addition, MILSYS' traditional HRM practices were not fostering cross
functional integration but hampered teamwork.
The presented case may be interpreted as a negative one as it revealed little consideration of
HRM issues during the attempt to introduce CE. Though the company had started to realise
the critical importance of organisational enablers for far-reaching changes and initiated an
organisational and cultural change process, at the end of the case study, it was too early to
see a clear impact on CE. Moreover, the two processes - CE and OCC - were not linked to
each other, and only certain HR issues were discussed, both within the overall organisational
change process as well as within the CE Project. HRM issues were seen as outside the
purview of the CE Project - particularly by its leader. No attempts were undertaken to
develop a strategic HRM approach as part of the CE concept, and there was more of a focus
on technical and procedural solutions.
Furthermore, the HR Department was not involved with the elaboration of the CE concept
nor the implementation process, neither was any other HR specialist. Though employees
were said to be the key source of competitive advantage and the significance of HRM was
formally recognised by the company's senior management, a disparity existed between
management rhetoric and its translation into practice. The HR Department was consciously
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limited to the provision of administrative and welfare services and did not meet the demands
of an HR specialist function. The initiation and management o f organisational and cultural
change, and changes to HRM issues, remained within the purview of the executives and
selected line managers. Among line managers, on the other hand, there was little recognition
of the critical importance of HRM to the overall organisational performance and thus, the
success of the company.
The CE initiative so far proved to be of limited success, as few substantive changes were
introduced. At the end of the case study period most development projects were still set up
and managed following the more traditional approach. The limited success was due to a
number of factors.
A general reason lays in the nature of the CE concept, notably its interpretative flexibility
(Abrahamson, 1996) (see chapter three).
Another one touches the composition and potential o f the nominated CE Project Team, its
make-up, background orientation and leadership. The CE Project Team was inadequately
resourced and prepared and basically limited to an advisory committee. It was not
empowered to authorise more radical changes like the shift from functional to project
management.
O f severe effect on the implementation concept and process was the insufficient attention
paid to HR and organisational change issues by the CE Project Team. Successfully
introducing CE involves substantial organisational and cultural change, which is not simply
amenable to a "technical fix ” (Couchman and Badham, 1996), e.g. in the form of tools or
techniques like CORE, a new DFM/A software tool or the introduction of an INTRANET.
Though some attention w as given to the design of project teams (addressing issues such as
team formation, training for team building, the definition of clear team goals, and a team
charter), the roles, responsibilities and authority of individual teams and team members
remained largely undefined. Organisational implications of the shift from a functional to a
more project-oriented matrix structure or heavyweight project teams were not addressed.
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The limitations o f this approach later became apparent, when a lack o f senior management
support for the more substantive proposed changes and problems in the CE Pilot Project
clearly pointed to an inadequate organisational structure and culture and missing teamoriented HRM policies and practices.
A problem was also that the CE Project Team failed to present a coherent vision of CE for
the company (which partly stemmed from the ambiguous nature of the CE concept). It did
not adopt a comprehensive implementation strategy to address the above mentioned issues
and ensure that the required actions were taken. At the end of the investigation, it appeared
that different groups and individuals still had diverse understandings of CE. As a result, and
despite numerous training courses and seminars, these aspects further contributed to the
limited success in implementing CE within the company.
An additional constraint was the lack of senior management support and commitment the
CE Project Team experienced. Though formally of primary7 importance, CE was given
secondary7 attention by Senior Management. The CE Project Team was not really
empowered. No "space" was created to foster the required changes. Issues relating to more
radical changes were avoided. Members of the Executive Committee did not ,Lwalk the talk"
and made little attempts to link CE with other change projects and initiatives.
Furthermore, on the part of the CE Project Leader insufficient attention was paid to the play
of organisational power and politics in the context of CE. He did not effectively mobilise
support for CE, nor did he neutralise any opposition. In this context the missing support on
the part of the nominated project sponsor, who showed no interest or responsibility for the
CE Project, was the more weighty'.
The prospects for the full implementation of CE and the adoption of a strategic HRM
approach in MIL SYS did not look too good in the foreseeable future with a subsequent
turnover in key managerial staff, including the CE Project Leader and the pressure from
other strategic business issues in a highly competitive and demanding industry. But the
results of the stud} also point to the interesting irony of this and similar cases, namely the
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increasing dependence of defence electronics companies on the adoption of more effective
product development practices (e.g. based on CE principles) in order to remain competitive,
which will not happen unless a major shift in their approach to HRM is realised. The results
of the case study indicate that it is unlikely to achieve high levels o f cross-functional
integration without the deliberate and systematic application of supportive HRM policy and
practices. More conventional HRM policies and practices run counter to teamwork and
cross-functional integration and tend to reinforce what CE seeks to change. Thus, HRM is
the hidden agenda of CE. CE, despite the technical connotations of the term, is an
organisational issue in the sense that its successful implementation requires appropriate
organisational culture, skills, structures, and interpersonal relations, and implies a major
shift in the approach to HRM.

9.2

CONTRIBUTION TO THEORY AND PRACTICE

The thesis has made several contributions to theory and practice. The six main achievements
are summarised in the next section.
First, in the theoretical area the study advanced the understanding of CE by exposing the
two literature areas CE and HRM to each other. With the growing complexity of processes it
becomes extremely necessary to build up integration mechanisms to facilitate the work of
specialists. While the work of "technical" specialists remains and even gains importance, the
reliance on "integration" specialists and process facilitators becomes at least as important.
This thesis is one such integration effort in its attempt to overcome the traditional
independence

of the different research streams and by showing their growing

interrelationship.
Secondly, with the insight that flows from this undertaking, particularly the potential for
dialogue between the attendant academic disciplines, the study contributes to the internal
development and enrichment of those respective bodies of literature. It produces a more
detailed and sensitive understanding of the potential role and implication of HRM in product
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development and further develops the concept of CE, as presented in the conceptual
framework. While research in the field of CE tends to be prescriptive and presenting the
implementation of CE as a rational process, the framework introduced here conceptualises
the implementation of CE as messy, multivariate process. It is argued that there is no "one
best way , no single solution for implementing CE. The implementation is product and
process dependent, as well as contingent on an organisation's strategy and structure, which
in turn will lead to variations in the organisational arrangements for CE.
Furthermore, and this is the third contribution, the study shows the importance of
organisational enablers in implementing CE, in contrast to the engineering based CE
research with its focus on technological enablers (such as enabling tools, technologies and
support systems for the different phases of product development). The framework assumes
that the implementation of CE involves organisational, procedural and technological
changes, but from an organisational perspective the achievement of cross-functional
integration is one of the most important aspects of the CE approach. Within the
organisational dimension emphasis is given to people management in CE. It appeared that
almost all aspects of managing the new product development process under a CE approach
are linked to people management and require supporting HRM policies and practices in
order to establish an appropriate employee role behaviour.
With the introduced research approach and methodology the study also furthers, and this is a
fourth contribution, the transition from a speculative stage to an empirical confirmatory
stage in CE theory building and provides further empirical content to the abstract and
diffuse concept of CE (Gerwin and Susman, 1996). The CE literature to date has been
predominantly anecdotal. Numerous CE surveys provide a snapshot in time and convey the
picture that CE has been widely adopted by companies in many industrialised countries,
even though there have been few detailed studies of the implementation of CE. The
problematic processual and complex nature of CE implementations, however, remains
underexposed. In contrast to ordinary case studies with their often superficial, little
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contextual investigation, this thesis - based on a longitudinal case study of a company
attempt to implement CE - provides a detailed insight into the implementation process by
investigating the interdependence of the change process and the causal and temporary
context it is embedded in.
A fifth contribution is that the study advanced the exploration o f the process and the impact
of CE in a particular industry and country. Most studies to date focus on CE
implementations in industries such as automobile and aerospace and electronics in the USA,
Japan and European counties. The investigation here shed light into the implementation of
CE for a company with a market approach different to the one pursued by the above
industries, which produce complex products for customer in markets. By contrast, the case
study company produced complex products but under contract for a single customer. The
case study results indicate that the market approach does not function as a barrier for CE and
that CE is applicable in this particular industrial setting - Defence electronics.
For compames considering the implementation of CE, and this is a sixth contribution, the
case study sen es as a guideline to strategy formulation by directing their focus to the
organisational side of the process and discussing the consequences if organisational
requirements are not met. The study sensitises CE steering committees, senior management
and CE project leaders about the complexity of CE and its political nature. It raises their
awareness that such a change process does not only require a suitable organisational
structure but also an appropriate organisational culture and approach to HRM. In addition,
they are shown that political sensitive behaviour and actions as well as the establishment of
strong alliances throughout the organisation are required in order to successfully
institutionalise CE. So when companies begin to consider the introduction of CE, they
should start such undertaking by focusing on the human side of the organisation.
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9.3

LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Despite the contributions of this thesis, it has several limitations, and caution is
recommended in interpreting the results. The following section discusses the limitations of
this research on a theoretical, practical, and methodological level.
On a theoretical level a reason for caution is the conceptual framework which was
constructed on the basis of the selected research literature. Several factors were identified
that determine the CE implementation process. But not all were taken equally into account
in the proposed framework. They may nevertheless be of relevance, which needs to be
investigated by future research. Beyond it, additional literature may have pointed to further
determinants of CE.
Also, a number of critical questions remain unanswered. Not all of the relationships in the
CE framework could be verified. So far little light has been shed into the question how CE
differs in small and large, technically complex projects, with an hierarchy of collaboration
between cross-functional teams and individual team responsibility for its own system
including co-ordination of lower level teams working on subsystems (Clark and Fujimoto,
1991; Gerwin and Susman, 1996). Future research could explore whether and how CE
differs under different project conditions and what this means regarding appropriate HR
policies and practices.
While the study showed that traditional HR policies and practices run counter to teamwork
and did not foster and support the achievement of high levels of cross-functional integration,
it could not establish that team-oriented HRM policies and practices have indeed a positive
impact on CE. Due to the protractedness of the change process it was not possible to
investigate the effect of the new HR practices on cross-functional integration nor whether
different cross-functional arrangements and different stages of the development process
require different HR practices. To establish the assumed positive effect of team-oriented
HRM policies and practices on CE, could be another objective for future research.
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Future research also needs to establish whether companies with a more traditional approach
to HRM (HR Department limited to administration and welfare; no internal HR specialist)
pay less attention to HRM issues in conceptualisation and implementation process o f CE
than companies with a more progressive approach to HRM. Based on the findings of this
thesis it seems reasonable to suppose that HRM issues as a rule will be neglected if no HRM
specialist is involved in the CE Project. This will probably be even more the case in
organisations with a strong engineering culture and an engineer as driver of the CE
implementation. Due to the technical mindset of such change drivers the critical importance
of HRM issues will not occur to them.
Moreover additional research is required about the role of organisational power and politics
in CE and in implementation processes in general. Although the thesis examined this issue,
future research needs to reveal in more detail who the actors are, what their personal and
organisational agenda is and what tactics they apply? Answers also need to be found on
whether the actors, their agendas and tactics differ in the four distinct stages of the CE
implementation process and how.
Although many factors play a role in shaping the CE application within a company, certain
factors tend to have a larger influence. Hence, the second potential avenue for future
research could be the quantitative testing of the proposed framework. Future research could
quantify the relative impact of different processes or features on CE and statistically
determine the interaction between the different processes.
A number of practical aspects may also be seen as a limitation of this research, such as the
time-span of the longitudinal study and its restriction to one CE implementation effort. Due
to the protractedness of organisational change the study finished at an early stage of the "to
be" institutionalisation of CE. The researcher was unable to include results from the
institutionalisation in the overall analysis, which limits the meaningfulness of the study. The
findings from the institutionalisation may have led to different interpretations and
conclusions of the implementation process. Studies are needed that are long enough to
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include all stages of the implementation process in order to derive statements o f how the CE
concept is put to work and what modification occur at this later stage. More research should
be done to understand the problems of sustaining CE practices and skills once the first pilot
project is completed. Longitudinal studies could explore in more detail how the
organisational context changes over time with the implementation o f CE and in turn again
influences CE.
The presented study was based on qualitative research, which is by its very nature, theory
developing rather than theory confirming, and which rises issues o f reliability and
generalisability of the findings. The research findings were based on large amounts of data
from one company in one particular industry. Expanding the investigation to additional
companies would expand the base of qualitative input and thus, increase the generalizability
of the proposed framework. By repeating the qualitative investigation in other companies
with the same market approach and companies with a different market approach CE research
could establish whether the proposed framework is equally applicable across different
industries or is dependent on the type of industry and market approach, the type of product
and its complexity.
Sensible answers to these questions can greatly advance the field o f product development in
handling product innovativeness and time to the market aspects. Though the thesis was not
able to answer the above questions and despite the discussed limitations, it provides a
valuable reference point for further research in the CE area.
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APPEN D IC ES

Appendix A:

Preliminary Case Study - Project Summaries

The investigation focused on two specific product development projects. Both projects had
already been underway and moved out of the conceptual phase when the case study
commenced. In one project the development process was at the stage prior to the design of
production processes. Project participants from Marketing and Research and Development
had fulfilled their main tasks, when the project was put on hold. In the second project trial
production had already commenced but initial results were not satisfactory to warrant a full
production. The two projects presented examples of a new CE approach to new product
development in the organisation, as company representatives from middle management
indicated. In addition, a number of company representatives, particularly from the
Marketing Department, saw the introduction of a "New Product Commercialisation
Manual" as the beginning of Concurrent Engineering in the company. Although the term CE
was not used, the manual emphasised cross-functional integration and concurrence in
product development tasks in order to improve and accelerate development projects.
Integration was seen as the early possible involvement of all departments directly concerned
with the development process and their continuous information throughout the process.
Concurrence embraced the parallel execution of a number of activities within and adjacent
to the development process. For other company personnel involved in product development,
particularly outside Marketing, none of the projects run by the company at the time of the
investigation met the requirements of CE. Some of them questioned whether CE was an
appropriate way for conducting the company's development process.
Elements of CE were observed in both projects. Both Project Managers were interested in
the new approach (one of them was involved in the design of the new manual) and tried to
ensure cross-functional integration by involving project participants earlier and committing
them at the outset to the decisions made in the project. Both project teams involved
representatives from up- and down-stream functions. Various communication media and
techniques were applied to enable and ensure cross-functional communication and co
operation (video-conferencing, e-mails, telephone, written minutes and memos, meetings,
etc.). A number o f design and development activities were run in parallel.
The extent of the team emphasis, the degree of cross-functional integration as well as the
extent and variety of communication media used, depended on the Project Manager. CE was
mostly carried out in an informal manner. The new manual supported a CE approach, but
did not formalise it; it was indicative but not prescriptive. A project sponsor to support the
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implementation of CE was not appointed. No training, neither at the management level nor
for the project teams, was provided to facilitate CE. Communication barriers in the form of
functional disintegration, e.g. the exclusion of Production were observed in both projects.
Managers and project members were not familiar with the new concept and the new
requirements. There were differences in the understanding of CE among the project
personnel. Project Managers had only a limited authority in decision-making processes and
towards team members and remained in a "lightweight" position (Wheelwright and Clark,
1992b). Team members as functional representatives were not equipped with decision
making power. Decisions were mostly reached by functional managers in the home
department. Team structures were best described as loose networks. Team participants,
including the leader, remained bound to their home function and were only part-time
dedicated to the project and not collocated. The organisational implications for CE to realise
its full potential were not recognised within the company. The approach was not backed up
by an appropriate organisational structure, nor did the interviewed managers indicate the
intention of such changes. The company's strong functional structure hampered the
application of CE, which could not be compensated through a powerful informal network
within the organisation (supported by a large number of long serving employees). The HRM
department was not involved with the initiation or management of any changes to the
development process. For Project Managers, on the other hand, HRM skills and tasks
(performance appraisal, career management, etc.) played no or only a subordinate role.
Organisation-wide changes in HRM policies and practices to support the implementation of
CE were neither planned nor anticipated.

Project 1
Project 1 was already operating for 4 to 5 years prior to the case study. It was a service
based project. It meant, from a customer point of view, the end product remained
unchanged. The actual manufacturing process however improved or/and changed. To the
company the project meant improved technology, higher environmental standards (reduced
health risk from toxic fumes), lower production costs (smaller amounts can be produced
more efficiently) and flexibility increase (facility of faster line changes though simplified set
up of process facilities, new product line two to three times smaller), and thus, a better
access to other regions. One sub-project was tasked to locate new markets.

One of the tasks the project team was dealing with was the mass limitations for efficient
production. At the time the customer had to order a certain minimum quantity of the
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product. The question was whether the new line can be utilised to produce smaller
amounts/quantities efficiently. In order to solve this problem the project team started to
determine whether mass limitation was a necessary adaptation. On one hand, the team
started to develop a strategy to test the market (does the market really wants or needs
smaller amounts?). On the other hand, the team started to investigate the technology for
possibilities for more rapid changes in the appearance range with same effectiveness.

At the time of the case study the project team was confronted with a number of difficulties.
The product trial involved only one customer. The project had to overcome some conflicts
with distributors of the traditional product (e.g. separate handling of the two products;
delivery guarantee of the new product in case of emergency). The variety in the appearance
of the differently produced product was still very small compared to the wide range in the
traditional product. The company co-operated with a number of suppliers to increase the
variety. But it appeared to be a time consuming undertaking. The commitment to greater
variety also required in advance preparations (e.g. provision of special storage). Though a 5
days per week trial was proposed in order to get "real life" production results, the project
team was only assigned to run 2 shifts per week during the case study period. The profit
margin of the project was low, therefore the project account still belonged to the Research
and Development department.

Due to this latter constellation the principal project manager was a representative from
Research and Development. A representative from marketing was in charge for the
commercialisation side of the product. The project leader (as well as the team) was
dominated by another team member from a comparably higher management position, who
determined decisions and the course of the observed meetings. The lack of strong leadership
was seen by some team members as a reason for the long duration of the project. Similar to
the other project investigated, the team leader was not provided leadership or project
management training. Decision making authority resided with higher management levels.
The success of the project was measured by the fulfilment of certain milestones.

Project 2
In project 2 a new product was tested as a means of differentiating the company's product
offering and to react to international market trends. The project started off with a market
survey in order to find out customer attitudes towards the traditional product. Numerous
complaints and problems were raised by the customers. This and the market trend in Europe
and America let to the decision to set up a market trial. Great effort was put into this phase.
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Meetings took place with numerous distributors (used by the company as part of its delivery
chain and seen as partner to promote the new product) in order to discuss their fears and
complains about the new product. As it turned out, however, a number of customers were
resistant towards the new product due to a variability in its surface appearance, while others
gradually started to appreciate the qualities of the new product. In addition, the capital
expenditure to set up a new product line was said to be too high, exceeding the initial
estimations by a multiple.

About a year after its initial start, the project was cancelled as it failed to convince senior
management of the success of the new product. In consequence the proposed extended
market trial was stopped completely. The company’s new direction was to find a completely
new approach to keep and even extend the market share in the traditional product segment
(feature and quality improvement of the traditional product), but with the option of a market
conversion to the new product in future times. This move disturbed not only people inside
the company but also numerous customers (partly representing whole industry segments) as
they were convinced about the advantages of the new product and did not intend to
reconvert to the traditional product. Representatives from the marketing department
assessed, that these customers were likely to turn to other suppliers to satisfy their new
needs.

The project leader was a representative of the marketing department. He was given only
limited decision-making authority {"lightweight" leader). Team member remained in their
old functional reporting structure. Non of the project members nor the project leader were
dedicated full-time to the project. At the beginning the project leader tried to involve all
relevant people of the team up-front in discussions and decisions about the project strategy.
In further steps he differentiated between, as he called it, an involvement of people at a
direct level and a communication level. He used different communication media, and
management tools (fishbone diagrams, minutes, telephone-conferencing, telephone, e-mail,
computer, etc..). His appointment as team leader was not supported by any team
management or leadership training.
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Appendix B:

Preliminary Case Study: Data Collection

Primary Data
- Interviews with Key Players
Project Manager Market Offer
Division Manager Sales and Marketing
Senior Supervisor New Product Development
Supervisor [product] Trial Line
Supervisor Product Development
National Marketing Manager Manufacturing (former Manager Product
Development)
Division Manager Human Resources
Team Members

- Informal Talks Inside and Outside Office Hours
- Observations (e.g. meetings of both projects)

Secondary Data
- Public and Proprietary Documents
- [Company] Referee (1985), [Company] Fact Sheet (1993), [Company] Pocketbook (1994)
- Various [Company] Product Profiles
- Various [Company] Brochures
- [Corporation] Review (quarterly), [Company] News (monthly)
- Various Information Bulletins e.g. about quality projects, supply and purchasing
improvement activities
- Marketing Business Plan 1993/94
- Drafts: new standard price list, demand forecasting, marketing information planning
- [Project 1] commercial application project paper
- [Project 1] meeting summaries and action plan
- Draft: [Project 2]
- [Project 2] meeting summaries and action plan
- Study of [a particular product market] incl. questionnaire
- Defence strategy [for a particular product market] - discussion paper
- Standard Procedure for Commercialization of new Products - New product proposals
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- Other Information Sources
[Company] videos about its products and production process
Visit of manufacturing sites
Visit [product] trial line

Data analysis
Triangulation, Proof-reading of the Case study report by company representatives
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Appendix C:

Preliminary Case Study: The Design and Development Process (DDP)
in Company Heavy-Metal

Up to 1993

Sequential Design and Development Process, Lack of
Documentation

-

traditional design and development proceeded mainly in a sequential manner

-

responsibility for overall process not fixed to particular position

-

no control mechanism to predict success of a project

-

final decision for project proceeding at an advanced stage

-

lack of documentation concerning procedures of the development process, which made it
complicated to trace decisions and responsibilities backwards

1993

Product Design and Development Process Procedures
Documented and Revised

- traditional product development process documented and in the following revised
(assisted by external consultants)
-

new process structure worked out with the aid of the Motorola process mapping approach

- people from all relevant departments involved in this design process
-

one major alteration: screening of the project idea at an early stage of the project (to
ensure fit with company market strategy or certain market segment - decisions followed a
so called "risk adjustment net": concentration on highest returns and preference to
products with higher market share and volume)

-

front end process, the project proposal and evaluation stage, still not efficiently
implemented in the overall process

-

no appointment of a project champion to ensure that the procedures were followed (many
people involved in the product development process, according to the Senior Supervisor
new Product Development, did not know there was a certain procedure or knew only a
tiny segment of the process, the part of their immediate responsibility.)

6/1994

Introduction of the "New Product Commercialisation Manual"

- marketing department initiated the new manual in order to overcome above mentioned
shortcomings of revised procedures, and to clarify and speed up decision-making
processes, (project cancellations after several months "down the track" should not
happen anymore)
-

measurement system was proposed in order to calculate the success of a new product in
the marketplace
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-

The new procedure contained the following stages:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

New product proposal
Project evaluation
New product proposal to DMT (Divisional Management team)
Project management
Research and Development eligibility
Funding trial order
System utilisation
Determining customer requirements
Materials supplier involvement
Implement proposal
Internal trials
Trials with customers
Market offer
Promotional program
Monitoring first order

-

Each step involved different functions and departments.

-

Twice during the whole process a project evaluation meeting takes place with
representatives of all departments involved

- After project proposal set up and evaluation by the marketing department and Research
and Development, meeting with all other departments to evaluate the project
-

responsibility for the following steps then with the Marketing or Research and
Development department.

-

appointment of a team leader from relevant department (taking over accountability for
project)

-

After preparation of project plan, discussion of the plan with all involved departments,
customers and suppliers to include their alterations and new ideas

-

When approved at senior management level, set up of trial run by the Quality integration
department in close co-operation with the customer

-

When customer expectations were met, next evaluation meeting takes place (with
commercialisation questions raised officially for the first time).

-

Parallel to trial run, the information services department starts to modify the system and
suppliers get involved.

- After these stages customer requirements are checked against supplier constrains and a
promotional program is worked out to determine customer requirements.
-

The last stages include the order placement and the monitoring of the first orders.
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Appendix D:

Excerpt from Interview Guideline:

Background to Interviewee
What is your exact position and title (report relationships)?
What are your duties and responsibilities?
Can you tell me more about your career and educational background?

Company Background
Can you provide me with some information about the company’s history?
What is the ownership and legal status of the company?
How would you describe die relationship to parent company?
What are the company's main products?
What are the company's main customers?
How would you characterise the market the company operates in?
Can you give me some background information about the TOP-Initiative?
What are the most important changes within the company since the initiation of TOP?

Business Planning and Strategy Formulation
Do you have a mission/vision statement (who was involved in development)?
Do you have a formal procedure for business planning (who is involved; how often does it take place;
what is the time horizon)?

Organisational Climate in the Company
How would you describe the organisational climate (communication systems, employee involvement,
trust)?

Product Development Process
What changes occurred in the product development process since the initiation of TOP?
What changes are planned in the product development process within the next one to two years?
How are new product development projects initiated (initiation, approval, is it formalised)?
How are the functional departments represented in the development process (attention to Production,
Marketing, HR)?
Are project teams assigned to product development projects (selection procedures, team structure)?
What role does the of Product Manager play in the product development process (authority,
responsibilities, accountabilities - is it formalised anywhere)?
What role does the Product Engineering Manager play in the product development process (authority,
responsibilities, accountabilities —is it formalised anywhere)?
How would you describe the relationship between functional managers and project managers
(position/influence of project manager in comparison to functional managers)?
What are die greatest weaknesses in MILSYS's product development process?
What are the greatest strengths in MILSYS's product development process?

Concurrent Engineering
Why did MILSYS's decide to implement CE? ...
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Appendix E:

List o f Interviewees from Formal Interviews Conducted in MIT .SYS

Senior Management Level
Technical Managing Director
Managing Director Business Administration
(R)

Director of Quality Assurance

(R)

Manufacturing Director
Engineering Director

Middle Management
(R)

Project Manager ( 1)
Project Manager (2) (Pilot Project)

(R)

Project Manager (3)

(R)

Business Administration Manager o f the Engineering Department

(R)

Systems Engineering Manager

(R)

Human Resource Manager
Manager Strategy and Planning
Manager Configuration Management

Staff Level
(R)

Tearn Member ( 1), from Engineering

(R)

Team Member (2), Contractor

(R)

Team Member (3), from Manufacturing

(R)

Team Member (4), from Quality Assurance

(R)

Team Member (5), from Engineering
Team Member (6), from Marketing

(R)

Staff (1), from HR, Recruitment and Administration
Staff (2), from HR, Recruitment and Training
Staff (3), from Manufacturing, Industrial Engineering
Staff (4), from Engineering, Hardware Engineering
Staff (5), from Engineering, Systems Engineering (Pilot Project)
Staff (6), from Engineering, Systems Engineering
Staff (7), from Material Planning and Control, Order Planning (Pilot
Project)

(R) - Repeat Interview

309

Appendix F :

Reviewed Documents in M ain Case Study

Documents Produced by the CE Project Team
Code
Name of Document
Al
Initial CE Implementation Plan
A2
Project and Design Management Focus Group Results From Problem
Analysis
A3
CE Newsletter (3-to 6-monthly)
A4
A5
A6
A7
A8
AIO
A ll
A12
A13
A14
A15
A17
A18
A19
A20
A21

from
2/96

Collaboration Contract Between UOW and MELSYS
CE Cost-Benefit Study

2/96
3/96
CE - Findings of the "as-is" Study
4/96
CE Case Study (analysis of successful development project in MFLSYS) 6/1996
Strategic Framework for CE
6/96
Efficient Communication and Information Sharing: Intranet Proposal
7/96
Rewritten Design and Development Process Manuals and Procedures
7/9610/96
Discussion Paper: Design and Development Performance Metrics System 8/96
Systems Engineering Handbook
10/96
Test/Design for Manufacturability Handbook
10/96
Draft: Team Building Training
7/96
Training Material for Various CE Courses
9-11/96
Assessment Results of the Various Training Courses
10-12/96
CE Best Practice Brochure
7/96
CE Status Reports (half-yearly)
1996/97
Memos and Minutes from CE Project Team

A22

Memos and Minutes from Other Related Meetings (irregular)

A23
A24

CE Implementation Plan (for the period March - September 1997)
Design and Development Process Manual (2nd Draft)

A25

Proposal: Project Management and Product Life-Cycle Process
Handbook

A26

Draft: Project Management and Product Life-Cycle Process Handbook
Updated CE Implementation Concept

A27

Issued by
11/95
2/96

from
9/96
up to
10/97
3/97
5/97
7/97
8/97
11/97

Documents Produced by the Pilot Project or the CE Project Team for the Pilot
Project
B1

Minutes from Pilot Project Meetings (irregular)

B2
B3
B4

Teamwork Risk Management Tool for Pilot Project
Recommended Team Organisation for the Pilot Project
Pilot Project and CE Progress Reports (monthly)

11/96 5/97
11/96
12/96
12/96 7/97
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B5

Pilot Project Status Reports (half-yearly)

up to
8/97

O ther Company (and related) Documents with Relevance for Investigation
Cl
C2
C3
C4
C5
C6
Cl
C8
C9
CIO
C ll
C12
C13
C14
C15
C16
C17

Vision-Mission Statement
Draft: Engineering Career Structure and Competency Standards
Unpublished Article (The Institution of Electrical Engineers)
Project Management Manual
(and Process Definitions)
Company Structures
Computer-Based Engineering Tools - Interim Policy
AQA Proposal
AQA - Guided Self Assessment Report, Results (Summary)
Corporate Quality Booklet
Quality Improvement Program
Results (Summary): Self-Assessment: Project Management Competence
Internal Memos (e.g. about A-Team/Current Structure)
Company Newsletters
Corporation Newsletters

1992
1994
1994
2/95
(2/96)
1995,
1996
10/95
12/95
10/96
10/96
11/96
12/96
irregular
quarterly

2monthly
Course Material for "Train the Trainer" for the CE Implementation Team 8/96
Training Need Analysis Forms
1996
Results (Summary): Employee Satisfaction Survey, carried out by
1995
external consultants
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A ppendix G:

E xcerpt from the Case Study Protocol

Contents
Introduction
-

Overview

-

Purpose of Study

-

Potential Significance

-

Framework and General Research Question

-

Limitations

Review o f Related Literature
-

List o f Relevant Literature Product Innovation and CE

-

List o f Relevant Literature HRM

-

List of Relevant Literature on Cross-Functional Teams

Design and Methodology
-

Overall Approach

-

Researcher's Role

-

Selection Criteria for Case Study Company

-

Operational Procedures for Data Collection
- Selection Criteria for Key Interview Partners
- Interview Guideline
- Key Company Documents

-

Managing and Recording Data

-

Data Analysis Strategies

-

Issues of Confidentiality

-

Timeframe

-

Introduction Paper (presented to the company)
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Appendix H:

Code List For Main Case Study

Code N um ber/C ode
I

Environmental Context

1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4

Market Conditions/T rends
Competitors
Customers
Suppliers/Contractors

II

Company Profile/ Organisational Context

1

Company History/Ownership, Legal Status

2
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.3.1
2.3.1.1 -5
2.3.2
2.3.2.1-7

Company Strategy
Business Strategy
Vision/Mission
Strategy Change
TOP
Individual Projects (excl. CE)
Change Project and Initiatives Complementing TOP
Individual Projects and Initiatives

3
3.1
3.2
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.3
3.2.4
3.3

Structure
Employees
Hierarchy - Functional Organisation
Functional Managers
Proj ect Managers
HR Manager
CEO
Executive Committee

4
4.1
4.2
4.3

Organisational Culture
Communication
Trust
Employee Involvement

5
5.1
5.2

Parent Company
Background Parent Company
Relationship to Parent Company

6
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
6.5
6.6

Product Development Process
Stages
Proj ect Structure/Proj ect Tearns
Project Management
Strengths/Weaknesses
Functional Integration
Project Initiation
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7.5.3
7.6

Concurrent Engineering
CE TOP Team
Team Members
Team Leader
CE Concept
Tools/Technological Enablers
Organisational Enablers
Cross-Functional Arrangements
HRM Considerations
Understanding of CE
Course of CE Implementation
Co-operation and Communication
Team-Internal Co-operation and Communication
Co-operation and Communication with Other Change/TOP Projects and
Initiatives
Co-operation and Communication with Other Company Representatives
Pilot Project

8
8.1
8.1.1
8.1.2
8.2
8.3

Approach to HRM
HR Department
Structure/Composition
Involvement in Organisational Change, CE
HR Strategy, Policies, Practices
Historical Developments

9
9.1
9.1.1-6
9.2
9.3

Open Code
Individual Perceptions
Vision and Political Skills of Key Players
Functional Background
Relationships and Behaviour Pattern

7
7.1
7.1.1
7.1.2
7.2
7.2.1
7.2.2
7.2.2.1
1222
7.3
7.4
7.5
7.5.1
7.5.2
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Appendix I: Overview of Team Reward Systems

Team
R ew ard
System

Gain-/
(Profit-)
Sharing

Knowledge
-or SkillBased Pay

One Time
Bonus Plan

D escription

Pros

C ons

E xam ples/
L iterature

Relatively new term, but includes
several older reward programs
like Scanlon Plan, Rucker Plan,
Improshare.
Key concept: rewards are directly
related to performance
Goal: share gains of efforts of
employees with those same
employees.
Performance (usually labor costs)
improvements in productivity
measured on the basis of
financial formulas;
Gains in form of cash payments
or non-cash awards

Rewards are
distributed to
employees on the
basis of performance
of their team.
Rewards are directly
related to
performance, thus
encourage
improvement of
input/output
productivity
relationship

Plans differ in
definition of
unit defined as
a team (small
group to entire
organisation)
Line -of-sight
connection
might not be
given

Forms of
profit-sharing
used by 30%
of U.S. firms
(Feldman)
Parker, 1994;
Belcher,
1991;
Cleland et
al., 1995;
Feldman,
1996

Team members encouraged to
acquire new skills and in return
get pay increments

Rewards behavior of
xft members on
basis of number and
depth of skills
mastered
Direct line -of-sight
connection

Temporary team is offered a team
bonus for achieving certain
objectives (e.g. ahead of
schedule, under-budgetdelivery,...)

Does not
require team
results before
receiving
reward.
Focused
mainly on
horizontal skill
building.
Not suitable
for all forms of
xfts

Johnsonville
Foods,
Wisconsin;
Shenandoah
Life
Insureance
Virginia;
applied
mostly in
production
and some
front-line
service
functions
Parker, 1994;
Cleland et
al., 1995;
Honeywell's
Space
systems
group.
General
Electric
Parker, 1994

Perfor
mance
Improve
ment
Program
(PIP)

Provides rewards for actual
improvement in performance.
Objectives for improvement (e.g.
productivity, quality, safety,
absenteeism) and baseline figures
for a previous period are
established and rewards are given
for exceeding the baseline.
Offer non-cash awards in form of
merchandise.

Focus on efforts of
individual teams.
Can be run
temporaiy (less than
two years) or on an
ongoing basis with
adjustment in plan
design to reflect
changing business
objectives.

Parker, 1994
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coni.
Team
R ew ard
System

Group
Bonus- or
Team
Incentive
Scheme

EmployeeBased
Recog
nition
Program

D escription

Pros

Can differ in format, but are
thought to directly pay for
specific results;
Attempt to bring awards down to
the team level in order to
improve the line of sight between
team performance and payoff,
which is seen as motivator for
XFT.

Tailored to needs of
company.
Measures team
performance but
allows recognition
of individual efforts.

Not tied to specific objective rewards team for unplanned and
extraordinary effort,
Dominant form:
plaque/certificate alone or in
combination with other forms
often with dinner/meal

Gives chance to
reward team and
individual members
the way that
motivates them
most.

C ons

E xam p les/
L iterature

white collar
areas in
biotechnolog
y company,
Banks,
Parker, 1994;
Elliott, 1991;
Murray,
1991;
Eisman,
1990;
Feldman,
1996;
Armstrong
and Murlis,
1995
Bell
communicati
ons
Research,
New Jersey;
Boing 777
project
Parker, 1994,
p. 127;
Sabbath,
1996

Informal
Team
Recog
nition

Based on recognition of team and
individual efforts (e.g. in
company newspaper or in a
meeting).

Suitable for firms
that can not establish
a reward program
for xfts.
Low cost basis

Parker, 1994,
p. 129
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Appendix J:

Roles and Responsibilities in the Proposed Team Structure for CE
Projects

(Sources: Internal Documents A l 1, A 17)

The Project Management Group (PMG)
The Project Management Group is charged with supporting the Project Manager and the Business
Administration Manager fulfil their role of ensuring the timely and profitable performance of the
project. They are primarily concerned with: cost and schedule control and reporting, quality assurance,
and administrative support to the project.
Team
Member

Project
Manager
(PM)

Tasks and
Responsibilities

Champion (forms, leads,
inspires teams and
protects them from
outside interference).

Role

- Leader of the
overall project
- Leader of the
PMT

Member-ship
Over Time

Fullor
PartTime

Nominated
or Selected
by

concept
design (cd)
to end

F

Project
Manage
ment

cd to end

F

BA Director

Co-ordinate activities of
teams with supplier,
customer and the rest of
SPES
Business
Admini
stration
Manager
(BAM)
Scheduler

Responsible for
producing monthly
schedule status reports

cd to end

F

Project
Manage
ment

Accoun
tant

Manage project budget

cd to end

F

Finance
Director

Quality
Assurance
Manager

Ensuring that all project
practices and products
conform with SPES QA
standards

cd to end

F

QA Director

Admini
stration
Assistant

Responsible for proper
issue and receipt of
external correspondence
+ their filing

cd to end

F

Project
Manage
ment
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The Integrated Development Team (IDT)
The Integrated Development Team is responsible for developing the technical design of one or more
Configuration Items (Cl) that are subsidiary to the overall system or product.
They are primarily concerned with:
- requirements analysis and design of the CI(s)
- detailed design and prototyping of the CI(s), and
- integration and testing of the CI(s).

Team
Member

Tasks and
Responsibilities

Role

Membership
Over Time

Fullor
Parttime

concept design
(cd) to end

F

Hardware
Engineers

cd to end

F

HW Manager in cons.
with PEM and Eng.
Director

Software

cd to end

F

SW Manager in cons.
with PEM and Eng.
Director

Site
Designers

cd to end

F

HW Manager in cons.
with PEM and Eng.
Director

Key
Component
Supplier

cd to end

F

Principal
Technical
Specialist

Leader of
the IDT

Engineers

Nominated or Selected by
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The Project Integration Team (PIT)
Projects with more than one Integrated Development Team (DDT) w ill have a Project Integration
Team. The Project Integration Team is responsible for completing die system level design and
specification, and for ensuring that the work done by the IDTs is in harmony with the system design
and specification.
They are primarily concerned with: requirements analysis and design o f the system, integration and
testing o f the system, and verifying the requirements analysis and design efforts o f the IDTs.

Team
Member

Tasks and Responsibilities

Project
Engineering
Manager

Oversees, directs, and
manages the design and
development activities o f the
PIT, IDTs, SET and DPT
the way: rigorous
decomposition and
development is ensured and
design and downstream
planning take place in
parallel, especially in the
early phases

(PEM)

Role

Leader
o f the
PIT

Membership
Over
Time

concept
design
(cd) to
end

Fullor
Part
Time

F

Nominated or
Selected by

Eng. Director in
consultation with
Systems Eng.
Mgr., PM, and
Product Engineer

Systems
Engineers

F

PEM + Systems
Eng. Mgr.

(Systems)
Test
Engineers

F

Test Eng. Mgr.

Configu
ration
Manager

F

Config. Mgr.

(Customer
Represen
tative)
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The Downstream Planning Team (DPT)
The Downstream Planning Team is responsible for developing downstream processes whilst the
Integrated Developm ent Team(s) (IDT) develop the technical design. The DPT also reviews proposed
changes to the formal configuration baseline.

Team
Member

Tasks and Responsibilities

Project
Enginee-ring
Manager

Oversees, directs, and manages the
design and development activities
o f the PIT, IDTs, SET and DPT the
way: rigorous decomposition and
development is ensured and design
and downstream planning take
place in parallel, especially in the
early phases.

(PEM)

Role

Leader
o f the
DPT

Member
ship Over
Time

concept
design
(cd) to
end

Fullor
Partt
ime

F

Project ILS
Manager

P/F

Production
Represen
tative

P/F

MP&C
Represen
tative
Installation
and
Commis
sioning
Manager
Configu
ration
Controller
(Customer
Representati
ve)

P/F

Nominated
or Selected
by

Eng.Directo
r in cons,
with
Systems
Eng. Mgr.,
PM, and
Product
Engineer
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The Speciality Engineering Team (SET)
The Speciality Engineering Team is responsible for supporting the Integrated Development Team(s)
(IDT) in creating designs that are manufacturable, supportable and procurable.

Team
Member

Tasks and Responsibilities

Project
Engineering
Manager

Oversees, directs, and manages
the design and development
activities o f the PIT, IDTs, SET
and DPT the way: rigorous
decomposition and development
is ensured and design and
downstream planning take place
in parallel, especially in the early
phases

(PEM)

Role

Leader
o f the
SET

Member
ship
Over
Time

concept
design
(cd) to
end

Fullor
Part
Time

F

Logistics
Engineer

P/F

Industrial
Engineer

P/F

MP&C
Represen
tative

P/F

Represen
tative from
Test Eng.

P/F

(Customer
Represen
tative)

P/F

Nominated or
Selected by

Eng.Director in
consensus with
Systems Eng.
Mgr., PM, and
Product
Engineer

321

Appendix K: Excerpt from Best Practice Brochure Developed by the CE Project
Team

The new process represents a combination of our traditional strengths and current
international best practices.
The changes address four areas:

Better Teamwork
We need to get the input from all relevant departments early in the project life cycle. We
will therefore form larger Project Teams, with representatives from all relevant departments,
in the pre-tender stage. Even if someone is not assigned full time to a team, they will be
identified by name, given a clear role and responsibility, and included in regular, structured
team meetings.
We need to quickly build a sense of teamwork and cooperation in Project Teams. Each
project will therefore conduct a team building workshop to set agreed standards for
behaviour and obligation in the team.
We need to explicitly state the goals of the team, and ensure the goals address he
requirements of all departments. Therefore, at the start of each phase of the project, the
Project Team will write out what goals the team will achieve by the end of he phase in the
Project Charter.

Better Techniques
We need techniques that allow us to design and develop a product that is "right the first
time". Therefore, each project will apply rigorous requirements analysis and system design
to ensure we understand the needs of the customer better than our competition, and then
design a solution that meets those needs.
We need to check the Project Team is designing a product that is easy to manufacture, test,
procure, support and deploy, as well as meeting customer specifications. Therefore,
appropriate Functional Directors will review the progress of Project Teams at the end of
each phase. This will ensure a product design that satisfies all its "customers".
We need to design products that are easy to manufacture and test. Therefore, Project Teams
will apply rigorous Design for Manufacture and Design for Test techniques. This will avoid
delays in the production and support phases.
We need to maintain better quantitative data on how long we take to do design and
development tasks. Therefore, Project Teams and functional departments will both maintain
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standard metrics on important tasks. This will both help to identify problems in a project,
and improve die accuracy of estimates, reducing overruns and increasing profitability.
We need to ensure our project estimates are comprehensive and timely. Therefore, Project
Teams will apply a generic list of sub-tasks (Work Breakdown Structure) to support
accurate estimating and comprehensive project planning.
Manufacturing needs to trial the production for a product before it can enter volume
production. Therefore, Project Teams will work with Operations to produce functional
prototypes using normal production methods. This will reduce the time spent in setting up
the production line for a new design, and therefore shorten the overall development cycle.

Better Tools
We need tools that allow us to analyse the customer’s requirements, and confirm that they
are satisfied by our design. Therefore, tools such as the systems engineering database CORE
will be widely available throughout the company to support requirements analysis and
systems design....
We need a tool that allows designers to design hardware that is quick and easy to
manufacture. Therefore, the Design for Manufacturing software from Boothroyd &
Dewhurst will be evaluated.

Better Product Planning
All departments must coordinate their planning so the company can quickly and efficiently
concentrate its resources on important projects. Therefore, Sales and Marketing will be
inviting representatives from many functions to take part in product planning and help to
determine the company’s marketing and development strategy. This will lead to greater
coordination and a clearer sense of common purpose throughout the company, allowing us
to concentrate our efforts and complete important projects very quickly.

